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ABSTRACT
THEORIZING AGAINST POLITICS:
RETHINKING MAX WEBER AND THE PURPOSE OF POLITICAL THEORY
SEPTEMBER 1999
JOHN A. GOULD ING
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES
M • A
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
DIRECTED BY: PROFESSOR NICHOLAS XENOS
Political theorists have long noted the "liberal"
dimensions of Max Weber's theory of politics. In doing so
I believe they overlook the anti-political overtures in hi
push for national glory, his mechanical design of
parliamentarism, and his desperate faith in plebiscitarian
leaders- -all of which constrain the prospect of human
struggle underlying his idea of politics. Political
theorists who address Weber's works on science and
methodology have viewed them as "correlates" of his
theoretical project of politics. ! contend that they too
ignore the degree to which Weber's methodological works
reveal an immanent critique of his own theory of politics in
particular and the craft of political theorizing in general.
In this dissertation I confirm the anti-political
overtures that underlie Max Weber's theory of politics. I
challenge his theory of liberal democracy insofar as he
anchors it to his public and quite problematic advocacy of
German national glory. But more important, I charge that
his scientific and methodological works provide greater
insight into the elements that comprise a theory of politics
in his thinking. I believe they do so in that Weber's
theory of scientific scholarship posits the aim of ethical
clarity, the divide between facts and values, and the
conditional quality of all human values. I thus turn Weber
the ethical scholar against Weber the active citizen.
With this critique, I draw several conclusions about
the contemporary value of Max Weber's political thinking.
In clarifying the differences between his concepts of
political judgment (Augenmass
)
and scholarly judgment
(Urteil)
,
I confirm that where the former succumbs to the
dictates of one conviction, the latter ultimately contests
all convictions. Based on this contrast, I also affirm how
Weber's idea of scholarship invites more fruitful prospects
of political struggle, prospects that extend outside the
"life-sphere" of the liberal institutions of politics.
viii
Finally, from this alternative location of politics, I
suggest that Weber's idea of an ethic of responsibility
( Verantwortungsethik
)
includes the scholar as much as the
politician, especially a scholar who contests the ultimate
ends of the politician, other scholars, and one's own self
IX
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INTRODUCTION
The bulk of the scholarly literature on Max Weber's
political thinking tends to be broad in its volume yet quite
narrow m its theoretical focus. For instance, the works of
Wolfgang Mommsen, David Beetham and Robert Eden-
-among many
others-
-demonstrate a thorough mastery of Weber's
theoretical project of politics. In each case, however, his
theory of politics becomes a mere validation of the
political project of modern liberalism. Though he renders
Weber's "political goals ... subordinate to the [German]
nation's requirements," Mommsen still relates his thinking
to a "defense of liberalism, " one "endowed with an entirely
aggressive rather than a resigned tone ." 1 David Beetham
employs another approach to Weber's liberal project, such
that he reveals a clash between Weber's "commitment to
German cultural values" and both "his emphasis on leadership
in society and his concern for liberty in an increasingly
bureaucratised age ." 2 Even Robert Eden, who rejects the
Straussian view of Weber as a perpetrator of nihilism,
contends that Weber' s theory of politics represents a
"defense of liberal democratic institutions ... against
Nietzsche's nihilistic politics ." 3 Given these
interpretations, it is apparent that they view his political
theory primarily from the standpoint of its emancipatory
gesture either to revitalize the German nation, to mend
1
Germany's class divisions, or to sate the starved moral
space of European culture
.
I Wish to depart from these "liberal" nationalist
interpretations insofar as they fail to acknowledge the
deeply flawed design of Weber's theory of politics. That
flaw appears m the very liberal aims that underlie his
political thinking: parliamentarism, universal suffrage, and
individual autonomy. For such aims, I believe, tend to
impede rather than invite the human struggles that inform
and undergird Weber's idea of politics. Indeed, I contend
that a more interesting and fruitful idea of politics
derives from Weber's writings on methodology and science.
Though much of the scholarly literature explores the
intricate bond between science and politics in Weber's
theoretical corpus, such works approach it from a somewhat
limited perspective. It is Peter Breiner's contention, for
instance, that Max Weber's social scientific works support
"his objective stance to argue for the unfeasibility of
political projects he disagrees with substantively ." 4
Dsvid Owen also seeks to reveal what he calls an "implicit
politics," a "political correlate," in Weber's notion of a
cultural science. In fact, Owen perceives his idea of
science "in terms of its capacity for 'breeding' autonomous
individuals" who can partake in "a political activity which
is manifest through the specification of the conditions of
autonomy in the different life-spheres ." 5 There is also H.
2
H. Bruun, who argues "that the concepts of conflict and
power, which indisputably constitute the central core of
Weber's conception of the essence of politics, maybe
contained within the frame of reference defined by his
various methodological reflections ." 6
Thus each thinker underscores the bond between science
and politics. However, where they tend to view Weber's
theory of science as an essential corollary of his politics,
I view it as both a immanent critique of his political
theory in particular and a provocative rejoinder to liberal
politics in general. In this dissertation I thus confirm
the anti-political overtures that underlie Max Weber's
theory of politics. I challenge his theory of liberal
democracy insofar as he anchors it to his public and quite
problematic advocacy of German national glory. But more
important, I charge that his scientific and methodological
works provide greater insight into the elements that
comprise a theory of politics in his thinking. I believe
they do so in that Weber's theory of scientific scholarship
posits the aim of ethical clarity, the divide between facts
and values, and the conditional quality of all human values.
In short, I turn Weber the ethical scholar against Weber the
active citizen, concluding that his theory of science offers
something his theory of politics does not: a more keen
perception into the idea of democracy.
3
I find myself siding with a view of Weber which ceases
to corner him between either a blind defense of a particular
moral conviction or a scholarly indifference to all
convictions. Rather than further establish Weber's
intricate moral aims, however, I wish to explore how such
ambitions compel us to rethink his theoretical project of
politics. Indeed, I approach Weber's political thinking
from the standpoint of his nationalist convictions, which, I
believe, tend to constrain the possibilities of political
struggle and, thus, undercut the very goal of German
national glory. Still, this paradox of national politics is
evident in more than just Weber's political thinking. it
also appears in relation to his concept of science or
scholarship {Wissenschaf t)
,
such that one of the moral aims
of science is establishing "clarity" between human values,
technical means, and any corresponding consequences. Thus a
problem is apparent in Weber's thinking, a problem that
issues from a clash of multiple moral ambitions. A
significant part of this problem manifests itself in an
ethical paradox of sorts, one that exposes the degree to
which Weber the theorist of national politics deviates from
Weber the professional scholar. I therefore offer an
interpretation of Max Weber's political thinking that moves
beyond explorations of the moral diversity and ethical
ambiguity in his work. I offer an view whereby the ethical
limits of his project confirm not simply the problem of
4
theorizing politics, but the critical and instructive value
Of theorizing against a flawed notion of politics.
With regard to the concepts of "politics" and
"political," I, much like Weber, understand them to signify
the possibility of a human struggle, one premised on a
multitude of ultimate convictions. Yet unlike Weber, who
utilizes the struggle of politics as a means to advance the
singular end of German national power, I also understand
politics as an end itself: a sporadic, unanticipated, and
wholly contingent contestation of all ultimate ends-
-even
the end of politics itself. Thus, when I use the concept of
"politics," I am referring to those historical and
theoretical instances in which an open-ended public
disagreement over ends and means flourishes among equally
impassioned persons. When I use the concept of
"political," moreover, I am referring to those individual,
social, or public circumstances which are informed by at
least the prospect of the aforementioned human struggles.
Accordingly, even parliamentary democracy becomes
contestable on the basis of its limited and finite location,
its narrow and specialized criteria for admission, and its
closed and instrumental advance of, say, the ends of law and
order, democratic republicanism, or liberal individualism.
As Weber himself notes, parliamentary democracy is
contestable insofar as it inevitably mandates "that things
must be emptied and made into matters-of -fact
5
(Versachl 1 chung ) , and the following must undergo spiritual
proletarianization, in order to achieve 'discipline'."? m
short, parliamentary democracy is a political condition
which, ironically, threatens the prospect of politics with
constraints on both the number and value of ultimate ends.
Max Weber's desire to advance the Wilhelmine German
nation strongly influences his theory of modern politics.
This leverage is plain in his early essays, in which the aim
of his theoretical project was "not to make everybody happy
but the social unification of the nation." 8 it persists
after his emotional "breakdown" and up to the outbreak of
the First World War, when Weber's explorations of the
Protestant Ethic" presaged a "modern man" who is "unable to
give religious ideas a significance for culture and national
character which they deserve." 9 From the First World War
until his death in 1920, moreover, the impact of Weber's
nationalism on his theory of politics manifests itself in a
variety of newspaper articles and public lectures. These
works concern his belief that "the question of the internal
reconstruction of Germany" will determine "whether the
nation feels ready to bear the responsibility which a nation
of seventy million people has towards its descendants." 10
Clearly, then, though Weber's theory of politics touches on
numerous topics, it consistently mirrors his moral ambition
to advance the power of the Wilhelmine German nation.
6
What is novel about the nationalist underpinnings of
Weber's political thought is not so much that they bare
troublesome ties to the anti-democratic and anti-liberal
sentiments of German National Socialism
.
11 Nor that they
illuminate tensions in his particular brand of "aggressive
liberalism, « tensions which appear to privilege democratic
institutions and charismatic politicians at the expense of a
democratic citizenry
.
12
what is novel is that the bond
between Weber's political thought and his nationalist
convictions indicates a significant problem involving the
marriage of morality and politics in the modern world
.
13
The union of morality and politics is a theme that
pervades the entire range of Max Weber's writings. It
begins when he declares in his 1895 "Freiburg Inaugural
Address" that an "ultimate subjective core" underlies all
moral convictions in modern politics, a core which ensures
that " [e] ven our highest, our ultimate ideals in this life
change and pass away." 14 It expands in the first two
decades of the 20th century, notably in his essays in The
Methodology
—of the Social Sciences
. There he argues that a
person's "value- judgements" are not so much conceived by
modern science as they are constructed over the course "of
an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between 'God'
and the 'Devil'" which is endemic to modern science. 15
Finally, this union, which is predicated on the "ethical
irrationality" of the modern world and the centrality of
7
conflict m social life, saturates Weber's famed 1919
lecture on "The Profession and Vocation of Politics." in
that lecture he submits "that the achievement of 'good' ends
IS in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally
suspect or at least morally dangerous means." 16 Given
these claims, it seems as though Weber is at least equally
interested in the mix of morality and politics as he is in
devising a theory of politics that advances the aim of
German national power.
In the chapters which follow, I argue that Weber's
interest in morality and politics places him in a
significant predicament. it does so, not because he
straddles a fine line between the morally "empty" creed of
"Machtpolitik" 1 and Kant's dictum that "[t]he God of
morality does not yield to Jupiter, the custodian of
violence." Rather, in light of Weber's axiom that
morality and politics reflect "a tension that may erupt at
any moment into a irresolvable conflict," 19 it is a
predicament that makes him prone to the "ethical paradoxes"
that appear in his own theory of politics. By an ethical
paradox, he means the situation in which a person, who seeks
"to save his own soul and the souls of others," discredits
his own moral end "with the diabolical powers that lurk in
all violence." 20 These paradoxes, which evoke
Machiavelli
' s tale of the contingencies of "fortune,"
confront the purpose of politics and the constancy of
8
morality. They challenge those persons who, like Weber with
nationalist ambitions, seek to combine both while
striving for power" in the modern world.
I maintain further that Weber's interest in morality
and politics reveals at least two types of "life-conduct"
( Lebens fiihrung) that are capable of withstanding the force
of these paradoxes. The basis of this claim derives from
his lectures on "The Profession and Vocation of Politics"
and "Science as a Vocation." in the former lecture, he
points to a conduct of politics indicative of a person's
"passionate commitment to a 'cause' ( Sache )" and a "sense of
responsibility" and "judgement." These two latter traits,
which combine to subdue the "vain" tendencies of one's
"soul," direct a person's life-conduct "entirely at the
service of the 'cause'" despite the modern world's ethical
incoherence
.
21 In the other lecture, Weber notes that a
life-conduct of science requires self-sacrifice, insofar as
"strict specialization" and " self
-clarification" help a
person "become fully conscious ... that he has achieved
something that will endure" the shifts of an irrational
cosmos."" But unlike the conduct of politics, which
requires total submission to a moral conviction, the conduct
of science is "subjected" to the historical fate of
"progress," which for Weber means the "common goal" of
dispelling and surpassing the absolute design of
knowledge
.
23 Hence the distinction between these two types
9
Of life-conduct denote a tension in Weber's political
thinking. it constitutes a tension in that the politician
restricts the scope of politics by obeying one particular
moral conviction and the scholar encourages politics by
questioning all-
-even one's own-
-moral convictions.
These two types of conduct thus signify the extent to
which Weber's theory of science, more than his theory of
politics, maintains the mix of morality and politics. In
his theory of politics, the politician appears to weather an
ethical paradox by fashioning both politics and oneself into
an instrument, "a human 'apparatus,'" that advances a moral
conviction. This transformation, however, cannot eliminate
the ethical paradoxes stemming from the union of morality
and politics. Indeed, it limits politics to a set of
parliamentary" institutions and a code of "responsible"
conduct, whereby a person's conviction accrues power enough
to influence the violence of the state, the moral direction
of politics and, thus, the meaning of an ethical paradox.
In Weber's theory of science, which mirrors the
conflicts surrounding his theorizing of the political, the
scholar appears to confront an ethical paradox, too. He
does so, not by obeying a conviction at the cost of politics
and oneself, but by "clarifying" the differences between
political means and moral convictions. The impact of this
conduct surfaces neither in the institutional design of
parliamentary politics nor in the violent enterprise of the
10
bureaucratic state. Instead it appears in the shape of a
scholar who "confronts" and "forces" politicians and
citizens alike to account for the ethir^i t
,
uu cn cal tensions between
politics and their moral convictions. Hence, I am not
turning Weber's political thinking on its head, so to speak,
defending the claim that science is more political than
politics itself. I am simply turning his political thinking
against itself, contending that Weber's idea of science both
augments his understanding of modern politics and questions
the way in which he theorizes it.
In the dissertation I discuss, examine, and confirm the
different dimensions of this argument over the course of
five chapters. Each chapter not only discloses the
problematic tie between morality and politics in Weber's
P°litical thinking, but specifies its impact on the
politician or political theorist who grapples with both. As
I will point out below, these themes issue from Weber's
theoretical and historical depictions of politics, nation,
ethics, judgment, and vocation in the modern world.
The dissertation's first chapter explores Max Weber's
idea of politics, an idea he posited on the assumption that
human struggle ( Kampf
)
is central to all forms of social
life. In his early work on the shifts from "in kind" to
"money-wage" labor in the rural regions of East Elbia, Weber
theorized a politics indicative of "the hard struggle of man
with man" for the creation of "elbow-room in this earthly
11
life." 4 Later, while outlining the epistemology of the
Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 1904,
Weber noted again "that the highest ideals," political or
otherwise, "are always formed only in the struggle with
other ideals ." 25 By the time the First World War was
ravaging both the modern nation-state and the liberal
individual, Weber easily pledged his support to "the given
palaestra for the modern politician," which took shape in
"parliamentary conflict and the fight for the party in the
country ." 26 Over the course of his varied works,
therefore, works which explored the meaning of rural labor,
scientific objectivity, and parliamentary democracy, Weber's
idea of politics presupposed human struggle as the
groundwork for power in the modern world.
By assuming that "all politics is essentially
struggle," and that struggle ensures an "influence on the
distribution of power," Weber appears to theorize a politics
which acts as a means for the advance of a conviction.
However, this "mechanical" view of politics and the human
struggle upon which it is posited poses a problem in Weber's
political thinking. It is a problem, not simply because a
contingent struggle over differing convictions works at
cross -purposes with a calculated design toward the
preeminence of one conviction over all others. But it poses
a problem, too, insofar as Weber signifies the advance of
the German nation as that conviction which informs his
12
He thus ignores his own
depiction of modern politics
claims about the capricious qualities of political struggle,
an omission that illuminates a discrepancy in his political
thinking
. Likewise, he narrows the scope of convictions in
politics by virtue of their duty to the preservation, unity,
and expansion of the German nation, a restriction that
reveals a tension in his theory of politics. Each case is
evident in Weber's theoretical push to "clear away
mechanical obstacles" that weaken Germany's national power,
as well as m his political drive to contest those who,
because of their "traditional," "immature," or "vain"
convictions, impede the path to that power. I thus conclude
that Weber's idea of politics both discloses the limits of
his own political thinking and foreshadows the extent to
which his devotion to the idea of a German nation obstructs
the theoretical expanse of each particular idea.
Weber's attempt to direct theoretically and politically
the human struggle of politics indicates the moral relevance
of his commitment to the German nation. The second chapter
explores the multiple meanings of Weber's idea of nation,
focusing on its moral dimensions as they appear in both his
political and sociological works. Though the advance of
German national glory marks the chief moral aim of Weber's
theory of politics, and that such an aim undergoes various
transformations over the course of his intellectual career,
the idea of "greatness" or glory still remains an ill-
13
defined concept in his thinking. if there is a substance to
Weber's idea of nation, it reveals itself most clearly in
his desire both to distance himself from the archaic
national aspirations of his Wilhelmine contemporaries and
envision a more robust and liberal concept in the future.
In early contrast to Treitschke's Idealist view of a
German nation "shrouded in mystical obscurity," Weber
conceives of it as a "worldly organization." Indeed he
renders it-
a
"worldly organization," the "economic and
political
-power interests" of which confirm its "decisive, "
"final," and "enduring" disposition. 27 Between 1910 and
1914, Weber perceives this historically distinct yet morally
absolute idea of nation as such from a more analytical
perspective. As he notes in Economy and Society
, the
meaning of "'nation' is usually anchored in the
superiority ... the irreplaceability
,
of the culture of
values" central to a peculiar group. 28 By 1917, as the
value" of a war-torn German nation took center stage in his
thinking, Weber found it easy to assert "that the vital
interests of the [German] nation take precedence even over
democracy or parliamentary rule." 29 Rejecting the dying
"traditions" of Prussia, the "ethnic" focus of German
Machtpolitik, and the "immaturity" of the Supreme Command
and the Munich soviets, Weber's view of both the German
nation and the nation as such evokes a multitude of meanings
reaped in opposition to his own times. They also evoke his
14
desire to verify a moral conviction capable, not only of
unifying a nation as diverse as Wilhelmine Germany, but of
guiding it beyond the earthly tedium of the present toward
the prospect of national glory in some other-worldly future.
Weber's moral commitment to the nation, however, and
its expression as the aim of German politics, tends to
narrow rather than expand the diversity of convictions in
modern politics. By defining a single moral purpose in
terms of training national leaders, reforming national
institutions, and unifying a national citizenry, Weber's
idea of nation represents a barrier to the political
struggles which promote such goals. His idea of nation
hinders them insofar as it excludes alternative
interpretations, public deliberations, and broad
participation in the human struggle of politics. Rather
than spurring national power in the future, his idea of
nation thus reveals an "ethical paradox" issuing from a
tension between the moral absolute of nation and the earthly
character of political struggle. Again, this paradox
ensnares not only Weber's idea of nation, but his theory of
politics tgo. It confirms the degree to which the nation
constricts the prospects of human "struggle" in politics,
and how politics unmasks the moral "'good'" of the nation.
The appearance of an ethical paradox between Weber's
ideas of nation and politics requires an examination of his
theory of political ethics. I do so by tracing, not only
15
Weber's interpretation of political ethics, but the
theoretical and political problems allied with his inability
to meet the very ethical criteria he envisions for others.
This examination represents the focus of chapter three.
The issue of political ethics is one which Weber
approaches most thoroughly only late in his life. Yet, when
he does approach it, it is always within the framework of
the potential for political leadership in the German nation.
In his lecture on "The Profession and Vocation of Politics,"
Weber notes that "to ask what kind of human being one must
be... to seize the spokes of the wheel of history is to pose
an ethical question ." 30 From this claim about the ethical
ground of leadership, Weber surveys various notions of
political ethics in post-World War I German politics. He
contests the political ethics of the Allied Powers as
ignoble, those of Pacificism as self-defeating, and those of
Syndicalism, Spartacism, and Bolshevism as irrational
.
31
These ethics of conviction" ( Gesinnungsethik
)
,
which focus
exclusively on advancing the moral purity of an ideal, are
viable only insofar as they reject the use of "morally
dangerous means." Given that "the use of violence" is the
"decisive means of politics," Weber holds little hope for
the political sustenance of such ethics in the modern world.
Only an "ethic of responsibility" (Verantwortungsethik)
,
which focuses on the conviction as well as its paradoxical
bond with violence, allows a person "to look at the
16
realities of life with an unsparing gaze, to bear these
realities and be a match for them inwardly." 32
It is important to note, however, that the ethic of
responsibility entails more than a way of acting in the
realm of politics, more than just a qualification for
assuming political leadership in Wilhelmine Germany. I
believe that it also reveals a substantive sense of the
political in Weber's thinking. it does so inasmuch as the
ethic of responsibility, one, reflects the chief criterion
of success in modern politics; two, necessitates a struggle
with opposing persons and convictions; three, underscores
the tragic violation and thus limit of one's own actions;
and, four, derives from Weber's public critique of the other
ethical positions in German politics. But the chief problem
with his notion of political ethics is that, as a political
theorist, Weber fails to measure up to his own self-imposed
"responsibility before history ." That duty, he says in
1895, is to find for the nation of Wilhelmine Germany a way
"to become something different: the precursors of an even
greater epoch." 33 Spurning the anachronisms of the
Prussian aristocracy, the passivity of the bourgeoisie, and
the divisive interests of the working class, Weber believes
the "responsible" path toward national glory leads Germany
through a network of parliamentary institutions. That is
where he thinks a political fight over the values of the
nation occurs and fosters active political judgment
17
(Augenmass ) as much as collective
before his death in 1920, however
unity. Some four months
Weber was no longer
concerned with educating the German nation in the ways of
political judgment and participation. By then he was simply
searching for a leader who, as "a hearer of the principle of
the unity of the Reich, " could "create a dam" against a wave
of fragmented interests. 34
Thus the problem is not so much that Weber fails as a
German citizen to expand the possibilities of politics and
national power. What is troublesome is that Weber's idea of
an ethic of responsibility reveals how his political theory
seems to fall outside his own prescribed set of ethical
standards. His inability to recognize, first, that his
moral concern for the German nation limits the possibility
of politics and, second, that his mechanical design of
politics violates his ideal of the German nation, highlights
his failure "to be conscious of these ethical paradoxes and
of his responsibility for what may become of himself under
pressure from them." 35 For this reason, Weber's idea of
political ethics stresses the "ethical paradox" facing, not
just the political leader in his theory of politics, but
Weber himself as a theorist of politics in the late-19th and
early-20th centuries.
These ethical limits reflected in Weber's theory of
politics, and in the politics that surround his theorizing,
presuppose at least two notions of judgment. On the one
18
his idea of political judgment (Augenmass) points to a
person who estimates within an historical moment the
differences between his own moral conviction and such
external parameters as other people, things, and even one's
own vanity. On the other hand, though, his notion of
scholarly judgment (Urteil) mandates a more thorough,
sobering, and on-going account of such distinctions, such
that it anticipates a reconfiguration rather than a
protection of one's ultimate convictions. In short, where
political judgment succumbs to the dictates of conviction,
scholarly judgment inevitably unsettles them.
Like so many other themes in Max Weber's thinking, his
idea of scholarly judgment ( Urteil ) derives from a number of
battles with other influential schools of thought at the
time. If Weber was not positioning himself against
scientific positivists," who, like Gustav Schmoller,
believed judgment generated moral ends on the basis of
empirical evidence, then he was situating himself contrary
to "cultural subjectivists," who, like Stefan George and
even Georg Simmel, considered judgment as a way to infuse
personal values into historical events
.
36 In each case the
problem was not one chiefly concerned with judgment per se,
but one concerned with the degree of "distance" between a
person's judgment, his or her convictions, and the empirical
constraint? of history. Weber thus argued that the notion
of judgment expressed by positivists betrayed too much
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distance, whereas the notion of judgment expounded by
subjectivists betrayed too little. He himself viewed
" judgement " in terms of "the ability to maintain one's inner
composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in
other words distance from things and people ." 37
Max Weber's two notions of judgment, however, is not
without its theoretical and political flaws. In one
instance, he identifies political judgment (Augenmass
)
as a
person's capacity "to overcome... the mortal enemy of all
dedication to a cause, " which for Weber means the "all-too-
human enemy" of "common vanity ." 38 The problem is not so
much that Weber's notion of judgment perceives a person
potentially "detached" from worldly things, other persons,
and even oneself. Nor that it seeks to rid human excess and
folly from modern politics, nudging Weber close to
positivism. Rather, the problem with Weber's theory of
judgment derives from its technical purpose in "clearing
away" the obstacles which impede one's moral conviction,
thus subsuming human judgment beneath the auspices of that
specific conviction.
In another instance, Weber's notion of scholarly
judgment ( Urteil
)
reveals how he, as a political theorist,
fails to judge the shortcomings of his own theoretical
project, one that marches politics toward the goal of German
national power. It divulges a political problem, moreover,
in that a lack of "distance" blurs the line between his
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devotion to German nationalism and his commitment to
theorizing politics, thus pushing Weber close to
subjectivism. This is evident in his battles with the
positivists, subjectivists, and even the reign of
bureaucratic "officialdom," whereby Weber's own lack of
judgment "tempts him to strive for the glittering appearance
of power rather than its reality." 39 Given these problems,
which feature Weber's want of "responsibility" before the
"paradoxes" m his political thought, judgment unveils him
to be both a political actor fated to surrender himself to a
moral conviction and a political theorist destined to thrust
himself into the struggle of politics.
The "ethical paradoxes" in Weber's political thinking,
and the limits of judgment in his theorizing of the
political
,
demand an exploration of what Weber means by a
life-conduct ( Lebensfiihrung ) in the modern world. Unlike
his scholarly probes into world religions, Weber's political
writings show little interest in exploring a notion of
"life-conduct," political or otherwise. In fact, his early
political thinking only alludes to a vague idea of life-
conduct. At that time, in opposition to the conduct of the
German bourgeoisie, he states that his chief concern was
"not the well-being human beings will enjoy in the future
but what kind of people they will be." 40 Continuing his
rebuke of an "eudaemonistic outlook, " Weber attacks the
Prussian Junker in a 1904 speech on "Capitalism and Rural
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Society in Germany," arguing that such a "traditional"
conduct will only decline when faced with the "counter-
current" of "modern capitalistic competition."- Later, in
1917, he questions Germany's penchant for "unpolitical"
conduct, challenging the bureaucratic rule of officialdom on
the ground that it champions a person who "must remain
outside the struggle for power of his own." 42 it appears,
then, that' though Weber never explicitly theorizes a conduct
of politics, he derives from his quarrels with groups in
German politics an idea of conduct that mirrors a struggle
over the role of moral convictions in modern politics.
Yet my concern with Weber's idea of a political life-
conduct is not focused on its failure to achieve a prominent
place in his political thinking. The more significant
problem, I think, stems from there being at least two
different sources of a life-conduct of politics in his
theoretical projects of politics. On the one hand, his
theory of politics features a life-conduct predicated on,
not only a person's ability to endure human conflict while
advancing an ideal, but one's capacity to judge responsibly
the ethical distance between the two. On the other hand,
the politics that corresponds to his theoretical enterprise
displays a conduct based on the above criteria as well as on
those of a "scientific" nature. As Weber notes in "Science
as a Vocation, " the scientific criteria of a scholarship
22
tend to "chain
progress" in a
a person "to the course of
way that "raises new 'questions'" about all convictions
.
43
Max Weber's two notions of a political life-conduct
indicate an ironic situation in his political thinking.
They do so m that the politician in Weber's theory of
politics represents a person who circumscribes politics by
using it to advance a moral conviction, while the scholar
who surfaces in the politics of Weber's theorizing depicts a
person who commingles morality and politics, if only to
contest both with "the inescapable historical situation" of
modern science. Thus, the conduct mirrored in the politics
of Weber's scholarly theorizing tells us more about the hope
for politics than does the conduct he attempts to portray in
his theory of modern politics. It confirms that, though a
theory of politics may promise power at the cost of morality
and politics, the task of theorizing the political promises
the chance of mixing the two. This chance, however, comes
ut the cost of yielding lasting political power.
Morality and politics represent a vital yet destructive
iu. Max Weber s political thinking. This mix is vital,
not just because it points to a dimension in Weber's work
more theoretically expansive than his devotion to the ideal
of the German nation. It is vital because it marks both a
wellhead of differing perspectives in politics and a worldly
vehicle for the advance of moral convictions. It is
destructive, however, not only on account of the ethical
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paradoxes it imposes on the politician in Weber's theory of
politics, paradoxes which challenge a person's advance
toward and maintenance of political power. it is
destructive, too, on account of the ethical paradoxes it
imposes on. the political theorist. For they impel a person
outside the politician's domain to engage in a type of
politics marked by a conflict over the value of convictions,
the "intellectualization" of the world, and, thus, the moral
uncertainty of one's life and worldly enterprise.
If this mix of morality and politics tells us anything
about Weber's political thought, it is that he was after
something more than the advance of German nationalism. Even
more than gaining knowledge about morality and politics as
such, I believe he was after insight into the worldly
consequences of such a problematic bond. He wanted insight
into the consequences that challenge not only a person's
capacity to advance a moral conviction in politics, but
one's sense of responsibility, judgment, and life-conduct in
an ethically irrational world. These consequences, of
course, surfaced as paradoxes in both Weber's theory of
politics and the politics that correspond to his theorizing,
confirming how they impact the lives of politicians as much
as political theorists. While the impact is more direct and
perilous for the politician, mainly with regard to one's
office, prestige, and power, the political theorist bears
the weight of such paradoxes with distrust for the earthly
24
longevity of moral convictions. The theorist carries this
weight in contrast to the politician's unwavering quest for
power and for the scholarly sake of maintaining the mix of
morality and politics. As long as Weber's political thought
maintains this distinction between scholars and politicians,
I believe it reveals differing locations of politics beyond
those defined by his commitment to German national glory.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICS AND "THE HARD STRUGGLE OF MAN WITH MAN"
Introduction
In his well-known work "The Prince," Niccolo
Machiavelli conveys to Lorenzo de Medici, heir apparent to
the Florentine throne, that the goddess of Fortune (fortune)
rules only half of our actions. She allows the other half
to be ruled by our own volition. Those actions ruled by
fortuna, he says, require a prince to confront her
contingent furies with vigor, or otherwise face personal and
political ruin. Yet despite a person's calculated response,
Machiavelli believes fortuna "shows her force where there is
no organized strength to resist her." 1 This unruly force
takes on a different character in Machiavelli
' s other work
of political theory, "The Discourses." in that work, his
task is not to admonish princes who seek power in the face
of fortuna, but to defend republican government against the
contingencies brought on by fortuna. Machiavelli advises
republics to busy themselves with the creation of "good
laws," for "good laws bring good fortune, and from good
fortune results happy success in all enterprises." 2
Together both works signify a tension in Machiavelli
' s
thinking, one between a politics posited on historical
chance and another based on human design. It is a tension
that underlies his idea of politics in 16th century Italy. 3
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In a similar way, Max Weber's theory of politics
reflects a tension involving the meaning of politics in 19th
and 20th century Germany. From his infamous "Freiburg
Inaugural Address" of 1895 to his celebrated lecture on the
"The Profession and Vocation of Politics" in 1919, Weber
assails just about every significant interpretation of
politics. He contests the political aims of Utilitarian
liberalism, scientific Positivism, the Prussian Junkers, the
German bourgeoisie, the youthful pundits of cultural
"experience," the German Supreme Command, and the universal
proletariat. 4 if Weber achieves any influence in these
battles, it appears in something more than a brief conquest
over his opponents. It appears, too, in a theory of
politics indicative of struggle (Kampf ) , denoting a person
who is "at all times" subject to "multiple sets of values,
each of which ... seems to impose an obligation on him." 5
In contrast to this fortuitous element in the human
struggle of politics, Weber also theorizes a notion of
politics characterized by a collection of modern
institutional structures. 6 These structures, which he
derives from the philosophical wellhead of liberal
democracy,
-
guide human conflicts through the "machinery" of
labor unions, party organizations, universal suffrage,
parliament, and the administrative state. 7 They also
cultivate "professional" politicians who, by way of a
parliamentary struggle, simultaneously confront a myriad of
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moral convictions and induce their opponents to support one
specific conviction over all others. This duty to a
singular "cause" (Sache) corresponds to Weber's view of
parliamentary institutions, the purpose of which is to
provide "the elements of mass discipline" for a German
nation replete with contending interests. "By contrast," he
writes in a 1917 issue of Frankfurter Zeitung, "as far as
national politics are concerned, the unorganized mass, the
democracy of the street, is wholly irrational." 8 Weber's
theory of politics signals, therefore, the gravity of a
human struggle between ultimate convictions, but only
insofar as the contingencies associated with such struggles
conform to the discipline of modern institutions.
Though distinct, these two views of political struggle
nevertheless admit the importance of power in Weber's theory
of politics. "Anyone engaged in politics," he claims in his
"Vocation" lecture, "is striving for power, either power as
a means to attain other goals.
. .or power 'for its own
sake'" J Like Machiavelli, Weber sees politics as a
struggle for power, one involving a relatively autonomous
person hindered by historical chance and human institutions
designed to order life's irregularities. Contrary to
Machiavelli, though, who views this struggle as a means to
advance the interests of "one man alone" or the "original
principles" of republicanism, Weber renders it as a vehicle
for the defense, unity, and expansion of the German nation.
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Though he shares Machiavelli
'
s view of struggle and the rift
between its source and design, Weber still departs from his
predecessor when he subsumes persons, institutions, and
ideals beneath the aim of German national glory
.
10
By assuming that "all politics is essentially
struggle," and that such a struggle promises an "influence
on the distribution of power," Weber theorizes a politics
that acts as a means toward the advance of one conviction.
I argue in this chapter, however, that this "mechanical-
notion of politics and the human struggle upon which it is
posited represents a problem in Weber's political thinking.
It is a problem to the extent that a contingent struggle
over convictions works at cross-purposes with a calculated
political plan that imposes one conviction upon all others,
notably the advance of German national power. Thus he
overlooks his own claims about the capricious qualities of
the human struggle of politics, an oversight which I believe
highlights a serious discrepancy in his political thinking.
Moreover, by limiting convictions in politics on the basis
of their allegiance to the German nation, Weber expels his
opponents from any fruitful theoretical discussion on German
national politics. This expulsion reveals, I think, a flaw
in his approach to the political conflicts that influences
the way he theorizes in the modern world.
Each shortcoming is evident in Weber' s theoretical
desire to "clear away mechanical obstacles" that impede
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Germany's quest for national greatness. They are evident,
too, in his political desire to challenge those thinkers
who, because of their "traditional",
"immature", or "vain"
ideals, obstruct the path towards national power. m light
of these events, I submit that Weber's idea of politics
reveals more than the limits of his political thinking. it
foreshadows the degree to which his devotion to the idea of
nation hinders the theoretical expanse of both politics and
the German nation itself. As a first step in confirming
these clarms, I begin with three questions: What does Weber
mean when he refers to the term human struggle? How does it
correspond to his theory of politics? And what, if
anything, does it say about Weber's impact on the enterprise
of contemporary political thinking?
Freedom and Nation-St-.at-P
Over the course of 54 years, Max Weber's intellectual
life was swayed strongly by a variety of human struggles.
As Marianne Weber notes in her husband's biography, he
witnessed debates between Wilhelm Dilthey, Theodor Mommsen,
Levin Goldschmidt, Heinrich von Trietschke, and Heinrich von
Sybel
,
all of whom frequented the Berlin home of Max Weber
Sr., a one-time National Liberal Party member in the
Reichstag. 11 His life also documents methodological
battles within the Verein fur Sozialpolitik
; personal frays
with his own emotional state; ideological tussles with
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Marxism; ethical disputes with German militarism and
Pacificism; and political fights with the Prussian
bureaucracy, the German Supreme Command, and the
Hohenzollern crown.- These events may not reveal Weber's
exact interpretation of human struggle, but they do reveal
how its historical specter loomed over his rendering of the
term and its place in his political thought.
Beginning with his earliest academic forays, Weber
approached the notion of human struggle from a decidedly
economic point of view. As a scholar at the Verein, a
relatively conservative policy institute established by,
among others, Gustav von Schmoller, he found himself
absorbed m the fight "for an improvement in the situation
of the working classes." 13 During one portion of his 33-
year tenure at the Verein, Weber focused his investigative
gaze on the conditions of agricultural labor east of the
Elbe River. He was concerned with the recent introduction
of "the principle of economic rationality into the wage-
forms" of farm workers, who prior to the late 19th century
laboured for feudal Prussian estate owners in return for
small land holdings and a share of the estate's product. 14
From these investigations, all of which stressed the
increasing divide among differing economic classes, Weber
gradually fashioned a theoretical notion of human struggle.
Originally a request on behalf of Prussian estate
owners, who, in the early 1890s, were seeking cause for
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state-imposed grain duties, Weber's probe of East Elbian
labor relations urged something altogether different.
Rather than affirm the traditional authority of the estate
owners, he argued that the "modern development" of the
"'free labour contract'" gave workers the chance to flee
such "brutal personal domination, » freeing them to fend for
themselves "in a struggle of interests . "> s it was this
human migration off the estates and into the capitalist
market that gave Weber insight into the meaning of human
struggle m late 19th-century Germany. He documented the
intransigence of Prussian traditions, the impersonality of
market relations, the rift between a dying landlord class
and a growing proletariat, and the infusion of Slavic
immigrants into newly-vacated jobs on the Elbian estates.
These effects, and others, moved Weber to conclude in his
Freiburg Address that in such an "economic struggle for
life... there is no peace to be had." 16
As landlords and laborers moved in accordance with the
"increased capitalization" of the estates, the latter did
not necessarily struggle for increased wages. What was
unique about their struggle, says Weber, was "the urge for
personal freedom" that lead them away from the feudal
domination of Prussian landlords. He highlights how " [t]hey
sacrifice their accustomed conditions in their aspiration
for emancipation: their apathy is shattered." 17 Severing
its ties to the estates, economic sustenance, and cultural
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tradition, this emergent class of laborers turned over its
duties to a mass of Slavic workers willing to accept the
despotic circumstances east of the River Elbe.
These German laborers were not thrown off the estates
by spiteful landlords, nor were they drawn to the cities
with material guarantees of factory employment. According
to Weber, they believed in the "magic of freedom," by which
he meant the chance for each person to labor by the tolling
of one's own estate bell. However, it was also a belief
that lead them into "a silent and bleak struggle for
everyday economic existence
... they [were] leaving their
homeland and [were] about to submerge themselves in a dark
future. Thus the lives of German laborers convinced
Weber that human struggle, despite its role in the death of
feudalism and the birth of capitalism, culled its
theoretical ground from such liberal ideals as human
freedom, commercial ambition, and self-determination.
In addition to depicting the ideals involved in a
laborer's fight for freedom, Weber was perceptive enough to
note the contingent qualities reflected in such a struggle.
His youthful theoretical renderings go beyond mere vague
allusions to some "dark future" facing German workers in the
impersonal
_ market place of modern capitalism. They evoke,
too, a sobering perception of East Elbian labor relations,
one that deters Germans "from imagining that peace and
happiness lie waiting in the womb of the future, and from
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believing that anything other
with man can create any elbow-
than the hard struggle of man
room in this earthly life ." 19
Hence his notion of human struggle appears to promise
persons neither human well-being, material security, nor
even human happiness. On the contrary, it secures a person
nothing more than a chance to advance these and other
ultimate convictions, and only then while remaining engaged
in a human struggle with other individuals.
Much like Machiavelli
' s view of fortune, then, Weber's
rendering of human struggle presupposes a person who, with
desire, calculation, and conviction, embraces the mere
possibility of furthering some ultimate goal. Indeed, it is
a person composed of what Weber calls "those characteristics
which we think of as constituting the human greatness and
nobility of our nature ." 20 But this person represents only
one side of his rendering, for, again like Machiavelli, he
denotes an institutional device capable of countering the
uncertainties that come with human struggle. Where
Machiavelli finds order in legal, religious, and military
institutions, Weber instead finds it in the nation-state, an
institution that "should have the final and decisive say in
all questions of German economic policy ." 21 As rifts
between Prussian tradition, modern capitalism, and Slavic
immigration became more evident, he thus qualified the
nation-state as a mitigating force in all struggles
befalling Wilhelmine Germany.
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In one particular instance, Weber prompted the German
nation-state to mitigate vigorously another facet of the
human struggle unfolding in East Elbe. That facet involved
"itinerant Polish workers,- who, because of the
-economic
death throes of the old Prussian Junkerdom" and the workers
new-found
-magic of freedom,- were able to amass available
German farmlands. Their ability
-to adapt- to subservient
living conditions in return for a share of East Elbian land
induced a situation in which, according to Weber, "one
hundred thousand peasants relate to their home soil in a
different way than a hundred thousand workers ." 22 Given
its potential threat to German unity, expansion, and
greatness, this discord lead Weber to interpret the nation-
state as sole adjudicator on "questions of whether, and how
far, the state should intervene in economic life, or of
whether and when it is better for it to free the economic
forces of the nation from their fetter and to tear down the
barriers in the way of their autonomous development ." 23
Whether that meant the "interior settlement" of estates, the
"opening of new markets" for Germans, or the "closing of the
eastern frontier" to Poles, Weber matched the ill effects of
human struggle with the imposing will of the nation-state.
By positing the nation-state as arbitrator of human
disputes and creator of capitalist markets, Weber signals
the chief instrument of German unity, expansion, and power.
He explains this position in his 1897 lecture entitled
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"Germany as an Industrial State." Speaking before the
Evangel isch-soziale KongreB in Leipzig, Weber argued that
though the state can easily quell those struggles which
impede the nation, Germany must not pursue a "policy of
national comfort but rather one of greatness." 2 * By
"greatness" he meant a policy through which the nation-state
alters the "vain and hopeless combat" between landlord and
working classes into an accord that combats the influx of
immigrants and the feudal traditions which draw them on to
German soil. in this way, the nation-state rids itself of
those internal divisions that obstruct Germany's chance to
compete for power with the world's other "Great Powers ." 25
Weber concludes "that the gospel of struggle is a national
duty, an unavoidable economic task for individual and for
the collectivity of which we are not 'ashamed' and
represents for us the sole path to greatness ." 26
This depiction of the German nation-state reveals the
extent to which Weber not only banishes "the urge for
personal freedom" to the realm of self-interest but modifies
its "element of primitive idealism" into a national fight
for greatness. In fact, the struggle for national greatness
was his way of bringing human design and order to the
unpredictable class and ethnic struggles unfolding east of
the Elbe River. However, insofar as Weber anchors his idea
of struggle to this end of German national greatness, a
theoretical rift surfaces in his political thinking. In one
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sense, his explorations of East Elbian labor relations posit
notion of human struggle based on a person whose quest for
freedom derives from
-the most elemental drives in the human
breast In another sense, they postulate an idea of
human struggle that, in contrast to the quest for personal
freedom, presupposes the supremacy of the German nation-
state, the aim of which
-is not to make everybody happy but
the social unification of the nation."- Judging from this
contrast, Weber's view of human struggle marks more than a
mere theoretical problem in the early stages of his
political thinking. it also suggests a political problem,
m chat the struggle for freedom becomes the means rather
than the goal of Germany's struggle for power.
This divide between a person's struggle for freedom and
the German nation-state's struggle for power points to a
paradox in Weber's early theoretical depictions of politics.
Insofar as his East Elbian scholarship accentuates a person
whose ability to struggle derives from a "primitive" site in
the "human breast," Weber hinges German national greatness
on a person's ultimate goal of human freedom. Put a
different way, the advance of the German nation-state
depends on persons whose ideals shift between such desires
as economic liberty, ideological autonomy and, possibly,
political opposition. Conversely, in that his same works
designate the nation-state as the "final and decisive" judge
of all struggles, Weber defies the very persons and ideals
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on which the nation-state pivots for power. Accordingly,
the struggle for freedom succumbs to the nation-state's
project of unity, expansion, and power, a project utilizing
persons for the goal of greatness rather than exalting them
as goals in and of themselves. His theory of politics
portends, therefore, a situation in which either the nation-
state limits its chief means towards greatness or a person's
struggle for freedom disrupts the aims of the nation-state.
Likewise Weber's early interpretation of politics
suggests a problematic situation involving the political
disputes that impact his theorizing. His scholarly approach
to the labor situation in East Elbe symbolized something
more than a detached analysis of Wilhelmine Germany's
shifting class structure. It also signified his passionate
dismissal of Prussian Junkerdom's claim to political
authority, the bourgeoisie's selfish aspiration toward an
unpolitical future, and the German proletariat's desire for
political leadership
.
29 Moreover, Weber's youthful
approach to theorizing politics marked his own desire to
distance himself from the conservative views of the Herein,
views which he thought simply bolstered the tradition of the
Prussian state at the expense of the German nation
.
30 The
politics of his theorizing thus imparts the weight of human
struggle in the theoretical enterprise itself, but only
insofar as it discounts contending views of politics that
impair Germany's prospects for national power. Rather than
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augment the dialogue between these differing views, Weber's
task tends to narrow the theoretical views of politics,
presaging the alteration of political theory into an agent
of German nationalism.
These early works suggest, in part, that Weber's notion
of struggle marks a dividing line between passionate persons
seeking freedom and the absolute authority of the German
nation-state. In turn, this division reveals a paradox at
the heart of his theory of politics, such that the
passionate persons who were suppose to elevate the nation-
state were the very persons whose passions the nation-state
sought to subdue. This division reveals, furthermore, a
paradox in the way Weber engages in the act of theorizing.
It is a paradox indicative of his public rejection of those
human convictions that are central to the very idea of the
German nation he sought to advance. These flaws in both his
theory of politics and his approach to the task of
theorizing exhibit the degree to which the idea of human
struggle points to the first problematic trait of Weber's
theoretical enterprise.
Asceticism and Revolution
Max Weber's studies of the East Elbe "situation"
between 1893 and 1898 demonstrate how his theory of politics
entails both an individual struggle for human freedom and a
national struggle for social order. It was a period that
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paralleled, his own personal struggle to come to terms with
both his growing influence in the herein and the demise of
Germany's archaic political traditions. Soon after this
fruitful stretch, Weber faced a struggle unlike any he had
ever experienced: his "emotional breakdown," that was
accompanied by "the psychological pressure of [an] 'unworthy
situation' in which he draws a salary and will not be able
to accomplish anything in the foreseeable future." 31 From
1898 until 1902, Weber fought off this crisis with trips to
the North Sea and Italy, stays at a Lake Constanz
sanatorium, and infrequent ventures into abstruse scholarly
projects. 33 Finally, in 1903, he returned to intellectual
tasks which reflected, not only his earlier commitment to
the individual and the nation-state, but his insights into
the role human struggle may play in a theory of politics.
At least three works represent this period of Weber's
combined intellectual and emotional rejuvenation. The first
work is The Protestant and the Spirit of ranitaiiam a
series of essays first published in the Archiv fur
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik between 1903 and
1905. 33 The other two works were his chronicles of the
1905 Russian Revolution, "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" and
"Russia's Transition to Pseudo-constitutionalism," both of
which appeared in the Archiv in 1905 and 1906,
respectively. 34 What all three texts share with Weber's
earlier projects is a keen perception of the historical
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impact of modern capitalism and its intrusion upon and
challenge to the cultural traditions of individuals and
nations alike. However, these later works depart from the
earlier ones not because they focus on the intransigence of
tradition nor the cultural weight of capitalism. As will
become obvious, these later works depart in terms of the
philosophical groundwork and the political aim Weber
ascribes to the concept of human struggle in his theory Of
modern politics.
In the
—otestant Ethic essays, Weber begins by
challenging the conventional axioms of late 19th and early
20th century Marxism, suggesting that capitalism may, in
part, derive from sources other than those of an economic
nature. 35 He argues that the development of modern
capitalism, marked by its penchant for material acquisition
and methodical self-control, corresponds instead to "the
influence of certain of religious ideas... In this case we
are dealing with... the rational ethics of ascetic
Protestantism." 36 Specifically, he notes that Calvinism
and its belief in "predestination" exemplify a person whose
doubtful destiny before an unfathomable God leads him to
create a conviction of spiritual certainty. He does so by
ordering the material world in a way that utilizes the
"objective results" of his labors as "proof" of possible
salvation from God. "The moral conduct of the average man,"
Weber explains, "was thus deprived of its planless and
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a consistent method
unsystematic character and subjected to
for conduct as a whole ." 37
Weber claims that such religious beliefs unveiled
before the world more than an ascetic person who, by melding
labor and ethical limits on consumption, spurred the
'productive investment of capital." Ascetic Protestantism
also revealed "an historical individual," one who "had grown
up in the hard school, calculating and daring at the same
time, above all temperate and reliable, shrewd and
completely deovted to ... business
,
with strictly bourgeois
opinions and principles ." 38 The location of this
"individual" at the crux of Weber's argument in no way
diminishes the historical gravity of either ascetic
Protestantism or the development of modern capitalism.
Rather, it both confirms the multi
-dimensional quality of
the "Protestant Ethic" essays and highlights the role of
struggle in cultivating an individual within what Weber
calls "the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order."
The underlying struggle is evident when Weber denotes
[t]he most important opponent" of a person to be "that type
of attitude and reaction to new situations which we may
designate as traditionalism ." 39 By traditionalism he means
any person who, "'by nature,'" wishes "simply to live as he
is accustomed to live." This includes Martin Luther and his
authoritarian notion of "Beruf," Catholics and their faith
in the Church's lax control of human conduct, the feudal
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patriarch and his tendency to privilege contusion over
production.. According to Weber, the ascetic who battled
tradition thus cultivated "an unusually strong character"
defined by "clarity of vision and ability to act," a unique
character that "acted powerfully against the spontaneous
enjoyment of possessions
... the irrational use of wealth.-"
In this sense, the source of human struggle corresponds to
the formation of an historically specific individual, and
its purpose is to contest the cultural traditions which
impede the individual's self-regulated and calculated
conduct
.
As this historical struggle continued, however, the
individual who was so integral to the advance of modern
capitalism developed a more "formalistic, hard, correct
character." The individual's regulation of passions,
appetites, and the natural world for the sake of producing
evidence of divine election led him to renounce, ironically,
even religion itself "as a means of drawing people away from
labour in this world ." 41 For this reason, Weber's
illustration of the struggle against tradition uncovers the
conditions for the possibility of the material advance of
the modern individual. But insofar as this fight with
tradition results in both the increase of material wealth
and the decrease of religious convictions, it also discloses
the conditions which make possible the spiritual demise of
the modern individual
.
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With this latter development, the Protestant Rt-h^
essays indicate another source of human struggle. In
addition to the challenges posed by tradition, the ascetic
Protestant had "to combat" both "a feeling of unprecedented
inner loneliness" and a "dependence on external things." On
the one hand, these psychological battles allowed him to
order the natural world, not for his own vain indulgences.
but for God's glory and the prospect of salvation in an
after-life. On the other, they provoked a conduct capable
of producing and accumulating an enormous sum of material
possessions, which, according to Weber, gradually lured the
Protestant's attention away from his belief in divine
predestination. Such tensions defined a "continual struggle
with the problem of the secularizing influence of wealth, »
one evident in the banishment of religion's "irrational"
beliefs for the individual's "rational planning" of the
natural world
.
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Finally, as a result of this spiritual renunciation,
Weber foresees the possibility of a human struggle aimed at
modern machine capitalism. His view of this "cosmos" posits
an historical condition by which an individual's conduct
cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and
cultural values, or when... it need not be felt simply as
economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the
attempt to justify it at all ." 43 The individual, who first
spurred modern capitalism with a religious desire for
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" objective results" and "temperate self-control," loses his
ethical orientation in relation to capitalists increasingly
productive technical prowess. "The most important functions
of everyday life of society," Weber notes, "have come to be
in the hands of technically, commercially, and above all
legally trained government officials."** if one hopes tQ
buck such a trend towards
"disenchantment" and gain back a
degree of cultural vigor, clarity of vision, and a modicum
of autonomy, then one must reorient one's conduct toward a
value other than that of economic compulsion.
Weber in no way advocates, therefore, a specific type
of struggle against capitalism, especially not a class
struggle pitting workers against the owners of capital.**
He merely suggests that if individuals fail to infuse their
lives with ideals as provocative as those of ascetic
Protestantism, then of the modern world "it might well be
truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without
heart. '”** 'This forewarning stresses more than just the
historical sustenance of an individual whose normative
aspirations inform the rational design of his earthly
conduct. It further implies a possible source of contention
between individuals guided by spiritual ideals and economic
institutions fueled most effectively by well-disciplined and
mechanical procedures
.
Though his Protestant Ethic essays fail to describe how
an individual combats the dehumanizing attributes of
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capitalism, a year later Weber illustrated such a deed in
his writings on the 1905 Russian revolution. Weber was an
active observer of Czar Nicholas II- s leadership of the
Russian nation, for, as Marianne Weber notes, he was
concerned with "the possible consequences of the Russian
Struggle for liberation for his own people."" m two
separate essays he chronicled the events, the participants,
and, most important, the ideas comprising Russia's attempt
to change from a provincial autocracy to a constitutional
democracy built on Western European ideals. Besides his
attention to historical detail, what is apparent in both
essays is Weber's interest in the Russian "freedom struggle"
(Freiheitskampf)
, which took on both the tradition of
agrarian communism and the advances of modern capitalism.
In his first account, "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia,"
Weber contends that if Russia hopes to succeed in
revolutionizing its national culture, it first must be
willing to fight for the ideals underlying such a project.
He assumes those ideals to be the liberal concepts of
democratic individualism, the once-universal convictions
with which. he believed Western Europe had grown sated and
bored. With Russia, however, he views the mix of such
archaic'" traditions as "agrarian communism" and Czarist
police absolutism" with the unsettling advances of
capitalism as a formidable barrier to the cultivation of
these ideals. According to Weber, Russian tradition sought
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to perpetuate "the village commune
-ideal,-., obtaining i„
varrous ways "not economic selection of the efficient in the
'business- sense, but
-ethical- equalization of
opportunity Russia's commitment to the ideal of
community symbolized the primary obstacle hindering
democratic, individualism, and for that reason the former's
demise was the primary task of any proponent who championed
the latter's ideal.
In addition to this communal conviction, Russia's
experience with modern capitalism promised "uniformity of
the external life-style by means of
' standarization' of
production. Weber criticizes this development on the
grounds that "[e]very precaution has been taken to ensure
that democratic individualism does not enjoy unrestricted
growth. The case for democratic individualism required
a vigilant fight to fracture what Weber saw as "the empty
shell for new serfdom, » a phrase referring to the modern
proclivity to pacify persons through the dispassionate ranks
of bureaucracy. Given such obstacles, therefore, he affirms
"the struggle for such 'individualistic' values" as a
countermeasure against both the despotism of agrarian
traditions and the material abyss of modern capitalism.
Weber also argues that the thrust of a "freedom
struggle" ought to target at least two manifestations of
tradition and capitalism in Russian political life. The
first involves "fighting against both bureaucratic and
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Jacobin centralism ,
" while the second entails "working at
the permeation of the masses with the old individualistic
basic idea of the 'inalienable rights of man.'"- Battling
the Russian bureaucracy, which gained its force as the
Czar's administrator and fortified itself with rational
techniques, necessitates a degree of human idealism able to
endure bureaucracy's affinity for "outward violence" and
oppose its myopic fixation on "material interests." The
same is true regarding the cultivation of differing ideals,
insofar as Weber posits that "' [democracy' and
'individualism'
.. .point as clearly as they can in the
opposite direction" from the "'material condition' of the
environment" which "renders the masses 'compliant.'" 51 in
both cases, he specifies a notion of struggle that not only
sustains the prospect of democratic and individualistic
ideals in Russian politics, but generates a durable force
that can oppose Russia's brush with bureaucratic capitalism.
With his follow-up account of the 1905 revolution,
however, "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-constitutionalism,"
Weber is quick to point out the hardships hindering the
possibility of such "freedom struggles" in Russia. Noting
rampant police crackdowns and the Czar's gift of mere
nominal liberties, Weber argues that Russia's fight for
democratic individualism mutated into a conflict defined,
not by idealism, but by violence for the sake of violence.
He designates Czar Nicholas II' s "October Manifesto," which
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affirmed civil liberty, an extension of the vote, and
legislative power for the Imperial Duma, as the catalyst
behind this alteration. it was not the quality of the
ideals espoused by the manifesto, but the way the Czar
Played "a game of tag with a nation's political liberties
by holding them out to it as one holds out a ball to a child
and, when it reaches for them, making them disappear behind
your back." Such political "insincerity," notes Weber,
along with the police repression aimed at resentful Liberal
Democrats, Socialists, and peasants, exhibited a total lack
of ideals beyond that of the "self-preservation" of the
Russian police state. It confirmed why Weber thought
Russia's "freedom struggle" had become "a continuous,
unrelenting struggle, with the wild deeds of murder and
merciless acts of tyranny in such numbers that even these
horrors finally become accepted as normal." 53
What becomes apparent in this latter analysis of
Russian reform is Weber's attempt to draw a distinction
between two types of human struggle. In one case, he
maintains that Russia's fight for freedom, its
"uncompromising 'idealism" and "relentless energy," mirrors
such great struggles in history as the age of Charles I or
the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament. Yet, in another case, Weber
declares that "the Russian freedom struggle reveals few of
the features of 'greatness', as usually understood, to
arouse the emotions of the uncommitted observer." 54 He
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justifies this claim in two ways: first, by virtue of the
Russran state's quashing of democratic and individual
ideals; and, second, by reason of the lack of "really
-great
leaders'" on both sides of the Russian freedom struggle.
Indeed, by fighting against "police absolutism" rather than
for "individual
'liberties,'" the nation "had inevitably to
consume so-much strength in mere 'tactics', and place so
much emphasis on 'technical party considerations', that
scarcely any room was left for 'great leaders'. One cannot
accomplish great' deeds against vermin." 55 in the
aftermath of the Russian revolution, Weber thus perceived a
human struggle noted for its leaderless and wholly
instrumental drift, a fight far different from the one
guided by individual convictions, calculations, and freedom.
These chronicles of the 1905 Russian revolution say
many things about Weber's notion of human struggle and its
place m his theory of politics. The same is true of his
Protestant Ethic thesis, which points to the possible
religious origins of modern capitalism but uncovers, too, an
individual's constant battle with tradition as much as
machine capitalism. in both projects, Weber's idea of
struggle presupposes the existence of the modern individual,
a category derived from neither the traditional a priori
foundations of divine right or natural law nor the economic
axioms of modern capitalism. Instead, such an individual
emerges from a constellation of historical transformations,
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the most pivotal of which is the incongruous mix of a
person's spiritual disposition with the world's material
institutions. This depiction of the individual, which
corresponds both to the ascetic Protestantism of the West
and the revolutionary deeds of the Russian nation, marks the
philosophical ground of Weber's notion of human struggle.
nlike liberalism s fixation on natural origins, Marxism's
fetish for material interests, and even his own youthful
belief in "primitive" idealism, Weber's individual departs
from a desire to change one's personal beliefs and worldly
institutions. Conversely, it suggests an apparent lack of
any clear teleological aim in his notion of human struggle.
If an aim underlies Weber's notion, moreover, it
appears m the political possibilities human struggle
affords an individual in the modern world. First, in the
Protestant Ethic and Russian revolution essays, the
political aim of human struggle corresponds to the
cultivation and maintenance of "'individualistic' values."
But more than just aspiring towards a set of ideals, human
struggle directs its energies against the institutions of
tradition and capitalism, defying the "leisureliness" of the
former and the despiritualized "iron cage" of the latter.
This melding of human ideals and institutions indicates more
than Weber's ties to the intellectual legacies of
Christianity and European Liberalism. It discloses, as
well, his view of the location of politics, a place in which
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power and greatness can be gained only by those individuals
who struggle to advance their ideals wrthin institutions
that, in turn, threaten such ideals with annihilation.
Maintaining this intersection between a person's ideals and
institutional means represents one aim of Weber's idea of
human struggle, an aim meant to promote only the possibility
rather than the certainty of democratic individualism.
From 1902 until 1907, Weber thus theorized a notion of
struggle posited on a belief in the individual, altering his
earlier perception of the term by placing the individual
within the theological context of ascetic Protestantism. At
the same time, his concept of struggle underscored the
historical weight of tradition and capitalism, allowing him
to augment his initial identification of struggle vis-a-vis
the German nation-state to include political parties, trade
unions, and other types of bureaucratic organizations. The
significance of these theoretical shifts lies not so much in
Weber's concern for individuals and institutions, for these
ideas, as such, carry over from the East Elbe studies. More
significant is the extent to which his idea of human
struggle marks both a broadening of the philosophical ground
of individuals and a narrowing of its political direction to
the rational confines of institutions. In this way, Weber's
idea of human struggle foreshadows a formidable tension in
his theory of politics, a tension between individuals and
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institutions as the chief
the 20th century.
source and purpose of struggle in
Leadership and Responsi h-i l -i i-y
During the last few years of the 19th century and the first
several of the 20th century, Weber fixed his gaze on the
lunctures between individuals and rationally organized
institutions. He even went so far as to include himself
among
"'individualists' and supporters of
-democratic
institutions" whom he believed "must swim
-against the tide'
of material constellations."- This battle with the
impersonal techniques of machine capitalism stems from
Weber's views of both the widening expanse of individual
ideals and the narrowing domain of political institutions.
Consequently, these two perceptions not only buttressed his
theory of human struggle; they demonstrated, too, the extent
to which he understood both as being equally important in
sustaining the prospect of politics in the modern world.
In the ensuing years, however, those following the
outbreak of the First World War, Weber shifted his gaze away
from the tension between individuals and institutions,
focusing instead on the latter half of this couplet.
Leading him in this direction were disputes he had with the
German bureaucracy, the German Supreme Command, and the
Hohenzollern monarchy
. The source of such disputes
concerned the inability of each particular group to provide
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Wilhelmine Germany a leader who could promise the nation-
state an opportunity for greatness in its struggle with the
world s "Great Powers .
"
Regarding the bureaucracy's active role in foreign
policy, Weber contended in his Frankfurter Zeitung articles
that any such official "must remain outside the struggle for
power" since "his sense of duty to his office overrides his
individual wilfulness."” In his 1919 "Vocation" lecture,
moreover, he contested the leadership of the German Supreme
Command, arguing that their ultimate aim of European
domination- "has shown us just how much inner weakness and
ineffectuality are concealed behind this grandiose but empty
pose M 58 Lastly, in his 1917 brochure "Suffrage and
Democracy in Germany," Weber challenged the "emotional
qualities" of Wilhelm II 's leadership, a monarch who
"compromise [d] the nation's political position for decades
to come by excited and incautious telegrams and
speeches." 59 Given these "inner" limits of German
leadership, at a time when it had "to resist the inundation
of the entire world" by England and Russia, Weber, like
Machiavelli in The Discourses, relied on the institutional
rather than individual traits of human struggle.
It is important to note that this change in Weber's
view in no way represents a conscious disregard on his part
for the principles of democratic individualism. As his
writings from this period indicate, Weber still acknowledged
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an individual who "can only feel himself subject to the
struggle between multiple sets of values.- what changes
is the degree to which he perceives an individual- s struggle
from the angle of Germany- s leadership void, allowing him to
claim that. "the only persons with the training needed for
political leadership are those who have been selected in
political struggle
.
" 61 Granted, Weber was always
interested in the sources of German national leadership, at
least as far back as his East Elbian investigations. But
after 1914 his works tend to neglect the "primitive
idealism" and "the complex interaction of ... historical
factors" which he believed, previously, qualified
individuals to assume leadership of the German nation. They
note, instead, Weber's belief that human struggle ought not
to occur between individuals and institutions but solely
within the political institutions of the nation-state,
restricting individual aims within a parliamentary design.
It should come as no surprise that this variation in
Weber's understanding of human struggle occurs during the
last years of Germany's disastrous involvement in the First
World War. Again in "Suffrage and Democracy in Germany," he
argues on behalf of democratic individualism, asking the
war-weary nation-state to relinquish its attachment to the
Prussian three-tiered voting system and grant "equal voting
rights" to all individuals
.
62 The reasoning behind this
claim rests on Weber's belief that an individual "for once,
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IS not
.
. .considered in terms of
and family position he occupies,
the particular professional
nor in relation to
differences of material and social situation, but purely and
simply as a citizen He thus inscribes all individuals
with "the equality of certain fates," the benefit of which
plays itself out in the reform of aristocratic party
structures, the arrest of an encroaching bureaucracy, and
the selection of national rather than class-based political
leaders. As Germany faced defeat by the Allies and strife
among its citizens, Weber pushed democratic individualism in
the guise of equal suffrage, believing it "expressed] the
political unity of the nation (StaatsvolJc) rather than the
dividing lines separating the various spheres ." 64
Underlying this defense of equal voting rights,
however, is something other than Weber's advance of
democratic individualism. As his argument unfolds, it
becomes apparent that the individual also represents an
instrument designed to advance the unity of the German
nation-state m its time of military and political ruin.
Weber posits an individual who neither "demand [s] only
freedom from the state" nor "intervenes directly in
politics." In fact, he posits an individual whose
"equality" derives directly from the modern state, which
grants individual citizens "sheer physical security" in
return for "the battlefield on which to die ." 65 By
entrusting individuals with the vote, he promises them at
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least
-a minimal right of codetermination in the af£airs ^the C°mmUnity
'
" 3 C—
- the institutional
confines of the German nation-state. But more explicitly
^ " lnte9rati^" ^to these confines, Weber promises'
Germany the means by which individuals ar0 utmzed ^ ^
purposes of regulating human struggles and advancing
national unity. If Germany chose to do otherwise, he
concluded,
-the energies of the masses would then be engaged
111 3 StrU39le gainst a state in which they are mere objects
which they have no share. 1,66
Insofar as Weber would transform individuals into
agents of German unity with the balTnt-y n D lot
'
he thus situates the
prospect of human struggle within the institutional
parameters of democratic parliamentarism. Between April and
June of 1917, Weber explained this position further in his
Frankfurter Zeitung articles, together entitled "Parliament
and Government in Germany under a New Political Order." He
argues many points in these five essays. Prominent among
them is his claim that Germany's "prime task... is to ensure
that the soldiers come back to find that it has already been
made possible for them to elect their own representatives at
the ballot box and through them build anew the Germany whose
existence they preserved." 67 Hence he failed to locate a
struggle among individuals in the East Elbian estates, in
the market place of machine capitalism, or on the streets of
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revolutionary Russia. if anywhere, he believed it raust
occur within the narrow confines of parliamentary politics.
In support of this claim, Weber first attacked
"Bismarck' s Legacy- on the grounds that it perpetuated
-a
nation accustomed to submit passively
.
•• He again castigated
the "Mule by officials" for having "failed utterly
whenever it dealt with political questions." And he
contested the Prussian Diet by virtue of its desire to
"obstruct the development towards parliamentarisation.
" But
more directly, Weber bolstered his claim by establishing
"parliamentary conflict" as "the given palaestra" of modern
politics, noting "there is nothing of equal value which can
replace such struggle."” This notion of parliamentary
politics-
-with its electoral, committee, and leadership
struggles-
- represents Weber's challenge to Germany's
traditional political arrangements, ones that hindered any
prospect of universal suffrage. It also demonstrates how he
invites all individuals, regardless of tradition, into the
modern arena of human struggle, underscoring a belief that
they are "actively involved in shaping the politics" of
post -World War I Germany.
Weber's thesis in the "Parliament and Government"
project continues to stress, therefore, his undying
commitment- to the modern individual. Yet, more than pushing
individual voting rights, Weber's argument champions
political institutions based on a parliamentary design, in
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which "great problems are not only discussed but are
conclusively decided there."- one result of such
institutionalized struggles, in which people are exposed todiscordant interests, ideals, and strategies, is the
development of a "training" ground for the purpose of
producing national political leaders. Conversely, the
trained in parliament must measure up before the
voting masses, whose function it is to "select" the
politician most capable of leading Germany out of its own
anti
-democratic morass.
The individual's task of selection and parliament's
function as the site of human struggle together reveal the
“machinery" by which Weber sought to avert "the possibility
that emotional elements become predominant in politics."™
With these tools, he advances both individualism and
parliamentarism, but only insofar as the latter harnesses
the former by virtue of universal suffrage, squelching any
vam or selfish impulse that derives from the human
struggle. Each function verifies, as well, the extent to
which Weber believed, especially near the end of the First
World War,
-that the vital interests of the nation take
precedence even over democracy and parliamentary rule ." 71
Neither the advance of the modern individual nor the push
for parliamentary democracy marks the ultimate conviction
informing Weber's theoretical project of politics. Instead,
such "technical changes" formed a restraint on "street
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democracy" and a consolidation of "the struggle for power "fueling his oonviction ^ the German ^ltS lmPSndln3 defe«' "has a decisive say" in a world with
other great nation-states.
By anchoring the individual to parliamentary
institutions, Weber circumscribes the range of human
struggle within the German nation-state. The struggle of
persons against or outside of such an organization, he
surmises, signifies a blend of politics comprised of civil
"'anarchy, » an "'authoritarian state,'" and a "democracy
without a leader." m January of 1919, Weber lectured in
Munich on the "qualities" required of those persons who
chose to struggle within the institutional confines of the
nation-state, titling it "The Profession and Vocation of
Politics." Before an audience of the Freistudentische Bund,
a group of leftist students whom he had first met at the
1917 Lauenstein congresses 72
,
Weber argued that "to feel
passion" for an ultimate cause "is not sufficient to make a
politician unless
.
. .responsibility for that cause becomes
the decisive lode-star of all action." 72 His support for
this claim stems as much from an aversion to the irrational
drifts of the masses as it does from a desire for leaders
capable of advancing a cause like German nationalism.
First, Weber defends his claim concerning "responsible"
leadership by positing a division between individuals who
live "'from'" politics and those who live "'for'" it. He
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regards the former, a party boss who struggles politically
for monetary reasons, as "an absolutely sober man" lacking
"firm political
'principles,'" whereas the latter takes part
rn the struggle with "passion, a sense of responsibility
judgement Based on this distinction, he affirms the
qualities of the politician rather than the party boss,
because the politician links his passion for a cause to a
perception of himself as burdened with any consequence that
corresponds to the advance of that cause. By using
"judgement" to discern passion from responsibility, the
politician is also better apt "to overcome a quite trivial,
all-too-huraan enemy which threatens him from within: common
vanity, the mortal enemy of all dedication to a cause and
of.
. .distance to oneself."- insofar as an individual
unites as well as discerns passion and responsibility, Weber
thus concludes that one can "achieve that powerful control
over the soul which distinguishes the passionate politician
from the 'sterile excitement' of the political amateur ." 76
In addition to differentiating the politician from the
party boss, this quality of responsibility allows Weber to
underscore another, more problematic division between
leaders and citizens. Without a sense of responsibility,
and enough judgment to detach one's ideals from "the
realities of life," a person's "striving for power.
. .becomes
a matter of purely personal self-intoxication instead of
being placed entirely at the service of the 'cause' II 77
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from
Responsible leadership in a struggle is quite distinct
hat Weber terms as the
"'occasional' politician," the
majority of individual citizens whose profession and
disposition precludp fj vq j __P i e fixed commitments to some cause. « We
are all 'occasional- politicians," he says, "when we post
our ballot slips or express our will in some similar way,
such as voicing approval or protest at a 'political'
meeting, making a 'political' speech and so on.’* The
implication of this difference between leaders and citizens
is not that the latter are necessarily
"irresponsible" and,
thus, incapable of partaking in the human struggle of modern
politics. it is that they, unlike "responsible" leaders,
are ill-prepared to accept the "paradoxes" issuing from a
mix of ideals and deeds, and thus are incapable of enduring
"the diabolical powers at work" in any political struggle.
Given this rendering of responsibility, it appears as
though Weber views human struggle as involving only a
limited number of individuals within the political
institutions of the nation-state. Indeed, from the First
World War until 1920, he viewed the prospects of human
struggle largely in terms of its capacity to foster a
"nation of masters" ( Herrenvolk ) who can "thrust their hands
into the spokes of the world's development." 79 But the
question concerning that which constitutes a "master"
capable of battling others for the destiny of a nation-state
goes to more than just the issue of responsible leadership
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in modern politicc: T t-
' 3°es to the issue of politics
“ WSber ' S thSOretiCal Project, a politics employed by
select persons to advance neither the ideals of human
freedom nor the chances of human struggle, but mainly the
power of the German nation-state.
tension first became obvious in "Suffrage and
Democracy in Germany,
- when Weber modified what was an
historically derived individual into a state-designated
agent of national unity. Here was an individual whose
ballot slip" promised German social order in return for
limited access to the struggle of politics. in his
"Parliament and Government" essays, too, Weber's allegiance
the German nation-state was apparent insofar as "the
given palaestra for the modern politician" marked the
institutional boundaries of human struggle. Human struggle
was to function like a "machine, « he said, producing
national political leaders within a highly disciplined and
hierarchical parliamentary design. By the time he arrived
at his position in the "Vocation" lecture, Weber's notion of
human struggle revealed an unique individual. Unlike the
"emotional" masses or the "unprincipled" party functionary,
this individual was "responsible" enough to lead other
individuals through the ethical labyrinth of politics in the
name of some ultimate cause. What these works confirm,
therefore, is a pattern of thought by which Weber alters the
individual and institutional components of human struggle,
68
transforming a once-contingent battle between both
components into a political tool of German ^r national order.
During the last six years of his life, Weber's
Political thought also signified the extent to which he
gradually ignored the individual as the chief source of
human struggle. By positing both the indrvidual conceived
by the modern state and institutions contrived to marshall
human struggle, his theory of politics leaves little chance
individuals-
-other than those capable of "responsible"
leadership-
-might advance their convictions in a political
struggle. Hence his theoretical project of politics
exemplifies what he himself called the "'principle of the
small number' suggesting a notion of struggle limited to
select persons within specific institutions, persons who
adhered to particular ultimate convictions. In these later
works, Weber made it clear that such convictions concurred
with the German nation-state's want of unity, power, and
greatness rather than the Enlightenment aims of liberal
individualism and parliamentary democracy.
Politics and Political Thpnry
Max Weber s references to the term human struggle
between 1895 and 1920 reveal the many-sided meanings it
assumed at different points in his political thinking. His
Elbian labor studies display a notion of human struggle
defined, on the one hand, by an individual who aspires
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toward the ideal of freedom and, on the other, by the German
nation-state'
s quest for historical greatness, when he
surveys the theoretical designs of ascetic Protestantism and
ssian revolution, his view of human struggle again
Punctuates the relevance of the individual and the nation-
only this time he clearly acknowledges the inimical
link between the two. By the time Weber ponders the
prospects of responsible leadership in politics, his idea of
Struggle admits neither the relative autonomy of an
individual nor the constant discord between individuals and
the institutions of the German nation-state. it bares,
instead, the submission of individuals and institutions
alike to the aim of German national greatness, leaving the
struggle of politics to those few leaders responsible enough
to achieve such a goal
.
Despite these historical variations, however, Weber's
interpretation of human struggle maintains a devotion to the
theoretical troika of individuals, national institutions,
and ultimate convictions. His idea of struggle assumes the
existence of a person who, by nature, history, or the modern
state, is capable of perceiving as well as promoting a self-
defined ideal in a world increasingly devoid of values
beyond those of an economic design. Juxtaposed to this
individual is a web of political institutions, which Weber
presumes to be rationally organized for the purpose of
consolidating and selecting individuals who wish to champion
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their ideals in the world. Both ^ ^
-lent to which his perception of struggi e presupposes the
necessity of convictions, whether they derive from an
"inarticulate, half
-conscious urge" of the individual orbend to the
"spiritual proletarianisation" of modern
institutions In any case, they reflect the immeasurable
prospects as much as the material limits of human struggie,thus presaging a divide in Weber's political thinking.
This divide appears at those points where his idea ofhuman struggle situates a willful and passionate individualm relation to the institutional confines of the nation-
It is problematic in that Weber, over the course of
some 25 years of serious political thinking, divulges a
shifting strategic position on the theoretical source and
purpose of human struggle in politics. Early on he locates
an individual who, despite a "political instinct" that in
"normal times
... sinks below the level of consciousness,"
typifies a "primitive idealism" that guides one towards "the
magic of freedom" and, thus, the prospect of struggle
against any limit on human freedom.*” Yet several years
later, Weber tempers this idealism by requiring the
individual to "take account of the 'material' condition of
the environment at every step" and, in turn, qualify the
contingencies of a "freedom struggle" with the "permanent
apparatus" of democratic institutions.* 1 Eventually, with
revolution looming in Germany's post-war future, Weber grows
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ever-more distrustful of individuals, their^
convictions, and their
He th„, u
9htS f°r hUman frsedom.
WOr S t0 Secure human struggles within the
parliamentary rnstitutions of the German nation-state
declaring that
"popularly elected" leaders are the only
persons who can "create a riamcl to prevent" such
" [p] articularism" from "non-in° getting out of hand ." 82
The problem with Weber's idee of ua human struggle, then,is not so much that it fp-iio *- ^ •ails to admit the political validity
of class conflict, revolutionary reform movements or
radical street democracy. It is that his idea privileges
over time, the quest for social order and German national
unity, despite assumptions to the contrary about a
passionate. individual whose actions and ideas add a
fortuitous quality to the nni i hi n-,iy political equation. Hence Weber
sounds like Machiavelli, when, near the end of "The
Discourses," he states "that all the things of this world
have a limit...; but those only run the entire course
ordained for them by Heaven that do not allow their body to
become disorganized."” The significance of this problem
shows itself, therefore, in the way Weber theorizes human
Struggle with an ever-increasing nationalist and
authoritarian purpose. He seems to forget Machiavelli
-
s
earlier warning in "The Prince" that fortune "directs her
fury where she knows that no dykes or barriers have been
made to hold her."” Though Weber's theoretical project of
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politics increasingly busies itself bv fa h •
ideals ar,a •
y shlonin9 national
nd institutions, he cannot rid it of the chief
source of human struggle--** fortuitous passions
individual citisens, politicians, and political
a probl
1S UntlmelY fSatUre ° f^ s ^ ru99lo also points to
“ Weber- s theory of politics. insofar as he
understood early on that the struggle for freedom, was
tantamount to fostering the German peoples- "political
maturity," Weber's thpnrvy politics questioned
"their
sp Of the nation- s economic and political power interests
and their ability... to place these ^ ^^
considerations In the Protestan^thic essays, too,
when he viewed human struggle as a check on tradition and
capitalism, Weber- s approach to politics found an individual
whose fight for possessions left one unable to give ideals
other than
-purely eudaemonistic self-interest" the
"significance for culture and national character which they
deserve. Finally, by limiting struggle to the
institutions of the German nation-state, his theoretical
project affirmed the extent to which such institutions,
"in
their function as places where mass leaders are selected and
have to prove themselves as statesmen, are fundamental
requirements of stable politics.-’ m each case,
erefore, Weber s theory of politics presupposes the
historical necessity of human struggle as well as the moral
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instability of modern individuals n,u , the combination of whichmarks a significant problem.
His theory Of politics is problematic in that it hingeshuman struggle to advance the goal of German national
power, yet it discounts the multitude of individuals who canPossibly constitute that struggle. On the one hand, Weber's
theory of politics admits struggle by virtue of its capacity
to elevate individual convictions, to merge individuals
within the nation-state, and to utilize them for the
selection of national leaders. Hence noli,- irep lit cs operates on
the ground of human struggle for a specific purpose, that of
unifying a multitude of citizens behind the advance of
German national power. On the other hand, his theory of
politics gradually ignores the source of human struggle,
insofar as individuals relent to a self-interested
eudaemonism, conform to the procedures of parliamentary
institutions, or submit to the convictions of a select
circle of political leaders. Hence politics mirrors a
distrust toward the foundation of human struggle, a
foundation rippled by either apolitical, indifferent, or
irrational individuals who can obstruct Germany's prospects
for greatness. This tension, then, between the source and
purpose of struggle, exposes the extent to which Weber's
theory of politics obscures its aim by equating the advance
of the German nation-state with the bridling of individuals
and their ultimate convictions.
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The significance of this problem is^ ^ ^ ^the elitist, specialized, and undemocratic qualities of histheory of politics. In addition, it manifests ^
_
theoretical disposition that is anti-political insofar as
Weber rendered human struggle a necessity of politics Atfirst
, Weber' s theoretical project of politics acknowledged
the varied possibilities underlying the modern individual's
struggle for freedom, even though they were offset by the
absolute authority of the German nation-state. But as
revolution, war, and civil unrest saturated his theoretical
focus, Weber became less concerned with individuals and
their boundless convictions. He instead became more
involved in the design of national institutions, which could
delineate the prospects of human struggle and dismiss
individuals whose ultimate aims challenged the advance of
the German nation-state. His theory of politics thus
prioritized the goal of German national power over the aims
of individualism, democracy, and freedom, altering the
struggle of politics from an art of the possible into a
mechanism of order. In this way Weber perceived politics,
not as an end in itself, but as an act if not to be denied
then certainly harnessed for the higher goal of ensuring
Germany a "decisive say" among other nation-states.
If Weber's own theory of politics is not enough to
confirm its anti-political disposition, then perhaps the
politics of his theorizing can provide additional support.
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l
3 the°riSt
' he WaS—— convictions, notingthat audiences
"for whom the hrsforrcal^ ^ ^^
nation do not take precedence.
.. over all questions of the
f0ri” that Sh°Uld «* anyone with a fundamentally
different perception of these tasks, win not he open to the
arguments advanced here 1,88SQ n . He wrote these lines in 1917,
when military
"officials" i-iv T .8 like Ludendorff continued to push
an aggressive policy of national conquest, when
"litterateurs" like Treitschke dismissed the national
efficacy of parliamentarism, when
"socialists" like
Luxemburg invited revolt against the war-weary German state.
Even prior to this period, Weber theorized politics in a way
that affirmed and advanced his ultimate goal of German
national power. In doing so, he also contested the
nationalist convictions of a "vain" Prussian landowning
class, an "unpolitical" bourgeois class, and a "vulgar" and
"politically uneducated" working class. These battles
underlying. Weber's quest to theorize politics thus suggest
that his project was as much a push for German nationalism
as it was a rejection of differing political ideas and the
ultimate aims with which they corresponded.
The politics of Weber's theorizing uncovers more than
just a passion for the German nation-state and his struggles
against his theoretical and political opponents, however.
It indicates, too, a problem insofar as his political
thinking seeks to exclude any sort of challenge that might
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1 the adVanCe ° f G“ national power. In his 192Qopening to the „ Protestant Bthic „ ^^ ^arxist disciple of historicai materiausm nHe ^yearns for seeing should qo to he cinema.
. .whoever wants asermon should go to the conventicle "« He
.
.
.
- also cautionedhis positivistic colleagues in t-hp o9 l he German Historical School
noting that if one aspired to "the pure Plato •, nic interest
of the technologist," it would be best to r-u D remain "in the
stillness of the library- Lecturing Qn fche „v00ation „
of politics, he even alerted his young audience to
Nietzschean trends that led to
-a mystical flight from the
world, implying that only those persons who could he . a
match for the world as it really is" were cut out for the
enterprises of politics and political theory.^ Each case
thus confirms how Weber, with metaphorical dash and pointed
clarity, extracts dissimilar views from his own project and
disperses them to philosophical sites that pose little
threat to the power of the German nation-state.
By expelling the views of Marxists, scientific
positivists, cultural subjectivists, and others, Weber's
theory of politics displays a problem shared by many figures
in the history of political thought. One need only note
Plato's exclusion of poets from The Republic Rousseau's
restraint on Hobbes in The_Sociabstract
,
or Nietzsche's
expulsion of positivists from The Gav Science Despite his
inclusion within this legacy of exclusion, however, Weber's
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theoretical project of politics is unique in that his
criteria for nullification derives from a devotion to the
acquisition, preservation, and expansion of German national
power, as far back as his Freiburg Address he understands
his theoretical enterprise to be "a servant of politics -
He furthermore makes it clear that his intention is to
serve,
..not the day-to-day politics of the persons and
classes who happen to be ruling at any given time, but the
enduring power-political interests of the nation.-" For
this reason, Weber's problematic exclusion of differing
interpretations of politics illuminates at least one more
element verifying the anti-political traits of his
theoretical disposition. it verif-iPQ uties, too, how the politics
Of his theorizing, much like his theoretical design of
politics, narrows the prospects of each task for the sake of
ensuring the certainty of the German nation-state.
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CHAPTER II
NATION AND THE PFRTTQ nc rmnILS °F 1TS "WORLDLY ORGANISATION"
Introducti nn
Max Weber' s view of the German nation assumes a variety
°f forms rn hrs political thinking. The most notable form
appears in his early studies of the labor
"situation" in
East Elbia. In those writings, he conceives of the German
natron as a "race" of peoples who "can no longer adapt" to
the changing economic circumstances in their homeland *
Some 20 years later, as he examines the likely impact of
parliamentary democracy on German society, Weber envisions
war-weary Germany as "a self-assured
'nation of masters'
(Herrenvolk)
, entirely confident in its outward manner .«
Between these two distinct views of the German nation,
Weber, in devising concepts that would later comprise
Economy and Societ y, conjectures an "ideal-type" of the
nation as such. it is a theoretical fusion of the
"sentiments of prestige" and "a specific belief in
responsibility towards succeeding generations ." 3 Like his
idea of the human struggle of politics, Weber's view of the
nation takes various and, at times, divergent forms in his
political thinking, what remains constant, though, is his
undying devotion to the ideal of the German nation.
I believe this devotion indicates a parallel between
Weber's political thinking and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
theoretical task in On the Social Contract As a citizen of
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f . ,, ,
S y ° f learnln9 ab°Ut affairs, " striving „ t0lnd ln my research new reasons ho ito love that of my
country ! -4 Yet as a political •P theorist his task is moredirect in that, among other things, he aims
-to examine the
act by which a people becomes a people. For this act... is
the true basis of society.- According to Rousseau, and
other 17th and 18th century political thinkers, human
"nature- signifies the creative force of a people by virtue
of nature's
"reasonable" capacity to impart far more than
selfish impulses and appetites.
• By "contracting with
himself," rather than with "brutish" Hobbesian others a
person admits to those passions and liberties which are
universal and, thus, integral to the formation of human
communities
-Instantly," notes Rousseau,
-in place of
the private person of each contracting party, this act of
association produces a moral and collective body... which
receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its
life, and its will."* The formation of this "general
will," as Rousseau calls it, depicts one of the chief
concerns in his theory of politics, as much as it informs
his duty as a citizen of Geneva.
As a citizen of Wilhelmine Germany, Weber is equally
interested in the formative aspects of a community of
people. Unlike Rousseau, however, Weber dismisses the
philosophical import of human nature since modernity's
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scientific prowess tends to undercut 5„ r isuch a universal theme
with empirical evidence >. He also rejects Rousseau's
negative rendering of human interests, desires, and idealsinsofar as their individual expression unifies rather thandivides a community. Weber instead contends that the
formation of a people
-notably a national one-isaues from
what he terms the human struggle of politics, a
.'machine., of
guides the voice, union, and growth of the German
Although he differs with Rousseau on the source and
direction of human collectivities, Weber still shares
Rousseau's curiosity about their theoretical and political
significance. indeed, Weber's devotion to the ideal of the
German nation dominates his view of the world around him, as
well as it obstructs his ability to theorize a politics
beyond the' bounds of that national ideal. 1 "
In this chapter, I seek to do more than reconfirm how
Weber s theory of nation, and its expression as the aim of
German politics, limits the variety of convictions in the
arena of politics. By restricting politics to the training
of national leaders, the reform of governmental structures,
and the unification of a citizenry, I believe Weber omits
convictions which might contest such instrumental political
ambitions. Moreover, insofar as politics serves the moral
aim of the German nation, I claim his theory of the nation
impedes the human struggles that, ultimately, promote the
prospect of German national glory. in fact, rather than
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spurring the prospect of glory in the future, Weber's idea
°f "e natl °n dlSCl °SeS “ paradox" at the heart of
POlitlCal thinkin3
' P—ox arises from the clashbetween the morally absolute aim of the nation and the
earthly function of modern politics. it highlights, I
conclude, an incongruity in Weber's thinking such that,
first, his idea of nation constricts the "human struggle" of
politics and, second, his idea of politics defies the
absolute moral "'good'" of the nation. In light of this
framework, I raise three questions: How does Weber
contribute to the German tradition of theorizing the idea of
nation? How does his theory of politics subvert the
ultimate ambitions he ascribes to the idea of German nation?
Lastly, what insights might such a subversion provide in
of weighing the enduring value of Max Weber's
theoretical perspective on politics?
Pathos and- Nation
In 1909 Paul Siebeck, publisher of the Archiv fur
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial Politik, asked Max Weber to
organize a collaborative study of the science of political
economy. After assuming editorial duties, and later failing
to receive contributions from his colleagues, Weber focused
on his own studies, which subsequently appeared as part two
° f
-
conomY and Society
. Entitled "The Economy and the Arena
of Normative and De Facto Powers," it represents an
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exhaustive catalogue of »ideal- types „ that he^ £rom
9rOWln9 lntSreSt ^ ^nterPretive ( Verstehen) sociology
The purpose of this cataloguing, some argue
, is fc{j define
the bond between
-laws and conventions, on the one hand, andthe groups that sustain them on the other. with a group
such as the nation, Economy^nd^oci^ exhibits Weber's
attempt to capture within an analytical device the complex
ties between individual citizens and political leaders.
These ties are complex because they designate a national
community based on the shared yet mutable traits of human
emotion and a sense of responsibility before history.
Detached from his orations on the East Elbian labor
problem, and not yet consumed by the furies of the First
World War, Weber approaches the
-ideal-type" of the nation
as such from an historical perspective. This is clear in
his 1914 preface to Economy and RnoWy There he
"proceeded from the view that the development of the economy
must be investigated primarily as a particular phenomenon of
the general rationalization of life .- 12 His theoretical
Ideal of the nation as such unfolds, therefore, along an
historical trajectory that confirms the ever-increasing
mastery of worldly forces by human calculation. Yet this
trajectory, and the analytical devices to which it
corresponds, imparts something different and, at times,
contrary to the "ideal-type" of the nation. Indeed, Weber's
impartial depiction of the nation posits both a specific
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Kind of "pathoS " and a speci£ic sentiment Q£ ^
ltS thSOretical foundation. 13 it indicates, I believe, a
break from the history of » rationalization" and the
"logical., structure of rdeal- types. Equally important I
think Weber 1 s theoretical ideal of the natron challenges hrs
own understanding of the
-.machinery., of modern politics. 1 *
The postulates of pathos and solidarity reveal the
degree to which Weber extends the German tradition of
theorizing the nation, a tradition that, ironically, stems
from the work of Rousseau, with his 1762 work On the
Contract, Rousseau elicited responses from seve^TTI^^
and early- 19th century German Idealist thinkers who fixed on
his belief in the
..collective" ambitions of "private-
persons. As each person "contracts" with another, Rousseau,
declared, "this act .. .produces a moral and collective body,
composed of as many members as there are voices in the
assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its
common self, its life, and its will.-- This reference to
the "general will " inspired Herder, among others, to
challenge not Rousseau's idea of community per se, but his
notion of the contract which informs it. Against this idea
of contract, which Herder contested on the basis of its a
prion gesture toward "the outcries of nature," he posited a
human community on man's "invention" of language. Thus, he
charged m his 1770 "Essay on the Origin of Language,"
[t]he first human thought is...
a
preparation for the
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With this
possibility Of dialoguing with others!" 1 *
communal view of language, Herder rendered it theu a source of
national feelings," a trait-ait that comes from "the dark
engender one another, where an urgent occasion musters all
the soul," 17 it was this emotional element in
Herder
-s work that allowed Weber to perceive the nation in
terms of historical change rather than man's static nature.
In his chapter on "Political Communities" in Economy
Weber portrays the nation in terms of a unique
"Pathos" such that it influences a specific group of people
However, Weber deviates from Herder's vision of a Holkstaat
insofar as he concentrates on a group's shared feelings and
not on the "objective" trait of language that transmits
them. In contrast to the Marxian and positivist tenets of
early-20th century social science, moreover, Weber argues
that the "fervor of this emotional influence does not, in
the main, have an economic origin. It is based upon
sentiments. of prestige." 1 ' By "sentiments of prestige,"
Weber means the shared bond between individual members of a
community, in which each "individual is expected to face
death m the group interest." 19 Given this "common
struggle of life and death, " a political community takes
form around "joint memories" that often outweigh the more
objective bonds of language, religion, race, ethnicity, or
economy. in fact, according to Weber, these sentiments
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"strengthen the ardent belief in the actual existence ofone s own might, and this is important fnor positive self-
assurance in case of conflict..,. Thus Weber do0s ^ground the ideal-type of nation solely on the basis of
objective measures. Rather, he grounds it on the "enduring
emotional foundations" nf a oo a group of individuals,
foundations that are prone to subjective impulse, not simply
empirical measurement
.
Weber also characterizes the nation as such in terms of
each individual's historical
"responsibility" toward the
future of the community. He perceives the source of this
responsibility to be that- .Y that which coincides with the
sentiments of prestige: the shared pathos that comes from
"facing death" in the interest of the nation. But rather
n merely fortify a passionate belief in the right and
might of the nation, this idea of responsibility entails a
belief in the perpetuation of the nation's own "succeeding
generations Given this latter belief, which connotes a
transcendent, other-worldly depiction of the nation, Weber
claims "great power structures per se are then held to have
a responsibility of their own for the way in which power and
prestige are distributed between their own and foreign
polities Indeed this "responsibility before history"
imparts, not just an added degree of emotion to the nation,
but a universal value by which the nation accrues,
maintains, and expands its power among other nations.
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The responsibility which individuals fegl^ ^
uture members of their community indicates another aspect
;;.;
eber,s ide
— - -— - t aspect is power
.6 eXPl °ring the
- "Ethnic Croups" rn
an^asiety, Weber remarks that "the concept [of nation]
seems to refer... to a specific kind of pathos which is
linked to the idea of a powerful political community of
people Yet, again, he untangles this link in a more
precise way in his exploration of "Political Communities "
Based on its shared sentiments of prestige, which foster a
sense of collective prowess, Weber maintains that the nation
strrves to confirm "the glory of power over other
communities... the expansion of power.- However, this
struggle for national power does not necessarily involve an
aggressive physical conquest of another nation's territory.
He notes instead that it is "usually anchored in the
superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the
cultural values that are to be preserved and developed only
through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group."”
This struggle thus involves the moral and political
depletion of those values that diverge from the ideal of the
nation itself, such that they promote either one differing
Ideal or a multitude of competing ideals. Hence human
pathos and responsibility more than clarify Weber's
theoretical design of the nation as such. They clarify,
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too, the type of absolute power that i = •P s pivotal to itslongevity in a world of other nations.
hS natl°n asserts this power over the differing values
i s crtrzens and other nations with the assistance of the
odern bureaucratic state. "The more power is emphasized,"
Weber explains,
"the closer appears to be the link between
nation and state.
m
his chapter on "Bureaucracy "
moreover, he defines the developmental path of this rule-
based and regulatory machine as one that inevitably
approaches the modern state. The state's role in the
nation s reach for power thus appears in "its purely
technical superiority over any other form of organization."
It affords the nation " [p] recision, speed, unambiguity
,
knowledge of the files, continuity, strict subordination,
reduction of friction and of material and personal
costs."” The state's untimely qualities surface, however,
insofar as its superiority over the nation's opponents also
risks expunging the human pathos that forms the basis of the
nation as such. As Weber makes clear, the modern state
"develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanized,'
the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official
business.
. .all purely personal, irrational, and emotional
elements." The state is as indispensable to the nation's
power as it is pernicious to the emotions undergirding the
nation's design. It therefore suggests, I think, the first
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of several theorpi-
-i i ^oretical discrepancies involving Weber's
ideal
-type of the nation as such,
view of the chot,-, / „
.
. .
state s reiatron to the nation denotes
screpancy in that the former's " technicali-ecnnic superiority"
implies a dismissal of the latter's
"enduring emotional
foundations Undoubtedly, he insists that the "impersonal
and functional purposes" of the state "frequently gain an
ideological halo from cultural values
... which appear as
surrogates for a this
-worldly or other-worldly personal
master and which are embodied by a given group.- with
regard to the nation, though, Weber also posits the state as
a mechanism that gradually confines the human struggles, or
"frictions," which stem from a multitude of human
convictions.
"A direet-r ct road leads," he says, referring to
^-•h.0 of o f- —j f
u
.phe state, from mere modifications of the blood
feud... to the present position of the policeman as the
'representative of God on earth.'"’" The state thus
assures the nation both emotional and ideological uniformity
among its individual members in return for a mask of honor
and integrity. Yet, when the dispassionate forces of
officialdom make this mask transparent, the state also
assures the nation nothing more than a disciplined
"discharge of business according to calculable rules and
without regard for person. ' 1,31
This discrepancy between the state's function and the
nation's exalted moral status points to another
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contradiction in Weber's political thinking. i t tends to
surface when the state utilises the nation in its own
reach toward greater power. Put a different way
the modern bureaucratic state seeks to advance more than ^he
nation's power. Weber notes, for instance, the extent to
which "those groups who hold the power to steer common
conduct within a polity" are the same ones who "most
strongly instill themselves with this idealist fervor of
Power prestige In view of these
"interested" members,
the state's advance of the nation's power represents neither
an entirely technical nor a wholly national project. Such
"status groups" as the military, intelligentsia, civil
servants, and politicians
"remain the specific and most
reliable bearers of the idea nf t-ho *-he state as an imperialist
power structure demanding unqualified devotion ." 33 The
nation's power thus derives, not just from the technical
Vigor of the state per se, but from those impassioned groups
who wield the state in favor of one expressed national
ideal. It resides, furthermore, on the perilous ground of
the modern state, perilous because the narrow ideals that
inform the methods of the state defy the broad emotions that
unify the individual persons of a nation.
Limited by the state's technical purpose and its most
entrenched members, Weber's theoretical ideal of the nation
is also bound by its responsibility to future generations.
The limits of responsibility have less to do with the
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9""“" 01 * "~«v .... „« „ „t e metaphysical framework of the nation itself By
:r;r
tne nation °n a
.
1 e and deaCh " and a hist °ry Of
"superiority, and
xrreplaceability,
- Weber underscores
^likeness which will persist ,, .after their demise."” This
anscendence of the nation's temporal boundaries in the
present signifies a narrowing of the nation's
"sphere of
values." it narrows this sphere for the sake ofx cn a singular
vrew Of the nation's future: that is, the perpetuation of
the nation's present across time. However, as Weber
remarks, the metaphysical reach of responsibility largely
extends from a group of
"intellectuals" whom he designates
specifically predestined to propagate the 'national
idea.'- In light Qf tMs cQntroi Qf ^ a ^
elites, Weber's idea of national responsibility operates
from a finite, even calculated position-a position at odds
wrth the nation's collective pathos. For all its universal
aims, then, the nation's responsibility toward its future
Citizens is not without its theoretical incongruities.
Besides its responsibility before history, its drive
for power, and its union with the state, the nation's
"emotional foundations" confront one additional challenge.
That challenge stems from the theoretical construction of
human "pathos" itself, which Weber links to an individual's
duty to face death for the good of the national group. Yet,
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“trata that are '" privile9ed within a polity and, indeed,
riV1 ^ ^ ltS Very Whence ." 38 These groups of
citizens
, who, according to Weber,
-think of themselves asbeing the specific
-partners' of a specific
'culture,'"
represent the stewards of the nation's emotional union
"Under the influence of these circles,- he notes,
-the naked
prestige of
-power' is unavoidably transformed into other
special forms of prestige and especially into the idea of
the 'nation. Therefore, though he postulates the
nation as such on the shared pathos of individuals, Weber
still situates its fate in the hands of certain individuals.
They are individuals who, because of their fixed convictions
and instrumental functions in the state, promise the nation
the prestige of power as well as a breach of emotions.
By predicating the ideal-type of the nation on the
groundwork of human pathos, Max Weber admits to the
individual's integral role in the nation's "common political
struggle of life and death." But his theory of the nation
as such also emphasizes "that it is proper to expect from
certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the
face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the
sphere of values ." 38 It is evident from this theoretical
difference that the emotional basis which Weber ascribes to
the nation privileges, not the individual person
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t7
SarUy
' bUt th°Se
can best marshall thePa h°S ° f °thSr in—- Moreover, insofar as elite3roups consolidate the nation- s indrvidual passions, it
evident that they-and not individuals-champion the
feelings concerning the nation-s sense of power prestige.
ce Weber s premise about the "emotional influence" of the
nation as such confirms the extent to which a passion for
glory, power, and greatness supersedes differing passions
- the nation itself. x„ other words, it confirms a narrow
rather than broad "sphere of values," suggesting a type of
politics that is bound by the anal nf9 a o national glory and a
restricted idea of human struggle.
The same can be said about Weber's premise of the
nation's responsibility toward succeeding generations. On
hand, he understands responsibility to involve a
shared sense of emotional solidarity between present and
future citizens. In this way, responsibility reveals a
universal bond that verifies the nation's historical
continuity and political purpose. On the other hand, he
perceives it to be a belief cultivated and maintained by
specific cultural and political elites who, with the
"idealist fervor of power prestige," strive to advance the
supremacy of the nation. Hence "responsibility" in this
context underscores neither the universal design of the
nation itself nor the ultimate end of national solidarity.
Weber's view of the term intimates instead the calculated
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aim of the nation as such wh-ii^
' lle Clrcumscribing the values
avaxlable to the national citizenry. This means ^ adividing line of sorts runs the length of the nation's sense
reSP°nSibility
'
3 llne by Persons whose zeal for
national power warrants the exclusion of
"irresponsible"
citizens from the nation's sphere of values. Accordingly
Weber's premise concerning the importance of national
responsibility no longer foreshadows the nation's sense of
solidarity. in fact, it portends a rift-P c a ft among citizens and
leaders, a rift which imperils «_that nation's reach for power
in the present and future.
with pathos and responsibility as the basis of the
nation as such, I think Weber unwittingly affords an insight
into the theoretical factors that obstruct politics and
national glory. Furthermore, inasmuch as the nation strives
to feel the "prestige of power, " he emphasizes the self-
interested groups that govern and guide the nation, denoting
simultaneously the aims which justify restraint on the human
struggles of politics. Such restraint, however, tends to
impede the nation's chances of achieving historical
greatness. By infusing the nation with the state's
'•technical superiority," Weber theorizes the nation on the
basis of something more calculable than the emotional traits
of a citizenry. He situates it, too, on the state's
ordering of the nation's emotional solidarity. Given this
impassive state function, I thus believe Weber's ideal-type
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outcomes
.
atl°n Slgnifles at least two troublesome
^ flrSt
'
° f C°UrSe
' iS ^tion of friction" betweenpassionate individuals who, with distinct ideals, help
:7r
Se the^ StrU39lS ° f
- second is the
h
y eliminati0n ° f
— emotions which may not aid
e nation- s "superiority, and
"irreplaceability,
„ but whlch
nevertheless mirror its impassioned landscape. Both
outcomes thus demonstrate the degree to which Weber- s theory
of the nation as such presages limited occasions for both
thS^ StrU93le ° f and the glory of the nation.
Race and
m his 1895 Freiburg Inaugural Address, Max Weber
detects a national crisis more troubling than the demise of
Prussian authority, the immaturity of the German working
class, or the rise in Slavic immigration, what troubles him
18 WUhelmine Germany - s self-imposed curse of "the hard fate
of the political epigone .
" His perception of epigone
derives, in part, from Bismarck's deft and forceful
unification of a culturally divisive Germany in 1871. As a
result of this monumental struggle, Weber beholds a nation
in which the taste for political conflict and new historical
challenges dissipates in the air of military conquest and
elative social calm. His view of Germany's
"political
epigone" is such that "a peculiarly
' unhistorical
- and
unpolitical spirit seized the rising generation of the
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ema" b°Ur3e0isie
' as it was with success and thirs
f°r PeaCe '" 59 BUt i»« a rebuke against the
bourgeoisie, Weber- s view o£ epigone includes the entire
Wilhelmine citizenry for whom, with great naivete
,
„German
history appeared to be over. The present was the complete
fulfillment of the past thousands of years.- Given this
depiction of epigone, Weber suggests that the least of
Germany-
s problems reside in the structural shifts occurring
in East Elbia. The nation's problem appears in the "mass-
psychological" flaws of its citizens, who would rather
subject the German nation to a legacy of dull mediocrity
than struggle for the aim of national greatness.
By denoting epigone as Wilhelmine Germany's primary
impediment to national greatness, Weber also acknowledges
the principal task facing Germany.
-we shall not succeed in
exorcising the curse that hangs over us...," he proclaims,
referring to the fate of epigone, "unless we discover how to
become something different: the precursors of an even
greater epoch. "« This transformation, which for Weber
entails "an immense work of political education," is
important from the standpoint of his theory of politics, in
that politics represents the means of cultivating a
community of people. It is also important with regard to
Weber's view of the German nation, since his desire to
transform it into "something different" discloses a
theoretical concern for the individual. In fact, Weber says
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that hS ^ MS SCh°lar^ “leagues in the cultural
sciences Mo not want to breed well-being in people
, ^
rather those characteristics which we think of as
stituting the human greatness and nobility of our
nature This concern for the individual territory of
the German nation i ssue s from Weber's view of epigone, but
rt opposes the push of "this hard fate" toward political
inertia
. Rather, his early approach to the German nation
stresses the alteration of an individual's
"psychological
and physical racial characteristics" which make the nation
prone to historical and political oblivion.
«
Max Weber'S desire to educate the individual citizen
again reveals an affinity with Rousseau, notably the
Rousseau who penned ffleGoverns^p^ in 1772 Facefl
with Russian domination, a group of Polish citizens
solicited Rousseau's thoughts on the measure that could best
foster a sense of national independence among all Poles.
Like Weber before his Freiburg audience, Rousseau's response
was direct: "it is education that you must count on to shape
the souls of the citizens in a national pattern and so to
direct their opinions, their likes, and dislikes that they
shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of
necessity. "« This view of education, however, which
foretold of Polish youth absorbed in "public" and "physical
activity," deviated from Weber's idea in that it presupposed
a "natural" person who, thanks to "private" customs, spurned
105
hiS
h
trUS HSnCe 1 tMnk SidSS
who,
" » 182! work on
censured
or reducing
"the union of individuals in the state to a
contract and therefore to something based on their arbitrary
W111S -’' 5 FiXinS °n the
''frightfulness and terror- that
issued from the French Revolution, Hegel rebutted his
Genevan predecessor, charging that
-the individual
.. .has
objectivity, genuine individuality- not by virtue of an aprion nature, but because of
-the state- which
-is mind
objectified. Though Weber clearly rejects Hegel's
notion of the state as
-an absolute unmoved end in itself -
he accepts Hegel's critique of Rousseau. it is a critique
that permits Weber to situate his idea of a political
education between a willful individual and a forceful
bureaucratic state.
the Freiburg lecture, which he titled "The Nation
State and Economic Policy," Weber insists that "race"
(Rasse) marks the key element in Germany's education of its
zens. At the lecture's outset, he expounds a desire "to
illustrate, from just one example, the role played by
physical and psychological racial differences between
nationalities in the economic struggle for existence.""
The struggle to which Weber refers pertains to the influx of
Slavic immigrants into what was at that time the eastern
frontier of Germany. They came in search of work and
freedom on the landed estates of East Elbia, estates which
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German laborers vacated for factorv h k •
j n
C ° y 3 °bs ln cities and towns
western Germany. For Weber
, the lntriguing
either by "nature" or „breeding
,
„^^
lving conditions on the Junker estates. it is a
..racial.,
difference no less, one which explains their willingness
"even to eat grass', in return for the chance to work a
Parcel of German farmland. Such indignities, he charges,
Issd back
. . .to onp pnH +->-1^e same reason, namely lower
tations of the standard of living.
.. something which is
either natural to the Slav race or has been bred into it in
the course of its history.- coupled with a German
reluctance to change the estate economy for the sake of the
"homeland,', the Slavs-
..racial., traits signify a nation that
endures grave structural alterations. Indeed, these traits
"have helped the Slavs to victory, in Germany- s eastern
frontier
.
Max Weber- s view of the German nation's racial
foundation stems from the Slavic capacity to make "the
fewest physical and ideal demands on the quality of life."
it informs his belief that "the two nationalities differ in
their ability to adapt to the varying economic and social
conditions of existence."” The idea of "adaptability"
(Anpassungsfahigkeit
) reflects the one component which,
according to Weber, the German race finds wanting. The
result of this process, he continues, is such "that one
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is the
7 dS t0 thS °thSr
' that the ViCt°rious nationality
J one Possessing the greater ability to adapt itself togiven economic and social condi tions of life ." 50 Givenwhat Weber sees as the di f
•
and
ffering racial traits o£ Germans
Slavs,- the ability to adapt to the changing
accumulate of German farmlands. More important, though,
ack of such a
"mass-psychological"
orientation
Geman natlon with
' ^ not the
"disappearance"
its cultural life, then its submission to a more
ersatile nation. Hence Weber's view of Germany's failure
to adapt to change in East Elbia punctuates its passive
racial composition, as well as it indicates the chief
deterrent to political struggle and national greatness.
The task facing the German "racial" nation thus reveals
itself in a willful cultivation of its citizenry. i„ other
words, it is an educational task that seeks to challenge the
historical fate of epigone, Germany's racial constitution,
the German citizen's apathy toward future glory. "The
question which stirs us," continues Weber, speaking to some
of Germany's most esteemed scholars, "is not the well-being
human beings will enjoy in the future but what kind of
people they will be."« The target of this task of
••political education," however, is not "the broad masses of
the nation" but "the political qualifications of the ruling
and rising classes."- Accordingly, it entails the
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cultivation of "nn7
.
n
al maturity" among the leadership
circles of the German bourgeoisie anrij-yeois d proletariat. in
short, Weber means "their araw -f9 P ° f the nation's enduring
economic and political power interests and their
ability... to place these interests above all other
considerations
."
53 A ]fbnnrt , ,Although he voices doubt about the
outcome of this task, he remains convinced that immersions
-to the human struggle for power
..breed., anything but "a
soft, eudaemonistic outlook" within the r-ecn German nation if
such a political education prepares a "leading strata" for
the strenuous struggles of the future," Weber surmises, the
German nation might have a chance to alter its racial make-
Up and prospects for glory.
In addition to advocating the maturation of Germany's
leaders, Weber argues that the modern state must act on
behalf Of the German racial nation. it must do so, he
continues,. insofar as it defends German citizens against the
influx of immigrant Slavs in East Elbia
. Moreover, it must
do so because it reflects "the worldly organisation of the
nation s power. In this nation-state the ultimate criterion
for economic policy, as for all others, is in our view
reason of state'.’"* with regard to East Elbia, Weber
notes the gravity of state intervention relative to
relieving Junkers of their authority over inefficient
estates and protecting German farmlands from foreign
appropriation. To ignore such a strategy only nurtures "an
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solated domestic economy,"
.
„ slavic invasion „ ^ ^1St“rbln9! 3 fSelin9 ° f "homelessness" across the eastem
reaches of the Wilhelmine German nation
.
„ Prom thg
standpoint of nation," he a<5qpn c •sserts with an eye on the
Prussian aanots,
-large-scale enterprises which can only bePreserved at the expense of the German race deserve to go
destruction. To leave them to their own devices
means permitting unviable colonies of starving Slavs to come
“to SXiStenCe ^ ^ gradual parcelling-off of the
estates Weber thus concludes
"that the German race
should be protected in the east," and that the state "ought
to rise to the challenge of defending it" by subsidizing
efficient German ownership of East Elbian farmlands.
«
udgmg from the "racial characteristics" he ascribes
to Germans, and the "breeding" tactics he thinks might
correct them, I believe Weber's early depiction of the
German nation reveals several theoretical disparities. The
first of which concerns Weber's understanding of race as the
central component of the German nation. By positing the
German nation on the basis of race Weber tends to highlight
not so much the specific racial characteristics of Germans
nor even the Slavs for that matter. instead, he illuminates
the racial traits which the German nation lacks: "the German
agricultural labourers can no longer adapt to the social
conditions of life in their homeland ." 57 If there is a
racial ground that underlies his idea of the German nation,
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V thS ShaPS °f PrUSSian
— owners who privllegepatriarcha] t- -r=, h 4- • ^ 9iai tradition over canit-ai-i *- ^apitalist development, abourgeoisie that prefers q Pl * • .
.
If-mterested eudaemonism tocollective qlorv , .y, and a working class that favors lifc“1CiSm t0 nat“- — -e tension i„
e er s idea of the nation is that the "racial
characteristics" of Gemats confirm a collective
unwillingnesg to adapt tQ change fQr the ^
"homeland." indeed ^
.
- y indicate a fragmented nation in
e present whose only hope for unity, power, and glory
resides in a speculative gesture toward the future.
What further complicates Weber's racial design of theGerman nation is his understanding of adaptability. He
perceives the idea of adaptability in terms of what the
n race refuses to do in East Elbia, notably Prussian
Junkerdom' s aversion to land efficiency, global competition,
and the money-wage economy. According to Weber, this lack
of an "ability to adapt to the conditions of its existence-
marks the most profound characteristic of the German race
It is a "tragic" deficiency, he says, one issuing from
Bismarck's Caesarist rule, which "was meant to lead not
merely to the external, but also to the inner unification of
the nation, and... that has not been achieved."- insofar
as it derives from this milieu and denotes a pivotal trait
German race, Weber's idea of adaptability confirms
the absence of a racial dimension in the German nation.
Ill
Th,s absence he again recesses with negative giances
oward the future, when the natron might be better prepared
o embrace change and the human struggles thatyyJ-e accompany it.
s for the present, Weber's • *. r,o s racialist depiction of the
natron simply suggests a theoretical rift between Wilhelmine
many s historical situation and its potential disposition
toward change. It also connotes a formidable barrier to
German national unity, power, and glory.
The tensions underlying these ideas of race and
adaptability, however, do not prevent Weber from
prioritizing the ideal of the German nation. For the
ailure of the German race to embrace willingly the
structural changes and human struggles in East Elbia merely
marks the conditions for the possibility of national
greatness. it also explains Weber's idea of a "political
education" for the German nation, the aim of which is to
render "the specific function of the leading economic and
political strata to be the bearers of the nation's sense of
political purpose (Sinn) Yet, educating these strata
to push for "the social unification of the nation" exposes a
tension in Weber's idea of the German nation, such that he
again stipulates a select group of persons to advance a
collective ambition. By stipulating a "leading strata" as
the source of national unity, Weber confounds his racial
design of the nation with a political divide between persons
who consciously guide and those who simply comprise the
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German race Tf t-y,-; „
racial
'
‘ SU99SStS anything about Weber - 8reding ° £ ^ G™ it is that the
explicit political function of leadership overrules thev^gue and passive role nf t->,o the citizenry. m other words itappears as though some Germans are more raci ,,
others.
ially sound than
political dlvide also surfaces in Weber's view of
h
StatS
'
"hiCh
- Reives to be the guardian of
e racial constitution of the German nation. state
ewardship of the racial nation constitutes a tension in
Weber's political thinking since he designates this "worldly
organisation" as the "final ,n and decisive say in all
questions of German economic policy.-” Thus neither race
nor any other cultural trait or value for that matter
represents the guiding force of the German nation m
addition, the state compounds this tension in that Germany's
racial ability to change depends on the state's power "to
free the economic forces of •the nation from their fetters
and to tear down the barriers in the way of their autonomous
development Contrary to the belief that it stems from
an inner" quality culled from human pathos, the racial
trait of adaptability derives from the "external" force of
the state. It is a force, in fact, that orchestrates social
conditions in a way most promising to the German nation.
refore, Weber s view of the German state supersedes the
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racial make-up o £ the nation, undercutting the centrality of
race and the political prospects of unity and glory
If Weber' s early perspective on the German nation
3 eopardizes the prospect of politics, there is little doubt
postulate of race is partly to blame. On the one
hand, he argues that Germany's racial traits promise little
more than a future of economic anachronisms and cultural
subservience, especially given the East Elbia "situation"
and power struggles with other nations. This racial flaw
certainly invites class struggles, Slavic immigrants,
feelings of alienation and homelessness among German
citizens, and a fixation on tradition despite the advances
of economic rationality. On the other hand, Weber argues
that the German race requires individual rulers who can
acknowledge and convey to others the "enduring economic and
political power interests" of the German nation. For these
’bearers of the nation's sense of political purpose (Sinn) "
represent the unifying link across a German race fragmented
by differing class and cultural interests, as well as by a
narrowly fixed center of political and economic power.
Whether it illustrates a collective apathy toward historical
change or a mandate for the cultivation of select
individuals, Weber's race postulate holds little hope for
broadening the prospects of politics in the German nation.
His idea of adaptability also accounts for another
factor that is central to the further diminishment of
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politics in the German nation, when Weber talks about
G
a
e
Ptabllity ifc iS
— - means the facility of therman race to fight in a unrfred manner tor the "endurrng"interests and values mirrored in the nation. After all he
-ws the German race as "imagining that peace and harnessHe waiting in the womb of the future ,ie r , even though it
embodies a dying Junker class
, . grQwing^
and a leadership vacuum in German politics. Thus, as with
postulate, Weber alters the idea of adaptability
when he claims that Germans must '.become something
different," yielding
-the dream" of peace and happiness for
"the strenuous struggles of the future." Yet this
alteration fails to include "the broad masses of the
nation, " whom he thinks are too often distracted by their
"struggle with daily necessity" to appreciate the magnitude
of the nation' s struggle for glory. Rather, it includes
only that "strata" of individuals who are "mature" enough to
Sacrifice their mundane personal interests for the advance
of the "enduring" power-interests of Germany. insofar as
his idea of adaptability indicates a nation either prone to
passivity or partial to specific leaders, Weber's racial
nation again reflects a narrow scope of political options.
But only When these racial traits mix with Weber's
quest for a vigorous breed of citizen does his idea of the
German nation reveal the narrow scope politics and the
limited reach toward national glory, witness his idea of
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persons
P°litiCal SdUCati°- “ struct, only certain
to raise themselves into the hard, clear air in which
sober work. of German politics finnr' uS lou ishes
, an atmosphere
which, however, is also filled with bhhe earnest grandeur ofnational sentiment ." 62 The nrr.m • ,problem with this instruction
“ ““ “ * ““-v 1. u, e„„ny
•»- o,
struggles" that advance the ideal of roa i German national
It is that the theoretical consequence of this
presupposition induces Weber to designate a
.'leading strata"
of citizens to be the chief political agent of the national
ideals of WUhelmine Germany. The German nation ^ges,
not so much a shared racial e utrait such as adaptability, but
select individuals who, because of i' C their learned
"maturity «
elevate the "enduring" values of the nation above all
others. If Weber denotes such leaders as best able to
embrace change with a sense of national purpose, his idea of
the German nation defies both the broad reach of race and
the variety of values in politics.
Besides cleaving the nation's racial foundation through
the elevation of specifically
"mature" individuals, Weber
fragments it further by granting the state the "final and
decisive say" in German politics. After all, it is not the
German race per se-with its fractious interests and values-
-that must adapt to the shifting social structures in East
Elbia. Nor is it the "leading strata" who go forth into
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"the strenuous struggles of the future »
of _
t ,” pushing the idealsGerman national power and greatnessa . Rather, as "theIdly organisation of the /nation s power,
" the state
orchestrates Germany racial faculty to emhraoe historioal
3 It does so by encouraging land sales in the east
market expansion abroad, and leadership struggles at home'.
nsolidating the German race and instructing German
political leaders, the modern state from Weber- s viewpoint
represents more than a vehicle for na r
•
t national power and glory.
Ironically, I believe it represents a barrier to the human
struggle of politics and, thus, German national glory
especially given the state- s narrow range of goals and its
decisive control over the mixed values of the citizenry.
idea of the German state thus undercuts his idea of
the German. racial nation, revealing how its "worldly
organisation" dispels the normative scope of the nation-
s
granduer" and "nobility."
Eerrenvolk and NaM™
One onerous bit of history differentiates Weber- s later
theoretical approach to the nation from his earlier ones:
Wilhelimine Germany- s role in the First World War. Besides
confirming his loyalty to the German nation, the war
illustrates the extent to which Weber blames Germany's
political institutions for prolonging the conflict and
weakening the nation's prospects of power. He does not
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th
attribute these institutional flaws to either
e specter of
..epigone- or
-the general rationalisation of
e- Rather, he attributes them to the effects of such
conditions as
: bureaucratic control of foreign policy
Provincial party structures, the lack of responsible
'
politicians, and the absence of universal suffrage - At
“1S PreClSe ^ n°teS in
-hen the Great War
as reached the stage where diplomacy i s raaking its VQiceheard again, it is high time to do everything we can to
prevent the old errors being committed all over again...«
Weber seeks to theorize, therefore, a way that allows the
German nation
-to become something different- after the war,
but he ceases to posit that project on the basis of race or
human pathos
.
64 He inqi-oaHste d attempts to ground the German
nation on the idea of " Herrenvni u- »ntizrenvo k, a community of
individuals who actively particinaiP
-iny ui p te m the nation's
political institutions
.
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The role of institutions in Weber's idea of an
errenvolk is not unlike that which Rousseau stipulates in
hiS ”°rk °n^Government of Poland. indeed, Rousseau
advised the Poles that
-national institutions" are what give
'form to the genius, the character, the tastes, and the
customs of a people
... what arouses in it that ardent love of
fatherland that is founded upon habits of mind impossible to
uproot." The German variant of Rousseau's approach to
institutions, moreover, manifested itself in the work of
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Fichte
, who, like Herder before and Hegel after him
, still
contested the Genevan- s theoretical solace in a
.-natural..P-t. in 1808, as Napolean's troops were occupying parts ofPrussia, Fichte delivered his 14 MO.^to the^
311 " WMCh“
—1 renewal of Germany
on the institution of education „ ,. He lectured his Berlin
audience that
-the sole means of preservino theP g existence ofthe German nation = n Qnt
•
.
. .an entirely new self.
.
,
a universal and
national self" recruireri iq ed a total change of the existing
system of education His idea of education, however
countered Rousseau- s as well as Kant-s in that it sought to
bridle an individual's free will for the sake of one
Platonic ideal. it replaced an "old system" with one that
"completely destroys freedom of will in the soil which it
undertakes to cultivate, and produces on the contrary strict
necessity in the decisions of the will.- Insofar as such
"decisions" concerned the advance of the German nation, I
believe Weber shares Fichte's view of institutions, even
though he rejects the idea that they be guided by the
"educated classes" of Germany.
Again like Fichte and other German Idealists, Weber
initiates his exploration of an Herrenvolk from the
standpoint of what the German nation lacks near the end of
the First World War.- He notes in his 1917 "Parliament
Government articles that postwar Germany cannot embrace
the "sterile and sentimental reminiscences of the
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regime,
governmental practices of the oldLn OJ
- " nor
"any theoretical search fn
Pursue
“ 3 5peci£l“Hy 'German' form ofthe state." 7 ” These
more th
tradxtxons" promise Germany littlean a parliament that forbidiac t rbids universal suffrage abureaucracy that lauds secrecy a mnC
' onarchy that relishes
y
'.
and SdUCated
"'ttterateurs" who belittle sober
a tempts to move the nation in a different direction In
contrast
, he charges, Germany must become "a 'nation of
masters
' (Herrenvolk,
, which means a people controlling the
elected representatives shar-incr •
p .
' S ar
^ decisively in the selection
° ltS leaders ." 77 His idea of Herrenvoi, thus
ignifies what the German nation was not up until the final
years of the war. It signifies, too, what he believed were
the normative aspirations of postwar Germany.
Max Weber's idea of an Herrenvolk symbolizes what
Wilhelmine Germany might become if it undertakes to
institute certain
"political arrangements" in the present.
If Germany desires more than administrative efficiency and
historical mediocrity, if it wants a "decisive say" in the
"universal trends" of the future, then " [t ]he internal
structure of the nation, including its political structure,
has to be adapted to this task ." 77 Indeed, Weber argues
further that parliamentary institutions constitute the most
effective structure for this task of national reform. He
supports this claim with his notion of a "working"
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parliament; in which the lecri si ^cn g lature scrutinizes the
bureaucracy, parties train the politicianSi politicians
Persuade the masses, and the masses select the politicians.
only a working, as opposed to a merely fve c talking parliament "he exPlarns, "can be the soil in which.
. .genuinely political
qualities of lsadpr^hi nhip can grow and work their way up
through a process of selection n„c . By assuring that rulers
and the ruled "are actively involved in shaping the politics
°f their country," Weber- s view of the "machinery" of
parliament' illustrates the means by which the German nation
becomes an Herrenvolk.
Given its potential for political self-mastery,
however, Weber warns the German nation that such a path to
power and greatness features neither happiness nor
certainty. Indeed, he contends that "technical changes" in
Germany-
s political structure "do not in themselves make a
nation vigorous Uucttig)
, nor happy, nor valuable. They
can clear away mechanical obstacles in its path and are
therefore merely means to an end."- The nation's task of
becoming an Herrenvolk thus entails, not only "a politically
mature people, " but "the sure instinct of other nations" who
will challenge Germany's "decisive say" in world affairs,
in other words, Weber believes the conversion of a nation of
"officials" into a nation of "'masters'" assures Germany
only a chance-
-not a guarantee--to struggle with other
nations for power. Conversely, "if parliament were to fail
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uncertainty, but it o .p .t is a future that signals many more
prospects for crreatnes^ i-htan , , .s than anything the present affords
the Wilhelmine nation.
The contingencies of the future, however, do not
preclude the German nation from utilizing a variety of
political beacons. In addition to its parliamentary
"machinery,
" Weberns nation of masters inevitably relies on
the modern bureaucratic state for its guidance. it is not
that the Wilhelmine German nation lacks the efficient
services of an administrative state. On the contrary, Weber
notes, "we lacked
... leadership of the state by a politician
which does not mean a political genius... nor even an
important political talent, but simply anyone who was a
politician at all.- His idea of a German Herrenvolk
requires a particular type of state, the will of which
reveals neither a monarch whose authority comes with birth
nor a bureaucrat whose duty to an office outweighs his
individual
-ideals. The will of such a state manifests
itself in a politician who, on account of his parliamentary
training, is more than just "moved by the political fate of
his people. This politician, says Weber, "will think in
terms of the next two to three generations, even where the
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creation o£ new political formations is concerned, since
' SSe are th
I
Pe°Ple Wh° Wil1^ what is to become of25 natl0n '" The link between an Herrenvolk and the
.
thUS 1SSUeS "either from an emotionally or racially
identified group of people. According to Weber, who by 1917
seeks a structural remedy for Germany's internal maladies
Xt iSSUSS fr°m a SPSCiflC Of person. That person is
'
a
Politician, one who exemplifies leadership traits that bothblossom in
-F-i^rvn- *9 or national power and brave the public
scrutiny from the nation's masses.
insofar as an Herrenvolk denotes willful persons who
further their power with parliamentary
"political
arrangements," 1 contend that Weber , g war ^
the German nation suggests a few theoretical incongruities.
The first involves the link between the modern state and a
nation of masters. it is an incongruity in that the person
whom Weber posits as the leader of the Herrenvolk state "is
meant to be something different," someone who "will often
make compromises, which means sacrificing something of
lesser importance to something of greater importance."-
Hence he bases his idea of the nation state on a specific
type of person-a politician, who distinguishes himself from
bureaucrats, military commanders, monarchs, and even the
masses. The politician does so because he, unlike the other
members of
-an Herrenvolk, willingly endures the human
struggles of politics. "If he proceeds differently," Weber
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stipulates, referring to the person who leads the
Z
rrenVOlK "" iS n
°
-ould not Step into
e arena where the problems of the present are
contested The German Herrenvolk thus revolves around
two potentially opposing premises, one being that of
-a
politically mature people" and the Qther ^ a
"small number of leaders who master the nation.
s people
This difference between a nation of masters and a
leader who masters the natinn 0o is more apparent, and
problematic
,
given Germany's pursuit nf nny to o power and glory.
POl
^
1ClanS
' WSber argUSS
' are Pe°P!e who "live and breathe"
[t]he struggle for personal power and the acceptance of
full personal responsibility for one's cause (Sache, which
IS the consequence of such power. - Monarchs rarely
struggle for power, he continues; in fact, they are
typically born into it. He believes bureaucrats fail to
grasp the nuances of a power struggle; they instead excel at
detaching themselves from such impassioned tasks. Lastly,
he perceives the masses as having some degree of power, but
only in that it takes shape in "the selection of the leader"
by way of the ballot box. In light of the Herrenvolk's
struggle for power, therefore, a problem surfaces in Weber's
political thinking. it is a problem because he ascribes
this struggle, not to a willful citizenry, but to a
politician who "uses the means of mass demagogy to gain the
confidence of the masses and their belief in his person, and
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thereby gains power " 81 put- a
nf „„
U dl££erent
^y, Weber' s view
e national pursuit of power presupposes more than just" nSCeSSlty ° f Politicians. An »errenvolh lsopresupposes the necessity of a politician's mastery over theerman citizenry, suggesting not a "nationl of masters" but anation of nonresistant subjects.
e politician's parliamentary preoaret
-iy P P^ a ion for masterv
moreover, i ndicates another element of tension in Weber's
approach to the German Herrenvolk
. „eber is quite clear
about the role of parliamentary politics in th e
. ,
y m e formation of
e postwar German nation. indeed, he claims that the
"actual form" of this democratic structure "will depend on
- ere political personalities with the qualities of
leadership emerge and what role they play.- But Weber's
parliamentary blueprints involve more than the restriction
of rts purpose to the cultivation of political leaders. xt
entails an underlying premise about the limited nunfcer of
persons who qualify for inclusion within this structure
those who exhibit "a strong instinct for political power"
and potential for "political leadership". According to
Weber,
-[t]he 'principle of the small nu^er' (that is the
superior political manoeuvrability of small leading groups)
always rules political action. This element of 'Caesarism'
us ineradicable (in mass states)."” Judging from this
exclusionary design of politics, I thus believe Weber
expends theoretical energy cordoning off a vital portion of
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erman natl°n fr°m the^ Juggles which transform itln ° “
' - - - expense that diminishes them°ral " the—
- political thinking
.
Based on these three theoretical i
,
r incongruities, Weber's
;
° f thS
——ses a narrow approach
to the meaning of Herrenvolk. On the one hand, he claims
that for Germany to become a "'nation of masters'" it must
allow a people to control both the
"administration" of its
affairs and the "selection" of its political leaders. This
ggests politically engaged persons whose ambitions ought
to exceed those mirrored in he ^endency toward demagogic
persuasion,
"'occasional'" votes of ni,hihui_e 01 publ c support, and
submission to "'a small nu^er'
" of impassioned politicians.
On the other hand, Weber, while presaging Germany's unstable
P twar circumstances, stresses the necessity "to create the
organisational preconditions for the emergence of leaders,
and indeed everything now depends on this happening.-- If
the German nation "depends" on these "leaders," and if they
signify the control of the st^i^ate and the membership of power
Struggles, then Weber's idea of Herrenvolk points to
something other than a German "nation" of masters. It
points to a political situation in which the German nation
reflects both a select circle of "masters" and a sizable
constituency of "followers."
Given_ this contrast between a nation of masters and the
masters of a nation, I think Weber's view of the postwar
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German Herrenvolk indicafes a consirainf ^ ^
not the theoretical contrast itself, however, that
constrains politics. Rather, it has to do with Weber- s aimto privilege the political agency of a "'small number-" of
masters over the "unorganised mass" of the nation. Though
he grants the mass citizenry control over both the selection
of leaders and the ambitions of officialdom, Weber still
grounds the force of his project on the lone politician.
This politician, whose chief concern is "the political fate
of his people," represents the chief participant in Weber's
theory of politics-
-that struggle for state power between
extraordinary personalities. The individual citizen,
though, seeks power only to the extent that trade unions,
party hierarchies, political persuasion, and the ballot box
can discipline his otherwise
"emotional" and "undirected
mass fury." Weber's idea of a German Herrenvolk intimates a
type of politics in which an elite group of dynamic
politicians articulate, contest, and determine the
historical course of the nation. It also divulges a
national citizenry of persons whom Weber renders as
incompetent to take part in such endeavors. He relegates
them instead to a faceless plebiscite. An Herrenvolk thus
hinges, not so much on a politics that transforms a diverse
nation into masters--as Weber intends--but on a politics
that requires politicians to master the nation's citizens.
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A Similar situatlon Qccurs ^ 1±ght of view ^parliamentary democracy, which he perceives fc<> ^ ^
"technical., means for the advance of German nationalism In
addition to restricting politics to the confines of
parliamentary institutions, Weber stipulates an evaluative
criteria for those persons who wish to occupy this domain
He underscores that when the right person engages in
Politics, typically
-a cool and clear head... is all the morem command." From this criteria, others follow: " (i) the
smaller the number of those who participate in the
iberations, and (2) the more unambiguously
responsibilities are understood by each of the participants
and by those whom they lead."- m short sober judgment,
decisiveness, and responsibility speak volumes about the few
persons who qualify for politics in the German nation. Yet
they also speak volumes about the "danger" which
parliamentary democracy presents to German politics," one
which surfaces in a citizenry "exposed to momentary, purely
emotional and irrational influences."- By cordoning off
politics from "the unorganised mass," Weber bestows the
"political machinery" of Wilhelmine Germany, not to a
"'nation of masters,'" but to a group of politicians who are
quite distinct from the national citizenry. And insofar as
this distinction warrants entry into parliamentary politics,
Weber's idea of Herrenvolk reveals both a constraint on
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pol”‘°’ ™ ”™
»> it „ „«
,
master as well as a nation.
Judging from these fixed nniitipolitical options, Weber's
ater view of the German nation stresses the •mess imperative of
social order as much as the push for national power. After
t
a
h
X1
' thS PreC°ndltl0n Herrenvolk reguires more thane "emergence of leaders ^ ^ .
' of Political masters of the
equires what Weber calls the
"counterbalance tothS rUlG ° f the Streets whi oh is so typical of purely
plebiscitary nations and so nron^fao p e to momentary and
irrational influences 1,87 uox
. Re envisions this
"counterbalance" to be the machinery of parliamentary
Politics, and it does more than simply cultivate the
collective push for German national greatness. It limits
the citizen's promise of power to the ballot box, in which
party bosses, politicians, and bureaucratic officials seek,
in various' ways, to harness the "dangerous" desires of the
masses. If parliament's role is to limit rather than extend
a citizen's political power, then this machinery can easily
foster the prospects of German national greatness. However,
the consequence of this task manifests itself in a rigid
order that precludes a sizable segment of the nation
from mastering its own fate. Weber's idea of Germany as an
Herrenvolk thus illuminates, paradoxically, the limited
prospects of politics and, consequently, the limited
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likelihood of power, greatness, and glory for a German
nation of masters ' "
^alue
__of Nat inn
Earlier I drew a parallel between the political
thinking of Max Weber and thar of Tt Jean- Jacques Rousseau.
I stressed each thinker's desire tos a explore the formative
sources of a political community like the nat-iy ^K t on. Rousseau
perceives that source to hobe the individual, who, by virtue
°f 3 "natUral " ““ "private" disposition, affirms
the values
; interests, and appetites one innately shares
with other persons. As a result, he argues that "the social
order is a sacred right that serves as a basis for all the
others. However, this right does not come from nature,- it
is therefore based on conventions.- Though Rousseau
posits a peoples
' formation on the a priori ground of
nature," he still seeks social order through the use of
human artifice: i.e., sovereignty, law, government,
education, the state, etc. His theoretical task in On The
Sscia^ontract thus entails more than the philosophical
discovery of human nature and its pivotal role in the
formation of a political community. it entails his desire
to revitalize man's "nature" with humanly contrived social
institutions, which, ironically, breed an individual
proclivity toward alienation, corruption, and vanity.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau discusses the base influence of
uman institutions in his Discourses on "The Arts and
Scrences" and "The Origins of Inequality." In the first
discourse, which he wrote in 1750
, Rousseau charges that
such modern institutions as science, education, and the arts
sap persons of their "nat-^-,1 .. ^
- natural" desire to coalesce into a
unified political community Thev ay- y instead compel persons to
search for things external to one's self th
•
u , ings such as
wealth, luxury, and commercial action rather than
collective solidarity. " We have physicists, geometricians,
chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters in
plenty," he thus declares; "but we have no longer a citizen
among us.- In the second discourse, which he penned in
1755
, Rousseau continues the same line of argumentation,
only this time he stresses how modern institutions
not just "private” interests, but "inequality" as
well. Unlike "natural inequality," which derives from the
"physical" traits of man's strength, age, gender and mind,
he claims that "moral and political inequality.
. .depends on
a kind of convention, and is established.
. .by the consent of
men. The latter consists of the different privileges which
some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of
being more- rich, more honoured, more powerful, or even in a
position to exact obedience . ">» Institutions thus reveal
one of many paradoxes in Rousseau's thinking because they
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ensure both the perpetuation and the depletion of his
concept of the modern individual.
Judging from his three views of the nation, Weber
approaches the formative source of a poiiticai c«„lty
somewhat differently than Rousseau. m each case „ h-i-n n , Weber's
approach mirrors an historical context which challenges the
natural" dispositions of individuals. These challenges
include "the general rationalisation of life," wilhelmine
Germany's
"political epigone ," and the "'mass fate'" of the
P stwar German citizenry. Unlike Rousseau, they allow Weber
to view the source of a community in terms of an
individual's lack of "nature " 3 u • u, a lack which he observes in,
say, the German laborer or Junker in East Elbia. Such
challenges also allow him to see the source of a community
m the political institutions that transform- rather than
simply preserve-the collective traits of individual
persons. Indeed this perspective marks the underlying
assumption in his later works on "Suffrage and Democracy in
Germany" and "Parliament and Government in Germany." Given
these contrasts, Weber's view of the national community
highlights his departure from Rousseau's political thinking.
Furthermore, it stresses the significance of individuals and
institutions in his theory of the nation, as well as the
degree to which the condition of the German nation always
impels his own approach to poiiticai thinking. But more
important,.! think Weber's depictions of the nation exhibit
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a tension in his political thinking, such that the
individual and institutions that constitute the nation
simultaneously dispel its collective and elevated design.
With regard to his ideal
-type of the nation as such,
Weber stresses the element of human
'.pathos" insofar as it
mirr°rS “ individual ' s outy "to face death" in the name of
the nation. The relevance of these "enduring emotional
foundations
,
M howevpr i c *-
' E to be found in the "nature" of
individuals. According to Weber, these emotional traits
emerge only after a political community
"imposes obligations
on the individual members."” indeed, he believes the
relevance of a nation's shared sense of pathos takes the
shape of an "idea" which, since its "earliest and most
energetic manifestations
... contain [s] the legend of a
providential
' mission'
... this mission can consistently be
thought of only as a specific 'culture' mission."” Such a
universal overture, which informs a nation with claims to
"superiority" and
"irreplaceablity,
" indicates the ideal-
type of Weber's nation as such. As he points out, the
nation achieves its exalted status on the basis of its
political institutions, which cultivate "leaders" and
intellectuals" who are "expected to shoulder this
mission Hence the "ideal-type" of the nation as such
certainly discloses a emotional element that separates it
from Weber s other depictions of the concept. Yet it
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overall
imparts a universal dimension that portends the
design of Weber's idea of the nation.
The foreshadowing of this universal rM mo •di ension appears
moreover, in Weber's early racialist interpretation of the
nation. With the racial nation, he fixes on an objective
^a^ ^ WMCh 3 " fUtUre " citizenry might
.'recognise
the character of its own ancestors" in the past. "Through
our work and our nature we want to be the forerunners of
that future rate.-. Race thus forms a trans _ historical
bond between generations of Germans, allowing Weber to point
to something more than a shared ability to adapt „ tQ fche
changes facing Wrlhlemine Germany. He also views
race in terms of the individuals-be they political leaders
or, in Weber's case, political economists
-who propagate and
advance the German nation as the ultimate collective value.
Why else does he claim that
-[t]he economic policy of a
German state, and, equally, the criterion of value used by a
German economic theorist, can therefore only be a German
policy or criterion Weber's racial idea of the German
nation represents, therefore, a deviation from the political
and emotional underpinnings of his later interpretations.
It confirms, too, the extent to which a sense of historical
permanence concurs with a claim of cultural "superiority,"
initiating again a universal task that informs the value of
the German nation in Weber's political thinking.
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The conclusion of this task appears
,
o£ . nWeber s later theoretical works on the German nation as
Herrenvol*. In those works, Weber implores the war . tornGerman natron to become something other than what they are
as of 19!7: "a nation entirely without any poli tical
wrll,..» The formation of this collective will into a
"'nation of masters'" compels Weber to postulate the
necessity of parliamentary institutions, which grant
individuals control over the political fate of the German
natron. This same postulate presumes, however, that
specific individuals control the "machinery- of
parliamentary politics. In fact he means a "national
politician" who, because of his parliamentary education,
acts in accordance with "those universal trends which will
hold sway in the future over the outward order of the lives
and fates of the masses."” it follows then, I think, that
Weber's idea of a German Herrenvolk suggests a theoretical
tension, one between his desire for a few "'masters'" of the
German nation and his idea of a "'nation of masters'."
insofar as it takes "precedence even over democracy or
parliamentary rule"’*, and denotes that "it shall and must
live as the land of our descendants,"” Weber's idea of an
Herrenvolk illustrates one other implication. It
illustrates the extent to which a universal thread stretches
from the trans-historical aim of his racialist nation in
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1895 to the "universal trends" of democracy that inform his
Political rendering- of the nation in 1917.10.
These- theoretical fragments of the nation reveal, 1
believe, a problem with the universal framework which Weber
ascribes to the nation. The elements of human pathos, race
and Herrenvolk hardly indicate a unified interpretation of
'
the German nation R-i q 4- • a ,political depiction rejects the
significance of race,- his racial depiction ignores the
weight of parliamentarism; and his pathological depiction
relegates both beneath the weight of collective emotion. it
follows that each component symbolizes a separate
terpretation of the idea. in each instance, however, he
perceives the nation as an absolute ideal, one that
supersedes the bounds of parliamentary politics,
temporality, and even other theories of the nation. Indeed
a universal ambition surfaces in each distinct
interpretation. But the problem with this ambition is not
that it parallels differing theoretical fragments of the
nation, for, despite its foundations of race, pathos or
politics, the nation remains a dominant and absolute idea in
Weber's work. Rather, the problem is evident in the
political machinery" which Weber assigns to his over-
arching "ideal" of the nation. This theoretical fusion of
machinery and ideals constitutes a defect in that the
worldly traits of the former dispel the "ultimate" reach of
the latter.
136
WhSn WSber f°rmUlateS his ideal
-type of the nation as
7
h " he 3-nds it on the foundation
° shared human emotions. But Weber also posits that view
of the nation on the "modern position" of political
associations. That position, he explains,
"rests on the
prestige bestowed upon them by the belief, held by their
members
, in a specific consecration: the
-legitimacy- of
that social action which is ordered and regulated by
them." 101 with this gesture he hitches a national
community to a whole galaxy of associations, including the
modern state, political parties, and various other
bureaucratic structures. The effect n f t-u- v. ^rr o this bond entails a
nurturing of the nation's pathos as well ^OS' H as a justification
Of the actions of individuals who pursue the nation's power-
interests.. But, as Weber admits, these institutional means
to national power are tinged with a degree of difficulty,
even though they reflect a citizenry- s bestowal of
legitimate prestige. This difficulty is evident insofar as
a citizenry-
s prestige supports national institutions in
Weber maintains, "social action comprises physical
coercion, including the power to dispose over life and
death. If a nation utilizes such earthly means to
ensure its "providential
-mission,-" then "superiority" and
"irreplaceability" may very well be the result. But this
result materializes only insofar as the "lifeless machine"
of modern politics guides the metaphysics of national
137
providence earthbound into the moral tumult of difference,
human struggle, and violence.
The same sort of paradoxical tension occurs relative to
Weber- s racial configuration of the German nation. As he
makes clear in his Freiburg lecture, the best hope for
advancing the German race manifests itself in a "political
educatron" of the nation. This task also utilizes political
institutions-
-notably the modern state-to prepare the
German race for its struggles over contested territories,
national values, and future glory. Hence, Weber- s early
political thinking provides a pivotal instrument by which
the German nation cultivates its specifically racial
"ability to adapt to the varying economic and social
conditions of existence." It also stipulates that the state
possesses "the final and decisive say" on national matters;
that select individuals embody "the nation's sense of
political purpose"; and that even political theorists act as
intellectual vehicles of "German policy." Together each
institution sustains the German nation's constant temporal
bond with "future generations" of citizens. Nevertheless,
Weber posits this universal aim of the nation on a "leading
strata" of individuals who "are able to raise themselves
into the hard, clear air in which the sober work of German
politics flourishes. By melding "the earnest grandeur
of national sentiment" with the "worldly organisation of the
nation's power," Weber theorizes what he thinks is a stable
138
pathway to German national greatness. z think it is an
unsteady theoretical route, one rife with the human
disparities that are evocative of Weber- s wish to inscribe
Germany's political
"machinery" with a "lead™ ^1 1 -L ading strata" ofindividuals rather than a "future race" of German citizens.
The tension between Weber's metaphysics of the nation
and his instrumental design of politics is also apparent in
his interpretation of an Herrenvol*. Against the bachdrop
of the First world War, Weber theorizes an interesting
notion of parliamentary politico T t- •y s. it is interesting, not on
account of its capacity to champion the cause of democratic
individualism, but because of its ability to cultivate
individuals who can "thrust their hands into the spokes of
the world's development
.
1,104 Thus, given the mechanisms of
party hierarchies, legislative debates, and plebiscitary
elections, Weber submits that the German nation will be
prepared to fight for a "decisive say within that universal
process" of development. Yet his theory of parliamentary
politics favors a "specifically Caesarist instrument," which
allows the German citizenry to supply the nation with
effective leaders. "This is not the usual 'casting of
votes or election'," Weber reminds the public, "rather it
is a confession of 'belief' in the vocation for leadership
of the person who has laid claim to this acclamation ." 105
He therefore advocates an instrumental design of politics,
but only insofar as its overriding absolute ambition is
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German natronal greatness. His advocacy also reveals
however, the degree to which he subsumes a citizenry beneath
111 1VldUal
suggesting a politics that can
easily unsettle the "final- ana „•d "
^replaceable" ambitions ofthe German Herrenvolk
.
Judging from Weber , s theoretical
^
" 13 6Vident 4t— itutes the instrumental means
'
!
hat PrOP6lS tte UUimate
- « German national greatness.
But more than Dust constituting means, it represents in a
paradoxical way the chief obstacle facing such an end.
Though it intends to cultivate shared values of power and
glory, the political machinery of the nation as such does
so, m part, through the use of "physical coercion" against
individual citizens. The state represents, moreover, not an
instrument for the nation per se, but for the individual
leaders who are charged with advancing the values of the
German nation. And insofar =10 •a as this is the case, the state
indicates how the ideal of national greatness reflects the
domain of some, thougli not all, German citizens. Even the
mechanism of parliamentary politics yields the prospect of
German national greatness, but only in that particular
political leaders control the institutions as well as the
Citizenry of the nation. Weber clearly signifies politics
as the primary route to the ultimate goal of German national
greatness. But he does so, I believe, without considering
the degree to which this route transgresses the German
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nation s sense of shared pathos racial h' homogeneity, andPolitical unity.
-
is apparent, therefore that ,, Weber's theoretical
approach to the nation illuminates a formidable paradox in
P°litiCal “-S' theorizes the nation as a
universal end to which Wilhelmine Germany ought to aspire,
d that extends across generations, eclipses other
convictions, and unifies a multitude of persons. This end
signifies, too, a nation of citizens that defines itself on
the basis of a shared emotion, a racial trait, or an
intricate web of parliamentary institutions. But Weber also
theorizes a politics that aims to advance the universal
ideal of the German nation, a politics he posits on the use
of physical force, organizational hierarchies, and the
" PrinClple of the smaH number'." indeed Weber anchors
politics to the moral vagaries of the material world, yet he
populates it with only those individuals who push the ideal
of German national greatness. His idea of the nation not
only necessitates a narrowing of the prospects of politics.
It also faces a challenge from politics itself, given that
machinery violates the nation's universal claims of
historical continuity, cultural superiority, and social
solidarity
.
Based on this paradox that issues from his theory of
the nation, I believe Weber's political thinking intimates a
difficult task for the politician as well as the political
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;o; ;
,«
at individual person who elevates
the shifts
an ultimate ideal onfting earthly sands of politics Thi h
from a
' P CS
- ls tumult derivesr union that- cihiot-o
s a politician between an ideal
such as German national greatness anHy Kdc d a political
"arrangement., that is partial to force and indifferent to
ail ideals. Conseguently
,
poll tics constitutes neither the
moral dissipation of the politician's ultimate ideal nor thetechnical malfunction of modern political institutions.
Politics instead reveals a politician who must, both
Publicly and privately, account for himself when ideals
outreach the function of political institutions and politics
undercuts the universal design of ideals. Weber's theory of
the nation thus connotes the extent to which the
politician's existence jeopardizes the prospect of German
national greatness, which in turn ™ -
' U
'
constrams the prospects
of politics in the modern world.
As it pertains to the political theorist, Weber's idea
Of the nation accentuates a similar sort of tension.
However, where the politician endures the paradox between
national ideals and the force of political institutions, the
theorist confronts it-either knowingly or unknowingly-
e working on a particular scholarly project. This is,
of course, evident in the way Weber theorizes his own idea
of the nation. As a theorist of "ideal types," he does more
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than interPrSt the direction of the nation as
Weber also situates himself at the problematic
crossing between the nation- s
"providential mission" and itsdependence on the "ohvs-ir^i „p ys cal coercion" of institutions,
punctuating a tension in his theoretical a
„
approach to nation.When he approaches the racial character of the German
nation, furthermore, Weber underscores the end of historical
greatness and glory. Yet
, he moors that universal end to a
narrow political domain of individuals who qualify for stateleadership on the basis of their unique devotion to the
nation, positioning himself in the crux of a theoretical
paradox. The same is true when Weber theorizes the German
nation as an Herrenvoi,. By allying the end of a
-nation
of masters-" to the instrument of parliamentary politics, heboth subsumes the German nation to a closed strata of
"'masters'" and colors his theoretical enterprise with the
hue of contradiction. Therefore, I believe Weber's varied
approaches to the nation illustrate a political theorist who
routinely alludes to the likelihood of a paradox in his
thinking. it is a paradox that hinders politics with the
ideal of German national glory, as well as transgresses the
ultimate idea of nation with the worldly and violent
functions of politics.
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CHAPTER III
ENTERING "THE ETHICAL HOME" OF POLITICS
Introduce i nn
The claim that Max Weber's political thinking
demonstrates an elitist, anti
-democratic
,
and nationalist
bent affords neither a unique nor particularly interesting
interpretation what is, I think, the more unique and
interesting approach concerns the "ethical paradoxes" that
correspond to these unsettling biases in Weber's thinking.
his theory of politics, for instance, Weber advocates an
instrumental design that promotes the goal of German
national power, a goal that nevertheless constricts the
scope of political struggle and, thus, the very promise of
national power. Furthermore, with regard to his ideal of
the German nation, Weber posits a universal framework which,
ironically, the machinery of politics undercuts with its
worldly, violent, and finite actions. In each case the
"professional politician" who inhabits Weber's theoretical
terrain must, regardless of his or her moral aims, confront
an ethical divide between political means and ultimate ends.
The vexing nature of this situation, however, does not
surface solely in relation to the theoretical appearance of
the politician. I believe it also surfaces in relation to
Weber himself, a political theorist who fails to account for
the ethical rift between his moral gesture to German
national power and his staunch advocacy of the "machinery"
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Of modern politics, with the exception of his lectures on
the "vocations" of science and politics in 1917 and 1919
,
respectively, Weber rarely explores in detail the varied’
intricacies of political ethics, when Weber does explore
the issue, he seems to rend himself from the aim of
AriSC °tle ' S 1^£Smafi!leai3-gtili£a ' »hich " is not to know what
virtue is, but to become good... Hence we must examine the
right way to act.- Weber also appears detached from the
more modern liberal claims of his German predecessor, Kant,
who postulates a strict ethical demarcation between morality
and politics. In his 1795 essay on "Perpetual Peace," Kant
declares that "politics cannot
... take a single step without
first paying tribute to morality
.. .The rights of man must be
held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may
have to make."' Contrary to Aristotle's active quest for
the "good life" and Kant's logical divide between "right and
utility, » Weber theorizes a political ethics that more than
couples "'good' ends" with the "morally dangerous means" of
politics. It decrees "that one must reckon with the
possibility or even likelihood of evil side-effects" which
stem from such a precarious amalgam
.
4
Max Weber thus posits his theory of political ethics on
the idea of "responsibility." He specifies his claim in his
lecture on "The Vocation and Profession of Politics." There
Weber stipulates that the "man who subscribes to the ethic
of responsibility
.. .does not feel that he can shuffle off
154
the consequences of his own actions
... and piace the burden
on the shoulders of others.- indeed, the politician bears
a "burden" inasmuch as he is "conscious" of the "ethical
paradoxes" that i nrir tlu k m the mix of good ends and morally
dubious means and of "his "responsibility for what may
become of himself under pressure from them.- Yet, though
this idea of responsibility informs the ethic of the
politician, Weber still ascribes
-it n •m i to his own ethical duty
Of scholarship. He explains his idea of scholarly
responsibility in his 1895 Freiburg inaugural lecture on
"The Nation State and Economic Policy." A scholar's
"responsibility before history
,
» Weber tells the Freiburg
faculty, not only entails "exorcising the curse that hangs
over us (that of being the belated offspring of a great, but
past political epoch)." it also demands that the scholar
teach the German nation "how to become something different:
the precursors of an even greater epoch."’ Accordingly,
Weber's attempt to measure up to his own sense of scholarly
responsibility manifests itself in the idea of the
politician's "ethic of responsibility." 8 This is all the
more evident in that the ethic rejects the provincial legacy
of German politics yet still exalts the ultimate aim of
German national glory.
I believe this idea of "responsibility" discloses,
however, a tension in Weber's theory of political ethics.
The tension surfaces not simply because the ideal of
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responsibility further constricts the prospects of politics
with the criteria of a specific type of ethical conduct.
Given that responsibility limits the scope of politics I
contend that Weber's idea of political ethics illustrates
the degree to which Weber himself, as a political theorist,
imperils his own
"responsibility before history. " it is a
predicament similar to one Friedrich Nietzsche highlights in
fin the GeneaTogy Nietzsche perceives
••responsibility in terms of what he calls man's cultivated
right to make promises" *-^ relative to some "'fixed'" and
"'unforgettable'" ideal.- Yet, what he rebukes is not
responsibility per se. He instead contests its chief
presupposition, that is, the understanding of man as
"necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and
consequently calculable" enough to keep his "word... in the
face of accidents, even 'in the face of fate '." 11 of
course, Weber would no doubt rebuke this view of a wholly
"sovereign" and "proud" man, especially when he declares
that a "responsible" politician "is at the mercy" of ethical
paradoxes. The question is whether Weber, as a citizen of
and a scholar for the German nation, comprehends the ethical
paradoxes that lurk in his political thinking.
I will confirm in this chapter that the answer to the
above question is negative, that Weber fails to grasp the
ethical paradox residing at the heart of his political
thinking
.
12 Such a task demands that I first explore the
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extent to which Weber- s idea of political ethics corresponds
to hrs other interpretations of polities and the nation It
also demands that I examine the historical context in which
Weber- s theoretical approach to political ethics confronts
the ethical archetypes of Christianity, revolutionary
socialism, pacificism and, yes, even German Machtpolitik.
in contesting these varied forms of what he calls an "ethic
of conviction-
" iGesinnungse thik,
, Weber constructs an
"ethic of responsibility" (Verantwortungsethik)
, thus
compelling a survey of its theoretical design. This survey
wrll reveal not only the degree to which the politician
confronts the limit of his enterprise, a limit which
reflects the violently transgressed ideal of the German
nation. It will also suggest how Weber himself encounters a
similar limit in the enterprise of political theorizing, a
limit complicated by his devotion to the ideal of German
national glory. I will therefore conclude that Weber's idea
of political ethics, though key to his theory of politics,
is equally significant in verifying the human limitations of
politics as well as contemporary political thinking. 13
Pol itics. Nation, and Ethics
In 1888, some seven years prior to Max Weber's Freiburg
lecture, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote what was to be the final
work he himself would publish, Twilight of the Idols
. With
pithy aphorisms, he again disclosed to the disciples of
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Western philosophy his desire for a " reevaluation of all
values," disputing the icons of Socrates, Christianity,
German Idealism, and Liberalism. The thrust of his critique
was not, however, aimed at the values of any one particular
person or school of thought
. He leveled it at the idea that
such values themselves stemmed from the absolute and
irrefutable origin of either reason, God, spirit, or nature.
"When we speak of values," claims Nietzsche, "we speak with
the inspiration, with the way of looking at things, which is
part of life: life itself forces us to posit values."”
Hence he stressed the prospect that human values emerged
from something far more immediate, more supple, more
provocative than the "'fixed'" and "'unforgettable'" ideals
which modern philosophers tended to oblige. By extending
his own "anti-natural morality, » moreover, "which conceives
of God as the counter-concept and condemnation of life,"
Nietzsche carved out "only a value judgment of life-but of
what life? of what kind of life? I have already given the
answer: of declining, weakened, weary, condemned life ." 15
When Weber pronounces his own "value judgment of life,"
he also expresses his sympathy towards Nietzsche's critical
task. This sympathy appears in Weber's critique of the
apnon foundations of Western philosophy and his outspoken
distaste for the apparent decline of European (notably
German) culture-
-political and otherwise. Yet his sympathy
concludes as his theory of ethics dawns, for Weber, like
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letzsche' s inimical depiction o £ Socrates,
-understood that
a the world needed him-his means, his^ ^
artrfrce of self-preservation.- Indeed, with thg
forces conquering Wilhelmine Germany, he theorizes a
political ethics that necessitates a person who
-must be a
leader,- not only that, he must, in a very simple sense of
the word, be a hero 1,17 o,, ^. By positing his idea of ethics on
the Philosophically dubious ground of a
-responsible-
political conduct, Weber thus confirms his departure from
Nietzsche- s critical enterprise. But in the same gesture he
also hints at how his theory of an
-ethic of responsibility-
might correspond to his thoughts on politics and the nation.
It does so, I contend, insofar as Weber denotes the "ethic
of responsibility" as a theoretical elixir for a German
nation drained of both politics and politicians. What
remnants in his political thinking point to a bond between
politics, the nation, and ethics?
In his lecture on "The Profession and Vocation of
Politics," Max Weber claims that an ethical problem resides
at the core of modern politics. This is the case, he
explains, because the "principled convictions" of political
parties, trade unions, parliamentary committees, the state,
and politicians "can only be achieved by force. The genius
-or demon-
-of politics lives in a state of inner tension
with the god of love... a tension that may erupt at any
moment into irresolvable conflict." 1 * Accordingly, Weber's
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approach to policies reveals a link tQ ethics Qniy ingofar
political machinery forcefully transgresses the very
m°ral a^itl0n iC -d itS political leaders seek to advance
in the world. in fant-ct, Weber continues, •• [t]he specific
means of legitimate violence per se in the hands of human
associations is what gives all the ethical problems of
politics their particular quality."” such "ethical
problems" represent a hey factor in his theoretical view of
politics, marking the politician- s hazardous domain as much
as Weber's delineation of the ethical bounds of politics.
By virtue of these ethical problems, Weber's political
thinking also signifies a link between ethics and the
requisite conduct of those persons who engage in politics.
Again in the "Vocation" lecture, Weber holds that politics
grants the politician both an extraordinary
"feeling of
power" and an awareness that one controls "some vital strand
of historically important events."” But more critical
than these "inner joys" of the politician are the "personal
qualifications" which "will enable him to do justice to this
power... and thus to the responsibility it imposes on
him. By denoting politics as an ethical minefield, and
then lacing it with the intoxicants of power, Weber
intimates a type of conduct that negotiates the
contingencies of the former and the compulsion toward the
latter. This intimation, he says, "takes us into the area
of ethical questions, for to ask what kind of a human being
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one must be in order to have the right to seize the spokes
of the wheel of history is to pose an ethrcal question." 22
It not only confirms a link between politics and ethics in
Weber' s politrcal thinking, but it also implies an ethrcal
standard that is as difficult for the politicran to attain
it is for the political theorist to defend.
believe these difficulties are most apparent when
Weber maps. out the intersection between his ideal of the
German nation and his theory of political ethics. In his
essays on "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New
Political Order," which he wrote in 1917, Weber argues that
the nation's fate requires
"technical changes" capable of
cultivating
"responsible" politicians and citizens. "The
question," he maintains, "of whether the nation feels ready
to bear the responsibility which a nation of seventy million
people has towards its descendants, will be answered by the
way we address the question of the internal reconstruction
of Germany." By "internal reconstruction" Weber means
several things: a "rational" rather than traditional design
of parties; a "universal" rather than restricted notion of
suffrage; a "'positive'" rather than "'negative'" use of
parliament; and a political rather than bureaucratic form of
leadership for the German nation. 24 Given these vast
reforms, it follows that Weber presages neither a "happy"
nor a "vigorous" nation. He only foresees a nation of
citizens and leaders who share a "responsibility" to provide
161
"the next two to three generations., with a human conduct
that willingly enters
-the arena where the problems of thepresent are contested
... if the n^inn hcn atio does not dare do the
one, it should reject the other fnr i i i ^n , to t leads nowhere
Politically ." 25 Thprpfnroo 6
' insofar as he anchors the ideal
of German national alorv t-n t-v, Q9 y o the moorings of "political
machinery- and
-responsible- politicians, Weber illustrates
a theoretical bond between political ethics and the nation.
In the "Vocation- lecture, where he lays out his most
detailed view of political ethics, Weber points to the
difficulty. of coupling a "responsible- conduct with the
"pure conviction- of German national glory. He does so by
arguing that politicians who seek to advance such a cause as
German nationalism have to personify and exhibit something
more than zealotry and passion.
-simply to feel passion,"
he notes, "however genuinely, is not sufficient to make a
politician unless, in the form of service to a 'cause',
responsibility for that cause becomes the decisive lode-star
of all action ." 26
Yet this blend of an "ethic of conviction" with an
"ethic of responsibility" reveals more than a possible link
between political ethics and the ideal of German glory. By
placing a person between
-the flame of pure conviction" and
"that powerful control over the soul," Weber also affirms
how the ethical norm of responsibility compels the
politician to admit the political limitations of his
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ultimate ideal. Thus, a difficulty emerges with the
"responsible" politician whom Weber names as the solution to
Germany's problems, a politician who admits to the paradox
between the violent machinery of politics and his ideal of
German national glory. As for Weber, moreover, the
"responsible" scholar, the difficulty manifests itself in a
theory of political ethics that defies, not only Weber's
view of the technical nature of politics, but also his
fervent duty to the German nation.
Judging from these ties between politics, nation, and
political ethics, I think the necessity of leadership and
the likelihood of paradox inform each particular idea, with
regard to politics and ethics, it is obvious that the
prospect of paradox bridges Weber's theoretical approach to
both concepts. This is the case insofar as Weber
presupposes political ethics to be inscribed with a tension
between "the means of violence" and "the achievement of
'good' ends." It is also the case in that these "paradoxes"
confirm, not just the composite of politics and ethics, but
Max Weber's theoretical ameliorant for such vexing political
circumstances. That ameliorant is, of course, the
"responsible" politician, one who is able "to look at the
realities of life with an unsparing gaze, to bear these
realities and be a match for them inwardly ." 27 Given the
world's "ethical irrationality" and Germany's defeat during
the First World War, the ethic of responsibility only
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underscores the urgency which Weber ascribes to the
Ptofessronai poiitician. In other words, the prospect of
paradox and the necessity of political leadership compel him
to theorize an ethic that allows a npr^nn t-pe so to measure up to
the formidable demands of both Yet hv •i , by trying to "cure"
what Nietzsche thought was a "declining, weakened, weary
condemned life," Weber posits the "value" of responsibility,
narrowing the human scope of politics and divulging a
tension m his political thinking.
With regard to the nation and ethics, I think it is
obvious that the necessity of "responsible" political
leadership marks the critical link between each idea. it is
critical inasmuch as his wartime view of the German nation
mandates
"organisational preconditions for the emergence of
leaders, and indeed everything
... depends on this happening.
Only nations of wasters are called upon to thrust their
hands into the spokes of the world's development." 2 ’
However, as long as leaders become responsible "masters,"
Weber's ideal of the nation mirrors a paradox, in that such
"organisational" political forces imperil the values of
German unity, expansion, and power. The ethical paradox of
the nation thus surfaces with the necessity of political
leadership, a theoretical panacea which, ironically,
stresses the moral distance between political means and
ultimate ends. It foreshadows a difficult course of action
for the person who "responsibly" promotes the principled
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conviction of the nation in politics. Though Weber views
this course of action as a remedy for the national ills of
Germany, it still points to an increased chance of ethical
incongruities for the nation's political leaders. lt also
signifies, I believe, an ethical incongruity for Weber the
scholar, who, in theorizing an ethic of responsibility
posits a value at odds with that of the German nation and,
thus, the purpose of his scholarly enterprise.
Within this theoretical web of politics, nation, and
ethics remains Weber's connection to the legacy of
etzsche
^
Among other things, this connection reveals a
shared view of modernity's incapacity to confirm a "'fixed'"
ethical standard in the world. This view of the world's
"ethical irrationality", however, fails to keep Weber from
perpetuating that "naive" approach to the world which
Nietzsche despised. Nietzsche associated it with those
"moralists who wanted man to be different, that is,
virtuous-
-they wanted him remade in their own image, as a
png: to that end, they negated the world !" 29 Similarly,
Weber prescribes the world another curative "'Man ought to
be such and such!" for confronting its ethical ambivalence:
the antidote of a "responsible" politician. Though Weber's
cure may " negate » some of the worldly components of
politics, it still engenders a bond between his
interpretations of politics and the ideal of German national
glory
.
30 Furthermore, the ethic of responsibility appears
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to generate a senes of tensions in his political thinking
They are tensions that impact the politician as much as
Weber himself, the political theorist, both of whom imperil
in different ways the "principled conviction" of German
national glory with "morally dangerous means". The fruitful
Promise of' these ethical tensions remains to be seen, *T
the first few clues become apparent when Weber confronts the
differing notions of ethics in Wilhelmine German politics.
Opposing an E thic of Convirtinn
Max Weber confronts the notion of political ethics in
much the same way a politician might approach a piece of
legislation: he contests the ideas of his opponents. He
also shares Nietzsche's theoretical approach to the topic.
This is so inasmuch as Nietzsche, in On the Genealogy nf
Morals, prods the "reversals of accustomed perspectives and
valuations
... so that one knows how to employ a variety of
perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of
knowledge." 31 However, in his "Vocation" lecture on
politics, Weber is not interested in contesting a piece of
legislation per se, nor is he intent on promoting a critical
philosophy of perspectivism. Given Germany's humbling
defeat by the Allies and the growing civil violence in the
cities of Kiel, Berlin and Munich, Weber's theoretical point
of attack fixes on "the problem of the ethos of politics as
a 'cause' (Sache)." 32 Indeed, he notes in January 1919
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that the issue o£ political ethics "has recently been re-
opened for discussion (in a quite wrong-headed fashion in my
view), so let us approach it resolutely."- The "wrong-
headed fashion is, of course, a reference to the dominant
on political ethics in post-war Germany, views that
derive from Christianity, revolutionary socialism,
pacificism, and the pundits of Machtpolitik. In light of
Weber's resolve to contest the ethical agendas of others,
what might it reveal about his own theoretical approach to
political ethics?
What is obvious about Weber's theory of political
ethics is that it rests on an historical critique of the
reigning interpretations of the idea. In fact, according to
Weber, the chief source of any discussion concerning modern
political ethics stems, in part, from the book of Matthew in
the New Testament. "The Sermon on the Mount," he says, "by
which we mean the absolute ethics of the Gospel, is
something far more serious than those who are so fond of
citing its commandments today believe ." 34 As Weber
perceives it, the Gospel mandates a type of conduct by which
a person rejects without condition such worldly means as
physical violence, risking the loss of one's life for the
other-worldly glory of God. He thus claims that "it is
necessary to be a saint in all things, or at least one must
want to be one, one must live like Jesus, the Apostles,
Saint Francis and men of that kind." Only "then," concludes
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Weber, "this type of ethic beco.es meaningful and expresses
a kind of dignity. But not otherwise.- Though this
"unworldly ethic" denotes humanity at its brotherly zenith,
it decrees a level of ethical uniformity that most people
fail to sustain, expressly politicians in post-war Germany.
Max Weber's critique centers, therefore, on the
problematic politics of Christianity's ethical agenda. It
is problematic insofar as the Gospel's "absolute principles"
of brotherliness and divine glory appear to be at odds with
"the use of violence,
" which Weber labels as the "decisive
means of politics." Drawing an analogy to a more secular
enterprise, he views the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount as
a doctrine compelled by forces similar to those that drive
modern science. "What has been said about causality in
science," he mentions in passing, "also applies to this
ethic, namely that it is not a hired cab which one may stop
at will and climb into or out of as one sees fit ." 36 The
moral substance of a Christian ethic results from neither a
person's occasional devotion to non-violence nor an
intermittent duty to the truth, depending on what the
circumstances dictate. "Rather," counters Weber, "the
meaning of the sermon (if it is not to be reduced to
banality) is precisely this: we must accept it in its
entirety or leave it entirely alone ." 37 Judging from this
view, it seems that Weber harbors little, if any, doubt
about the import of the absolutist ethic of Christianity, an
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More
ethic he believes ought "not to be taken frivolously."
significant, however, he does harbor doubt about its
capacity to endure the "paradoxes" that are endemic to
modern politics, paradoxes that issue from the political
requisite of violence.
Turning away from the New Testament, Weber seeks to
locate the more contemporary manifestations of "absolutist
ethics" in early-20th century German politics. The first
reveals itself in the Allied victory over Wilhemine Germany,
when, as Weber suggests in a roundabout way, "the victor
will of course assert, with ignoble self-righteousness,
'I
won because I was in the right.'" 38 Whether or not this
ethical posturing corresponds to the Allies' ideals of
popular sovereignty and national self-determination, he
still views it with great scorn. He does so neither by
virtue of its philosophical groundwork nor on account of the
vainglorious conceits expressed by any of its public
proponents, notably Woodrow Wilson. Instead, Weber scorns
such an ethic for allowing war-weary persons to "lose sight
of the inevitable falsification of the whole problem by very
material interests-
-the interests of the victor in
maximising the gain (whether moral or material)
,
and the
hopes of the defeated that they will negotiate advantages by
confessing their guilt." 39 Thus he contests the Allied
victors, not on the basis of the moral soundness of their
convictions, but for debasing them with the physical
169
violence of total war rpy.- ,
.
' Thls depute allows Weber to accuse
the Allies of "usinq 'ethics' =>0g n as a means of 'being in the
right rather than as an end in itself.
With regard to such transgressions, Weber views the
ethical stance of the Allies as inept at accepting
-the
responsibility for the future which the victor in particular
must bear." Anticipating the forces of foreign occupation,
financial restitution, and military justice, he discerns
this conquering ethic from one more attentive to the
consequences that issue from such violent deeds. "A nation
will forgive damage to its interests," he says, referring to
the material impact of war, "but not injury to its honour,
and certainly not when this is done in a spirit of priggish
self-righteousness. Weber rejects this ethic of victory
because it validates a quest for power while simultaneously
disparaging those persons who feel the indignant weight of
their powerlessness. More important, by bartering ethical
congruity for military conquest, the Allies foiled any sort
of "responsible" order among nations. According to Weber,
such an order is "only possible through a sober, matter-of-
fact approach (Sachlichkei t) and chivalry, and, above all,
it is only possible where there is dignity. But it can
never be made possible by an 'ethic' which in fact entails
indignity for both sides ." 41 it follows then that his
critique of the ethic of victory fixes, not on the moral
aims or vanity of the Allied powers, but on their lack of
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candor and perspective in the aftermath of a ruinous war
in short, Weber believes this deficiency reveals how the
Allies undermine their own ideals of sovereignty and self-
determination by wielding brute force to punish further an
already-vanquished German nation-state.
Another early-20th century display of ethical
incongruity surfaces in the deeds of the German Supreme
Command, the chief military authority during and after the
First world War. However, insofar as the Fatherland Party
( Vaterlandspartei
) mirrored the Supreme Command's political
ambitions, Weber claims that the latter suffered ethical
flaws different from those of the Allied victors. « Given
the Mach tpolitik creed of sur-h narfu -f ar c p ty founders as Admiral von
Tirpitz, General Ludendorff and other "annexationists," the
Supreme Command's ethical base dissipated with each and
every reach for power. "The mere
-power politician'," Weber
explains, "a type whom an energetically promoted cult is
seeking to glorify here in Germany as elsewhere, may give
the impression of strength, but in fact his actions merely
lead into emptiness and absurdity. "« The source of this
ethical void takes shape neither in a philosophical
commitment to some ideal nor in a political duty to
deliberation and compromise. Rather, Weber locates it
wherever and whenever a "parvenu boasts of his power and
vainly mirrors himself in the feeling of power-
-or indeed
any and every worship of power for its own sake." 44
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Accordingly, whereas Weber's critique of the Allied ethic of
victory fixes on the lack of "responsible" judgments, his
critique of Machtpolitik focuses on its absolute lack of an
ideal beyond that of human domination.
By chiding both the Supreme Command and the
Vaterlandspartei for their lack of an ethical orientation
Weber confirms more than just the vain and self-interested
desires of these politicians ^ .P
. Their orientation stems from
"a most wretched and superficial lack of concern for the
waning of human action, a blase attitude that knows nothing
of the tragedy in which all action, but quite particularly
political action, is in truth enmeshed .
»
46 it is evident,
therefore, that Weber perceives the ethical flaw of
Machtpolitik to be its inability to affirm the vitality of a
person whose devotion to an ideal outweighs his duty to
mundane self-interest. And insofar as the pundits of
Machtpolitik fail to appreciate this human component, Weber
believes they are incapable of comprehending the "ethical
paradoxes" which often issue from it. it is no wonder,
then, that he attributes "[t]he sudden inner collapse of
typical representatives of this outlook (Gesinnung) » to the
"inner weakness and ineffectuality" that are cloaked "behind
this grandiose but empty pose ." 46 Max Weber's commentary
on the ethical vacuity of the "'power politician'" certainly
stresses the absence of a guiding ideal, but he does so in
order to emphasize a more significant point: The absence of
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id"alS in POlitiCS PreSUPPOSeS * o f human perspective
and, thus, reveals a lack of responsibility.
Contrary to his direct attack on Machtpolitik, Weber
approaches the absolutist ethrc of pacificism with a more
nuanced critique in mind
. It is an ethic f<jr which^has great respect, even though he perceives it as wholly
unsuited for the
.oral tumult of politics.*’ viewing it as
an ethic that is closely aligned to the ethic in the Book of
Matthew, he echoes how the logic of pacificism requires a
conscrous renunciation of all worldly violence. He contends
that an ethic of non-violence is as problematic as the
Sermon on the Mount. Pacificism is problematic, not simply
by virtue of its imperative withdrawal from politics, but
because it demands a deqree of Pt-h^oithical consistency reserved
only for saints. Noting how good Christians reject
•completely the "coercion and order" of the secular world,
believes the "same applies to the injunction to 'turn
the other cheek !'-
-unconditionally
, without asking by what
right the other person has struck you. An ethic of
indignity, except for a saint. »« The pacifist thus holds
an unworldly ethic of love" which compels him to say,
"'resist not evil with force'," while "the politician is
governed by the contrary maxim, namely, 'You shall resist
evil with force'."*’ Based on these ethical and political
shortcomings, Weber avoids chiding the proponents of
pacificism the way he chided the champions of Machtpolitik
.
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Yet, what incites his critical wrath =against pacificism isthe pacificist who, in sDite , ,,m p of a devotion to an ethic of
non-violence, pursues the
"diabolical powers" of politics.
The ethical collapse of pacificism becomes apparent toWeber in the harsh light of post-war German politics. Given
that they are willing to live like saints in the purely
sense of the word, Weber expresses a deep respect
uch pacificists as Kurt Eisner, Ernst Toller, and F W
Foerster By 1919
, however, he Vlews
actions with more skepticism inasmuch as they "win refuse
weapons or throw them away... so that we might fulfill our
ethical duty to end the war, and thus to end all war." As a
result of this "ethical duty," Weber anticipates "that
peace, not war, will have been discredited" in the aftermath
of Germany's crushing defeat, foreshadowing the vitriolic
politics that sabotaged the Weimar republic. “ in fact,
Weber's ambivalence about the political wisdom of pacificism
manifests itself in the testimony he gave at the so-called
treason" trial of Toller. He describes Toller as a man
whose profound ethical ideals were matched only by his
complete lack of political acumen. "'in a fit of anger,'"
Weber remarks, explaining Toller's vexing character to the
court, "'God made him a politician .'" 52 Thus, according to
Weber, the political impact of pacificism surfaces in both
the deflation of the ideals underlying its ethical posture
and the pacifist's undignified abuse at the hands of
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forceful politicians. its absnint- -v •olute ethic of non-violence
cannot withstand the "ethical irraf nmea irrationality" of the violent
enterprise of politics.
The same can be said about Weber's insight into at
least three early - 20 th century ethica! displays of
"revolutionary Socialism”: Syndicalism ni m, Bolshevism, and
Spartacisnr
.
53 Some ^pvpraib rn se e l months prior to his "Vocation-
lecture on politics, Weber discusses the issue of
"Socialism- before an audience of the Austrian Offrcer Corps
n Vienna. His critique of a socialist political ethic
departs from its claim concerning the necessary historical
movement toward an economic system unblemished by violence
and human suffering. indeed Weber targets revolutionary
socialism's
-true, ultimate hope: the proletariat cannot
free itself from servitude without putting an end to all
rule by man over man.-- This "prophetic- aim of justice,
though, which impelled the deeds of Lenin, Liebknecht,
Luxemburg and Michels, mandates the use of violence against
the feudal dynasties of the past and the growing bourgeois
class in the present and future.
-Hence," he retorts in his
"Vocation- lecture, "it is... utterly ridiculous for such
people to condemn morally the 'politicians of violence' of
the old regime for using precisely the same means as they
are prepared to use.— Based on this ethical discrepancy
between brotherly love and brute force, I think Weber
perceives the socialist ethic in the same way he perceives
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the ethic of pacificism. In other words, he views both
ethics in relation to a conviction that precludes the use of
violence as much as the prospect of politics itself.
Yet one difference does emerge between Weber's views of
pacificism and revolutionary socialism. That difference
manifests itself in revolutionary socialism's explicit and
unconditional obedience to a political cause. Whereas a
pacificist adheres to an eth-ir1 o-fh c of non-violence, which
eventually drives one from politics, a socialist remains
stalwart in forcefully eradicating "all rule by man over
man " SUCh 9 PerS°n
' clarifies,
"feels 'responsible-
only for ensuring that the flame of pure conviction (for
example, the flame of protest against the injustice of the
social order) is never extinguished."” Weber therefore
narrows his critical sights on the human pathos underlying
the socialist's devotion to the ideal of social and economic
justice. He does so, not because the socialist ethic
intensifies the degree of political struggle, but because it
discounts the political significance of responsibility. A
syndicalist, for example, whose union violence targets other
socialists and the bourgeoisie alike, "might be fully aware
that the.
. .consequences of his actions will be, say,
increased chances for the forces of reaction, increased
oppression of his own class, a brake on the rise of his
class. But none of this will make the slightest impression
on him ." 58 Given this "utterly irrational" and purely
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•'exemplary value „ of revolutionary socialism, it follows
that Weber critrque s the ethrc of socialism on the basis ofltS Pr°PhetlC and em°tiona1 foundations. It is a critique,
moreover, that rebukes the proponents of socialism for
yielding to blind passion rather than a keen discernment of
the paradoxical consequences issuing from the "diabolical.,
mix of good
' ends with violent means.
Judging from these interpretations, I think Weber views
the ethical component of early-20th century German politics
as one completely void of a durable agency. His view of the
Allied victors shows how their lack of dignity and
foresight, relative to a conquered German nation, thwarts
the mingling of ethics and politics. The same is true about
the German Supreme Command and its political cohorts in the
Vaterlandspartei, only that it is their plain want of a
principled conviction that foils any hope for ethics in
German politics. As for pacificism, Weber's view reveals
how the aim of non-violence either diverts such an ethic
away from politics or, if the pacificist still pursues it,
collapses from the burden that stems from the political
necessity of violence. Lastly, his view of revolutionary
socialism demonstrates how the Syndicalists, Spartacists,
and Bolsheviks fail to fuse ethics and politics. According
to Weber, they instead adhere to a "feeling" that eclipses
the "irreconcilably opposed" yet "complementary"
relationship between ethics and politics. In each case
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Weber concludes that the eth-ir^ih cal component of politics lackspersons and parties, not because of the appearance or
absence of certain principled convictions. Rather, it does
so because such convictions tend to deflect a persons
critical attention away from the consequences that follow
the mix of
..absolutist ethics., with political violence
What Weber- s critique of political ethics says about
his own interpretation of the idea entails, X believe, more
than his desire to differentiate himself from his political
and theoretical opponents. it speaks volumes as well, i
think, about the standard of responsibility he believes to
be integral to any manifestation of ethics in modern
standard that alludes to tragic outcomes.” By
chiding the syndicalist "for ensuring that the flame of pure
conviction... is never extinguished" or the pacificist who
"'turns the other cheek-" when faced with violence, Weber
suggests a political ethic premised on something besides a
zealous obligation to a principled conviction. Indeed, he
posits his own theory of political ethics on the basis of
esponsibility, which is another way of saying that "one
must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one's
actions. This ethic of responsibility" represents Weber's
theoretical rejoinder to his opponents. It mandates a
passionate devotion to some ultimate end, yet it also
requires foresight and acumen enough to discern between "the
achievement of 'good' ends" and "ethically dangerous means
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3nd side-effect q 11 TT-n i a i , ,LLS
' Unlike the "'pfhin ^fet c of principled
conviction'," Weber' q fcufcii s idea of an "
'
^ethic of responsibility'
"
seeks to confront rather th^r-, •
„
S han lgn°re the "ethical paradoxes"
a the heart of modern politics. Just how far the
politician-
- and it, politic,!
_toward cd„,ro„ti„g th,„ par.do,.,
„„
when Weber postulates his own theory of political ethics.
Theorizing an^thi^ctL Responsi hi n ,
It is clear that Max Weber's critique of political
ethrcs further illuminates the intellectual legacy he shares
with Nietzsche. Be it Nietzsche's
"great declaration of
war" against "eternal idols" or Weber's claim that his
Vocation" lecture "will necessarily disappoint you in
various ways," they both regard theorizing as a defiant act
"against" their times. However, in terms of Weber's theory
of an ethic of responsibility, which presupposes a human
faculty to discern the mix of moral aims and violence,
Nietzsche portends a weakness in the thinking of his
Wilhelmine successor. In Twilight of the t^i
. Nietzsche
spurns the idea that man is "the effect of some special
purpose.
. .the object of an attempt to attain an 'ideal of
humanity or an 'ideal of happiness' or an 'ideal of
morality.'" 6 ” Hence he rejects the philosophical basis
that supports Weber's theory of political ethics: the
rational and sovereign individual. "No one is responsible
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for man's beinq there at- 3n „
remarks Nietzsche,
"for hisbeing such-and-such or fn-r hi v.
' r hlS bSln9 ln circumstances
or m this environment ." 61 As he pvniiexplains m Beyond cinnH“U ' 3 ’,phil°SOPter ''
— - —— "greatness" inideas "that would banish everybody into a corner and
'specraltr Rather, one findg ifc man , s ^
muitrplrcity, in his wholeness in manifoldness. He would
even determine value and rank in accordance with how much
and how many things one could bear and take upon himself,
one could extend his responsibility."" with a
hint of irony, therefore, the same legacy that allows Weber
to theorize an ethic "against" the idols of his own time
mirrors the key fount of reproach against his own idea of an
ethic of responsibility
.
63
In light of Nietzsche' s untimely impact, how might
Weber s theory to political ethics divulge the limits of
"responsibility" for the politician as well as the theorist?
More than measuring the ethical confines of
Christianity, pacificism, Machtpolitik, and revolutionary
socialism, Weber's theory of political ethics also assess
something else. Indeed, he seeks to locate and clarify the
theoretical crossroads between ethics and politics. He
begins this search in his "Vocation" lecture on politics,
asking his audience the following question: "Where is what
one might call the ethical home of politics?" The
intricacies of this search become apparent when, after
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having raised the auestinnq o , he answers it with a statement-
At this point, admittedly, ultimate Wei tanschauungen
collide, and one has eventually to choose between them .«
4
-*'* “—• ™ hone o,
thus entails at least two variations on the theme of human
Struggle. I believe it suggests a struggle between
politicians who devote themselves to differing causes as
well as one between political theorists who attach
themselves to differing views of ethics. Yet the hey to
grasping Weber- s idea of political ethics, and the struggles
which concur with it ic ^n, s not found m the "ethical
irrationality" per se that is indicative of the modern
collision of moral aims. According to Weber, it appears in
a person- s conscious choice between "two fundamentally
different, irreconcilably opposed maxims," whereby a person
can follow the 'ethic of principled conviction'
( Gesinnung )
or the
-ethic of responsibility- . "« At this crossroads of
human choice the ethical struggles of politicians and
political theorists alike become quite evident.
The choice Weber recommends to those persons who seek a
leadership role in politics is, of course, the latter one:
the ethic of responsibility. Portraying the ethic of
principled conviction as one "bound to founder hopelessly on
this problem of how the end is to sanctify the means," Weber
surmises that "the only position it can logically take is to
reject any action which employs morally dangerous means. II 66
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Moreover, given his perception that « Ttlhe h • •
.
^ c L ] decisive means ofpoises « the use of violence, " the ethic of convictlon
appears flawed in its potential for logical coherence and
political success. This explains, in part, Weber's critical
commentary against the political advocates of pacificist, and
revolutionary socialism. Accordingly, Weber claims that the
"means of legitimate violence per £e ^ hand£j ^^
ations is what gives all the ethical problems of
politics their particular character."- Based on this
tension between moral aims and violent means, he concludes
that a person's duty to a principled conviction, though
admirable, is still not enough to brace anyone against the
ethical bedlam of politics. The person who is most able to
endure this "ethical tension" is not only devoted to a
principled conviction but "responsible" for the paradoxical
consequences that issue from it.
Max Weber's idea of an ethic of responsibility reveals
more than the ethical void bestowed on German politics by
the varied proponents of an absolutist ethic of conviction.
It also discloses another one of Weber's chief preconditions
for the possibility of ethics in modern politics. His idea
of an ethic of responsibility posits, not merely a person
Who is capable of making "mature" choices in politics, but a
person whose choices are justified neither by right nor
nature. In other words, it postulates a person who stands
out on the basis of his "trained ability" to "make
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allowances" for such "everyday shortcomings in people" as
greed, resentment, stupidity, naivete, etc. According to
Weber, such a person "has no right... to presuppose goodness
and perfection in human beings. He does not feel that he
can shuffle off the consequences of his own actions, as far
as he could foresee them, and place the burden on the
shoulders of others. By experiencing a litany of
struggles, the person who "subscribes" to an ethic
of responsibility becomes cognizant of the moral limitations
of others as well as oneself. Such a politician evokes the
precept of an "original sin" of sorts, one more historical
than theological in its view of individual human conduct.
Thus, with an "unsparing gaze" into "the realities of life,"
responsible politician labors to discern the ethical
disparities between moral aims and violent means, defying
the absolutist overtures of "conviction" politicians.
By positing this person as the basis of an ethic of
responsibility, Weber hopes to fend off the excesses he
ascribes to the myopic followers of a principled conviction
and the hollow disciples of Machtpolitik
. As Weber observes
the problem, early-20th century German society all too often
indulges in the "deadly sins" against the "holy spirit" of
politics. By "sin" he means that the "striving for power
becomes detached from the task in hand ( unsachlich ) and
becomes a matter of purely personal self
-intoxification
instead of being placed entirely at the service of the
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w rv i8 of wtatWeber labels the "carnival" Qf ^Under this label be lumps the actions Qf ^Liebknecht who performed in Berlin and Munich
, as weU ag
those of Ludendorff
, whose arrogant and
piqued widespread distaste for political authority. In
Weber s idea of a
"responsibility" refers to a
person who; "[ejvery day and every hour," confronts the
"enemy which threatpnq him -fn e s him from within: common vanity, the
mortal enemy of all dedication to a cause."™ By curbing
the vanity of politicians, the ethic of responsibility
underscores not just a person's a capacity to differentiate
a variety moral ends from violent means. More specifically
it reminds the politician to be diligent in distinguishing
"one's inner composure and calm" from his "passionate
commitment to a 'cause'
( Sache ) "
What allows a person to discern between these
contentious elements, within one's own self and among others
m politics, is the element of "judgment" {Augenmass)
. In
using this term, Weber points to the "decisive psychological
quality" that is representative of the responsible
politician. It is a quality that deflects the vain "need to
thrust one's person as far as possible into the foreground"
of politics, compelling the politician to value the
"distance" between himself and other "things and people" in
politics
.
71 This notion of judgment as distance, which
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Weber also refers <- 0 as objectivity ' 1 iSachlichkelt)
, allows
a politician to differentiate conceptually one's passions
from the sobering circumstances of political struggle »
It also reminds a person that politics "is an activity
conducted with the head, not with the other parts of the
Yet if politics is to be genuinely human
action, rather than some frivolous intellectual game,
dedication to it csn nniwa o ly be generated and sustained by
passion. ' m short, Weber's idea of judgment accentuates
both an ethical chasm and an historical accord between a
politician s duty to a cause and his use of violent means to
advance that cause. The import of judgment surfaces,
therefore, in the view of a politician who understands the
present value of his ideals in light of the impending
consequences that threaten his ethical posture, social
status, and political power.
It seems as though the "responsible" politician banks
on little, if any, success in either balancing a conviction
with violence or estimating the consequences of such a
morally turbulent mix. "Nor," Weber continues, "can any
ethic in the world determine when and to what extent the
ethically good end 'sanctifies' the ethically dangerous
means and side-effects."- Thus, the point is that the
person who abides by an ethic of responsibility has within
his field of focus neither solely a principled conviction
nor only an instrumental view of politics, since these "two
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fundamentally different, irreconcil ahi „x e ll bly opposed maxims " 75
often reveal themselves as "complementary to one
another, - the politician chief concern is judging the
corollary effects.
"Anyone who makes a pact with the means
of violence, " remarks Weber "fnr- wVm-D
' tor whatever purpose-
-and
every politician does this-is at the mercy of its specific
consequences The "responsible" politician exhibits how
principled beliefs and violent means mingle in a way that
allows the one to bare the ethical limits of the other,
sparking consequences of greater gravity than power itself.
diabolical couplet is what forever compels the
politician "to be conscious of these ethical paradoxes and
of his responsibility for what may become of himself under
pressure from them.
"
The political significance of an ethic of
responsibility thus manifests itself in the consequences
that challenge the "inner defenses" of a politician. For
instance, Weber rebukes the politician who, like some
Bolsheviks and Spartacists, seeks "to establish absolute
justice on earth" by paradoxically calling "for one last act
of force to create the situation in which all violence will
have been destroyed for ever ." 78 He does not criticize the
philosophical ground of their convictions, nor does he
challenge their use of violent means to promote them.
Stressing the "ethical paradoxes" that correspond to their
deeds, Weber instead challenges the leaders of revolutionary
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socialism insofar ag nthey remain unaware of the diabolical
powers at work. They are inexorable k •y , bringing about the
consequences of the i r action, including consequences for
their being, to which they win fan helpless victims , f
they remain blind to them.- Hence the gravity of these
"paradoxical" outcomes defines the terrain where the
politician faces the moral divide between violence and
convictions. There the politician observes his ethical
limit. He does so whether he stays "blind" to consequences
and is "damaged and discredited for generations to come, " or
he gams an "unsparing gaze" and "withstand [s] even the
defeat of all hopes" with judgment and passion intact.
Given Weber's critique of "conviction" politicians, the
best hope for politics, the German nation, and political
ethics appears in the person with the "unsparing gaze".
However, this politician who adheres to the ethic of
responsibility also points, I think, to some theoretical
incongruities which ultimately cast doubt on the political
relevance of such an ethic. First of all, by positing his
ethic of responsibility on a person who is "trained" within
the narrow confines of political struggle, Weber designates
a political ethic for some but not all people. In doing so,
he not only impedes the conditions for the possibility of
politics, transforming the criteria of "the hard struggle of
man with man" into a "responsibility for the conseguences"
of one's deeds. Weber also impedes Germany's reach for
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national power, since his prerequisite of "political
machinery". diminishes the value of "'occasional'
politicians" in favor of more
"responsible" "
' full-time'
politicians
.
1,00 His idea of an ethic of responsibility no
doubt suggests a provocative option to the blind feats of
conviction-politicians" who comprise early-20th
century German politics. Yet, with all its curative
promise, Weber's idea does not absolve him for locating
political ethics in those persons whose "inner being"
supersedes morally the conre-it- *.y ie nce t, inconstancy, and immaturity
of other persons in politics.
By grounding the "responsible" politician's "inner
being- on "judgment," furthermore, I believe Weber points to
another flaw in his idea of an ethic of responsibility. it
reflects a flaw insofar as he depicts judgment as that
"psychological" trait which allows the politician to discern
"passion" for an ideal from the historical "realities" that
often counter it and, thus, hinder one's ethical reach. The
problem, though, has little to do with judgment per se. It
is most apparent in that Weber's idea of judgment posits a
"reality" in politics, a reality identified by other "things
and people" who are also marked by the coupling of
convictions and violence. By making judgment contingent
upon such empirically specific phenomenon, he not only
posits a narrow view of historical reality, but he theorizes
a narrow understanding of political judgment. Indeed, in
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an ethic
his zeal to give sight to the "blind" disciples of
of conviction, those politicians who-in vain-direct their
the void, " Weber prescribes a clarity of vision
in the form of his notion of judgment. Yet, though it helps
the politician "maintain one's inner composure and calm,
"
judgment's myopic focus on "things and people" still permits
the same person to ignore the possible normative
discrepancies in his own moral conviction. Unlike persons
who submit blindly to a conviction, despite (or maybe
because of) certain "realities," the responsible politician
judges the ethical difference between a moral conviction and
the historical struggle with reality. m other words, he
chooses to make this sort of judgment rather than judging
the very moral conviction for which he struggles with others
in politics.
The ethic of responsibility thus reveals a restricted
view of politics, one prioritizing a specific person who,
with keen judgment, advances a principled conviction
seemingly unaltered but by empirical events. Max Weber's
theory of political ethics impedes the possibility of
politics by qualifying it with the standard of
responsibility. it is a limiting standard, not because it
requires a. person to exemplify the moral and ethical
constancy of a saint, such as that demanded of one who
follows an ethic of conviction. On the contrary, a person
who typifies Weber's idea of responsibility accepts a
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different, if not more difficult charge Th^' n . at person must
anticipate ethical consequences in terms of "a quite
inadequate, even paradoxical relation" between violent means
and a moral conviction. Yet, like the ethic of conviction,
most people are incapable of measuring up to an ethical
standard of responsibility in politics, a task Weber
compares to a "slow, strong drilling through hard
boards.
^
Instead of a saint, Weber longs for a "hero"
whose ethical posture can endure even the paradoxical
2TGp0ircus s ions of oolit~i pqp lit cs. Hence his idea of responsibility
puts the prospect of politics beyond the " 'occasional- ,
"
"official," and even "conviction" politicians, making it the
sole domain of "heroic" politicians.
But more than that, Weber's theory of political ethics
tends to hinder the prospects of German national greatness,
and this is evident from at least two different angles.
Inasmuch as his normative longing for "responsibility"
restricts politics to the deeds of heroes, I think Weber
tends to drain the German nation of its cosmopolitan,
liberal, and democratic promise. His allocation of
responsibility to heroic politicians rather than eager
citizens indicates a serious diminution in the preconditions
for the prospect of German national unity and power.
Moreover, given the political significance he assigns to an
ethic of responsibility, I think Weber unwittingly reveals a
profound divide between the ideal of responsibility and his
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principled conviction of German national greatness. if
greatness presupposes
"responsible" politicians, and if
responsibility propels them to admit the tension between
violence and ideals, then Weber's theory of political ethics
undercuts his unflinching devotion to the German nation
His notion of political ethics does so in that it constrains
the possibility of politics, which in turn hinders the
German nation's advance toward historical glory. it also
undercuts Weber's devotion insofar as political ethics
necessitates a politician's self
-scrutiny of his own
principled convictions, even those that pertain to the
elevated status of the German nation. Thus I think Weber
confirms Nietzsche's claim the "the philosopher" lives "in
contradiction to his today: his enemy was ever the ideal of
today." Yet, though he "posits" a value "against" the idea
of political ethics in German politics, Weber languishes in
relation to Nietzsche's other hope that the philosopher of
"tomorrow" becomes "'capable of being as manifold as whole,
as ample as full . ' "« Nietzsche's view of responsibility
envisions numerous ethical postures, whereas Weber's view
documents a similar sort of diversity, but only for the sake
of exalting one ethic above all others in German politics.
The Ethical Paradoxes of Politics and Political Theory
At the end of his lecture on "The Profession and
Vocation of Politics," Max Weber voices an opinion which
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counters his earlier claims about the elevated status of the
"responsible" politician. After expounding on the ethical
qualities of the "leader" and "hero," he still concludes
that "even those who are neither.
. .must
.. .put on the armour
of that steadfastness of heart which can withstand even the
defeat of all hopes."- indeed, though he is clear about
the political distinctions between leaders and citizens,
Weber appears to qualify both with a capacity to judge one's
wn choices in the face of ethical paradoxes. The
importance of this textual contrast manifests itself, I
contend, in something more than just a lapse in Weber's
approach to the individual sources of an ethic of
responsibility. I think it surfaces, as well, in his own
theoretical judgments relative to the impending consequences
that confront the politician who abides by an ethic of
responsibility. For the contrast between political heroes
and everyday citizens underscores Weber's estimation that
"the man fighting for a belief ... needs a following in order
to do so, a human 'apparatus '." 84 As a result of this
"need," however, "the leader is entirely dependent on the
functioning of his apparatus ... dependent on its motives, not
his own ." 85 The impending consequences for the politician
thus derive not solely from his capacity to judge his own
political deeds. They also derive from other citizens who
have the capacity to judge the politician
.
86
192
In addition to this constraint on the politician's
ethic of responsibility, I think Weber's theory of political
ethics reveals a constraint on the ethical posture of the
political theorist. On the one hand, his efforts to
theorize a notion of political ethics presuppose "the
organisational preconditions for the emergence of leaders."
On the other hand, they promise the German nation a leader
who can "seize the spokes of the wheel of history." At this
very point, where Weber locates the ethical clash between
"morally dangerous means" and "'good' ends," he illuminates
not ] us t the "ethical paradoxes" that confront a responsible
p litician. By presupposing a politics based on
"mechanical" force, while at the same time advocating the
"principled conviction" of German glory, Weber's theory of
thics suggests a paradox in his political thinking. Though
the paradox that confronts the politician is by far more
menacing, given the impact of violence on a human following,
the paradox that defies Weber nevertheless reveals an
ethical limit in his theoretical enterprise. It signifies a
limit not simply on the basis of a tension between his
instrumental view of politics and his universal design of
the nation. Nor does it do so merely on account of Weber's
theory of political ethics, which tends to constrain the
prospects of modern politics and German national glory.
Rather, I think the paradox that confronts Weber indicates
an ethical limit insofar as he fails to judge such
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theoretical discrepancies and the impending consequences
they pose for the vitality of his political thinking. For
it is a failure of judgment that undercuts his scholarly
"responsibility before history
,
" a responsibility he
believes "weighs even more heavily on us today."-
The role of judgment in revealing the ethical limits of
the politician and the political theorist denotes yet
another link between Weber and Nietzsche. Again, given
Nietzsche's charge against philosophy in Twilight nf
Idols, judgment stems from what he calls the "weariness of
a sound clearly expressed by Socrates and Plato in
their "logical" quests for truth. "Judgements," he asserts,
"judgements of value... can, in the end, never be true: they
have value only as symptoms ... in themselves such judgements
are stupidities ." 88 This symptomatic feature of judgment
is conceivable to Weber given his perspective on the modern
world's "ethical irrationality," a view which notes the
dilution of absolute ends in an ever-widening tide of
empirical details. Yet, unlike Nietzsche, who values
judgment only insofar as it informs the philosopher " that
the value of life cannot be estimated , » Weber identifies
judgment as the prime measure of the paradoxical tensions
between ends and means. He likens it to "that powerful
control over the soul" which merges human "passion" for a
cause with an acute perception of empirical "realities ". 89
Thus Weber's desire to "control" that which Nietzsche
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believes "cannot be estimated " again forces him to fall
short of Nietzsche' s standard for future philosophers,
indeed, near the end of Ttejiaz^cience, Nietzsche charges
that the philosopher "must overcome'
... not only his time
but also his prior aversion and contradiction against this
time, his suffering from this time, his un-timeliness, his
romanticism
. m other words. I think Weber's faith in
judgment reveals the "weariness" not only of the politician
who occupies his theory of politics, but of Weber himself, a
theorist who blinks at the sight of an ethical paradox.’ 1
How does judgment operate within Max Weber's notion of
an ethic of responsibility, such that it discloses the
ethical limits of both the politician and the political
theorist?
With regard to the politician, Weber's idea of judgment
denotes ethical limits relative to the "human 'apparatus'"
which the politician uses to advance his principled
conviction. Among other things, judgment allows the
"responsible" politician to discern his conviction from such
political means as the "continuous administration" of a
citizenry, law, finances, and military force by paid
officials. Despite this function, however, the politician
remains at the mercy of political "realities, " mechanical
forces that are often at odds with his duty to, say,
1 ust ice
,
beauty, or even German national glory. To succeed
at these sorts of endeavors, Weber argues, "things must be
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emptied and made into matteis-of fact iVerSachllchung) and
the following must undergo spiritual proletarianisation, in
order to achieve
' discipline- . "» Therefore, for all its
ability to inform the politician of the ethical
discrepancies between "'good'" ends and "violent" means,
judgment nevertheless fails the politician. it fails to rid
or even offset what Weber calls the "everyday existence" of
the world, a "reality" which finds administrative functions
draining passion from a politician's ultimate conviction.
"This is why," warns Weber, "the following of a man fighting
for a faith... tends to decline particularly easily into a
quite ordinary stratum of prebendaries ." 93
By unveiling this flaw in the "unsparing gaze" of the
responsible politician, Weber points to the ethical limits
that the politician might encounter in modern politics. The
responsible politician judges the distance between "things
and people" and oneself, overcoming the "all-too-human"
propensity toward common vanity. He judges, too, the
distance between "the means of violence" and a principled
conviction, accentuating the dissimilar purpose of each
element in politics. He further judges the "ethical
paradoxes" that are typically the consequence of these
antithetical factors, anticipating "the diabolical powers"
that might foil his ideal, as much as nullify the technical
force of his means. More important, though, Weber's
politician judges "that the eventual outcome of political
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action frequently, indeed regularly, stands rn a quite
inadequate, even paradoxical relation to its original,
intended meaning and purpose (Sinn)."» It is thus
evident, I believe, that judgment detects the ethical bounds
of a " responsible" politician. indeed, judgment is what
allows the politician to pull back the veil of his own
principled convictions to reveal the mortal calculus of
violent political means. As Weber indicates near the end of
his Vocation lecture, these limits emerge most clearly
when a politician admits, both to himself and to his
following, nothing more than "'Here I stand, I can do no
other
.
' 1,95 '
The weight of this admission, however, far exceeds the
potential loss of a politician's office, prestige, power, or
sense of passion for a cause. Insofar as the ethical limits
of a responsible politician surface among "the ramifications
of the ethical tension between ends and means," the weight
comes down on Weber's theory of politics. On the one hand
its impact appears, not so much in Weber's privileging the
politician's "personality," but in Weber's illumination of
the tragic fallout which politicians must confront in
politics. By acting responsibly, the politician fights for
an end only to the extent that he admits his collusion with
the violent means that transgress it, suggesting a politics
in which the politician withdraws from the fight for the
sake of the end. On the other hand, the politician's
197
testimony to his ethical limits also suggests a politics in
Which other persons-be they
"full-time" or "'occasional'"
politicians-
-question the moral force of his actions. Hence
the weight of admitting one's ethical limits falls on more
than just the politician's shoulders, so to speak, a weight
imperils the sublime or earthly "rewards" for himself
and others. I believe it also falls on Weber's theory of
politics, in that the politician's judgment discloses the
tragic finitude of politics, which in turn constricts the
aim of German national glory. By the same token, the
politician's judgment of his ethical limits implies the
judgment of other citizens and politicians, a situation that
further foils Weber's aim of German glory by augmenting the
prospects of political struggle
.
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The idea of judgment in Weber's theory of political
ethics also portends the ethical limits of the political
theorist. This is the case especially for theorists who,
like Weber, champion a specific principled conviction over
the course of their intellectual enterprises. For all of
his resolute claims about "'the small number'" of "leaders"
and "heroes" who ought to inhabit politics, Weber still
concedes the political value of those persons "who are
neither of these things." In fact, on the margins of
Weber's theory of politics linger the "'occasional
politicians'" and those persons who "put on armour of that
steadfastness of heart which can withstand even the defeat
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all hopes." Thus he himself occasionally perceives
other persons who, though cordoned off from the "small
leading groups" that comprise politics, represent
nonetheless a mix of passion, judgment, and responsibility.
However, the key distinction between the politician and the
citizen is, of course, that the politician's ethical limits
come to the fore by way of the political requisite of
violence. But this distinction does not necessarily bar
from politics someone like Weber who, as a citizen and
political theorist, promotes his principled conviction by
means other than violence. "We are all 'occasional'
politicians," states Weber, in contrast to the
"'professional politicians'" whom he believes thrive on
modern politics. We are, he continues, insofar as "we post
our ballot slips or express our will in some similar way,
such as voicing approval or protest at a 'political'
meeting, making a 'political' speech and so on ." 98
Therefore the politician and, in Weber's particular case,
the political theorist are both capable of judging the
ethical incongruities between ends and means in their own
deeds and in those of others.
Yet the theorist's judgment of the tension between,
say, the ideal of German glory and the machinery of politics
does not altogether verify his duty to an ethic of
responsibility. Like the politician, the political theorist
judges both the ethical distance between "'good' ends" and
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"dangerous means" and then ethical paradoxes" that issue
from such unions. This latt-^-r .te faculty is what Weber appears
to lack. it is iacking in his critical exchange with the
ethical stands of Christianity, Machtpoli tik, pacificism
and revolutionary socialism, such that each critique
confirms the closure of politics for the sake of
responsibility and, thus, German grandeur. Furthermore, it
is absent insofar as he advances the cause of German
nationalism with a theory of modern politics, the
mechanical function of which violates the "final and
decisive" rank he ascribes to the German nation. Whether he
engages in- an "'occasional'" struggle with his worldly
opponents or a "scholarly" search for "the ethical home of
politics," Weber appears oblivious to the "ethical
paradoxes" that mar his theoretical enterprise. Perhaps
such misjudgments are the result of his "common vanity ,
«
what Weber himself calls "a kind of occupational disease"
within "academic and scholarly circles ." 99 Though Weber
also claims that such vanity "does not ... interfere with the
pursuit of knowledge, " his devotion to the German nation
seems to "tempt him to strive for the glittering appearance
of power rather than its reality ." 100 Weber's devotion
does not necessarily interfere with his search for
knowledge. Indeed, I think it propels his search, allowing
him to ignore the rift between the "machinery" of politics
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grandeur" of nation as well as the breach between
his theory Of ethics and his ethical conduct as a theorist.
One consequence of Weber's misjudgment thus surfaces in
his theory of political ethics, whereby a "responsible"
politician must remove either himself or the ideal of the
German nation from the domain of politics. if the
politician remains in politics, then violence transgresses
and alters his principled conviction. if he withdraws from
the fight, the ultimate aim of the nation remains morally
sound but politically weak. In each case the politician
typifies, tragically, the extent to which the ethical
teria of responsibility" narrows the prospect of
politics in the modern world.
Another consequence manifests in relation to Weber's
general project of political theorizing. Insofar as he
posits politics on an instrumental foundation, as well as
advocates its use as the chief means to the goal of German
greatness, Weber confronts his own ethical limit as a
political theorist in silence. He is quite vocal, however,
when it comes to acknowledging the ethical flaws in the
thinking of his scholarly and political opponents. But
these unilateral critiques underscore, I believe, more than
just the absence of judgment in Weber's theoretical approach
to political ethics. They accentuate, too, the extent to
which his ethical shortcomings as a theorist surface and
speak, if not through Weber himself, then through the rivals
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whom he subjects to the ethical standard o £ responsibility
Consequently, Weber- s theory of politics falls short of his
own ethical standard, illustrating a politician who imperils
German glory and a theorist who fails to judge the ethical
paradox in his political thinking.
Judging from Weber's theory of political ethics, the
ethical flaws of the political theorist thus appear to
emerge in the exchange between differing thinkers. This is
evident when Weber challenges both the ethical posturings of
Christianity, pacificism, and revolutionary socialism and
the ethical vacuity of Machtpolitik
.
He dispels their
political promise with the criteria of "responsibility," in
turn further restricting the prospect of politics and, thus,
his ultimate goal of German national greatness. He does so,
too, while unknowingly highlighting the ethical
incongruities that pervade his own political thinking.
The theorist's ethical flaws become evident,
furthermore, in Weber's historical encounter with Nietzsche.
It is Nietzsche who, with aspersions toward the "value" of
"responsibility," defies Weber not for narrowing the scope
of politics, but for narrowing theory with "judgements" that
fail to "'overcome'" Weber's own ethical "timeliness." In a
way, Weber epitomizes Nietzsche's belief about "men of
knowledge" in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals
that "we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not
comprehend ourselves." Indeed, Nietzsche continues, noting
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also the manifold value of such limits,
-we have to
misunderstand ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest
from himself applies to all eternity.— As long as
Weber' s notion of political ethics evokes an encounter with
his intellectual counterparts, it amplifies the ethical
flaws in his theoretical enterprise, as well as it extends
the paradoxical path of all succeeding political theorists.
in shouldering the ethical burden of "responsibility,"
the politician and political theorist convey the intricacies
of Max Weber s theory of political ethics. The politician
not only carries the weight of judgment in Weber's idea of
an ethic of responsibility; he illustrates, as well, how
judgment potentially restricts politics and the ideal of
German national glory. Yet this is not the consequence
Weber anticipates, since his chief concern entails
theorizing a type of ethics that can revitalize German
politics and, thus, facilitate the advance of the German
nation. As a political theorist, moreover, Weber himself
illustrates how the weight of judgment impacts his
perspective on political ethics. Indeed, by challenging the
dominant views on ethics and the legacy of Nietzsche, he
reveals more than just the extent to which his lack of
judgment unsettles his own theoretical approach to ethics.
By positing "responsibility" as the groundwork of political
ethics, Weber elects to "remain blind" to the consequences
that manifest themselves in more constrained notions of
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politics and German nationalism. Such a mis judgment
-or
lack of responsibility as a political theorist-indicates, I
believe, discrepancies in Weber's theory of political ethics
in particular and the enterprise of theorizing in general.
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I tend to share the view of Weber's sense of tragedy putforward by John Patrick Diggins, Max Weber: Politics and theSpirit of Tragedy (New York: BasicBook, 1996), 257-ff. it is
a visw that understands tragedy as having two specific parts.The first part involves a person "penetrating the illusions
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themselves to move toward power in the name of freedom." The
second parts entails "an understanding that there is no true
meaning to the world other than the interpretations and values
we bring to it, and we choose our values 'through a glass
darkly, without objective knowledge and to the exclusion of
other values and commitments." In this context, Weber not
only dismisses the political actions of the Machtpolitik
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CHAPTER IV
the "INCONVENIENT" GROUND OF SCHOLARLY JUDGMENT
Introduct i nn
Despite his condemnation of judgment in the Western
philosophical tradition, Friedrich Nietzsche still finds the
moral latitude to validate the judgments of Thucydides.
-My
recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has
always been Thucydides
,
» he says, again in The Twilit ^
Idols
.
1 By singling out the intellect of Thucydides,
Nietzsche claims there is far more to Greek philosophy than
just Socrates and Plato. He refuses to embrace such
thinkers who, as the Athenian city-state grew detached from
its "Homeric" cultural legacy, longed for moral comfort and
stability within the logical framework of their ideas.
Instead, Nietzsche contests both thinkers with one of their
own, Thucydides: "the great sum, the last revelation of that
strong, severe, hard factuality which was instinctive with
the older Hellenes ." 2 Thus his rejection of Socrates and
Plato reveals a distaste for human judgments, but only those
that masquerade as moral truths. It also reveals his esteem
for the judgments of Thucydides, judgments which upset the
universal ground of such moral truths with "untimely"
factual details. "In the end," states Nietzsche, "it is
courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like
Thucydides from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality,
consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control
219
of himself, consequently he alsoy cu maintains control of
things .
"
3
Having "courage in the face of reality" is Nietzsche'
way of saying Thucydides provides a differing approach to
s
the idea of judgment. it is a view that confronts rather
than evades the morally unsettled world which surrounded
him. Thucydides contrived its theoretical design over the
course of writing his forceful work of historical
scholarship, The Peloponnesian War
. As Athens and Sparta
battled over the loyalty of Corcyra, Melos, and Sicily, as
well as the meaning of the nexus between democracy and
empire, Thucydides judges more than "the greatest
disturbance" in the Hellenic world. He also questions the
judgments of those historical inquiries which lead up to and
through the war itself. Indeed, he claims Homer's poetic
depictions of the Trojan War and Herodotus's mythological
accounts of the Persian War make it such "that one cannot
rely on every detail which has come down to us by way of
tradition ." 4 Conversely, Thucydides posits his judgments
of Hellenic history on a ground of factual evidence, which
includes personalized accounts of political speeches and
corroborated reports of military engagements. "It is better
evidence," he states, "than that of the poets, who
exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose
chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth
than in catching the attention of their public ." 5
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Thucydides notion of judgment, therefore, rests on the
empirical rendering of "reality," one which informs his
desire to contest the judgments that comprise the historical
tradition to which he belonged
.
6
This so-called "courage" of Thucydides also indicates a
shared affinity with Max Weber, a political thinker whose
idea of judgment requires one "to look at the realities of
life with an unsparing gaze."^ m the previous chapter, I
argued that Weber's theory of political ethics hinged in
part on just such a notion of judgment. Judgment
corresponded to the professional politician's detachment of
empirical reality" from "principled conviction,
" but only
to the extent that one assumed "responsibility" for the
former's material impact on the latter's idealistic
underpinnings. More important, however, I claimed this
notion of judgment marked a formidable source of tension in
his theory of political ethics. By tethering ethical
conduct to responsibility, Weber not only narrowed the scope
and merits of political leadership; he also restricted the
possibility of politics which, in turn, undercut the ideal
of German national glory. The tension in his theory of
political ethics thus emerged in the mix between a
responsible" politician whose judgments restricted politics
and a scientist whose judgments defied a politician's "ethic
of responsibility." Given this depiction of the double-
edged blade of judgment, it appears Weber and Thucydides
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It is
share respect for the gravity of empirical details,
also apparent that their respect for historical
-reality.,
stems from both the formative and destructive effects such
knowledge has on the permanence of human judgments.
This affinity between an Hellenic historian and a
German social scientist ceases, however, when Thucydides
judges his view of history to be one "done to last
forever. "®
^
For Weber, who portrays political "judgment"
(AugenmaS) as the upkeep of "one's inner composure and calm
while being receptive to realities," such disregard for
successive views of history would seem naive, even vain.’
Furthermore, given the idea of scholarly judgment (Urteil)
which looms in his 1917 "Science as a Vocation" lecture,
Weber might desire greater distance from Thucydides's
"monumental" aims.” In that lecture he contends that the
social scientist's judgments are distinct from those
rendered by either ancient Greek historians or professional
politicians. According to Weber, such judgments are
distinct insofar as the scientist concedes that they "will
be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years ... Every scientific
fulfilment' raises new 'questions'; it asks to be
surpassed' and outdated." 11 Despite Weber and Thucydides
drawing on the same wellhead of factual details, the one
diverges from the other in relation to the historical
duration of judgments. Where Thucydides views facts as a
retort to tradition, and thus the foundation of an absolute
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history, „eber views them as a retort to all knowledge-
including science-aim thus the source of a struggle between
differing scholars.
As I stress in this chapter, Weber's theory of judgment
bares more than his departure from the thinking of
Thucydides. By basing judgment on the foundation of
"progress- (Fortschritt)
, meaning that what one
-seizes is
always something provisional and not definitive,- I argue
that Weber exposes a rift in his own thinking on
politics
.
12 On the one hand, his idea of political
judgment points to a person who must "detach- oneself from
worldly things, other persons, even his own vain desires.
This person does so in order to "clear away the mechanical
obstacles" which impede the advance of his cause, leading
him to relegate judgment beneath, say, the ultimate aim of
German national power. On the other hand, Weber's idea of
scholarly judgment points to a person who, rather than
submitting to a singular conviction, anticipates the
conditional traits of all convictions. Based on this
divide, I charge that Weber's idea of judgment displays the
limited bounds of his theory of politics as well as the
paucity of. values which inform it. But I do so in a way
that confirms at the same time how his notion of scholarly
judgment extends the limits of politics by rendering
"ultimate" judgments "provisional and not definite." As a
conclusion, I suggest that Weber's theory of judgment points
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to both a politician who circumscribes the prospects of
politics and a scholar who struggles to extend them.
Political Judgment (Augpnjnafi.q)
It is interesting to note that many of Max Weber's
political writings first appeared as public declarations.
They were either lectures delivered to audiences of scholars
and students or newspaper articles written with the
intention of swaying German public opinion. What was his
1895 essay on "The Nation State and Economic Policy" but an
"inaugural lecture" symbolizing his acceptance of the Chair
of Political Economy at the University of Freiburg. 13 in
it he rebukes the German bourgeoisie for their lack of
political experience, a class of citizens which no doubt
comprised at least part of the scholarly audience. For that
matter, his 1917 study of "Parliament and Government in
Germany under a New Political Order" ran originally as five
separate articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung. They are
articles in which Weber reproaches both the character of
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the "official" minions who helped
administer his monarchical government. 14 Finally, Weber's
1919 brochure on "The Profession and Vocation of Politics"
was initially a lecture he delivered in Munich, a city
which, at the time, was in the throes of a "soviet"
rebellion.' There, before the Freistudentische Bund and
Munich s radical Bohemia, he chides those revolutionaries
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Who, in contrast to their elevated aim of social justice,
use political violence to advance it.
What is interesting, however, is not so much Weber's
proclivity to theorize politics before a live public
audience. Rather it is his tendency to judge in a public
setting those groups whom he perceives to be his theoretical
and political opponents. >• For with his judgments against
the bourgeoisie, the monarchy, revolutionaries, and others,
unwittingly points to an unruly terrain on which his
own notion of political judgment becomes prone to criticism,
as well
.
Unlike his political writings, Weber's works on the
methodology of the social sciences reveal a different
approach to audience and judgment alike. Except for the
"Vocation" lecture on science, most of his methodological
works speak to a "specialized" audience of scholars who
confront him in the pages of academic journals. For
instance, his 1904 essay on "'Objectivity' in Social Science
and Social' Policy" appears in the "exclusively scientific
journal" Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik
.
16
There, Weber-
-along with fellow editors Edgar Jaffe and
Werner Sombart-
-claims the journal's "express purpose" is to
couple "the education of judgment about practical social
problems" with "the methods of scientific research." 17
Some 13 years later, Weber spoke to a similar audience on
The Meaning of ' Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and
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Which later appeared in the scholarly journal
Logos.'’ m it he spurns the "widely accepted value-
judgments" of both scientific positivists, who judge the
world by way of abstract maxims, and cultural subjectivists,
Who judge it by virtue of personal experience. He instead
implores social scientists of all stripes "to ask questions
about these things which convention makes self-evident."”
These instances depict, not only an audience defined by its
scholarly rather than political interests, but a notion of
judgment culled from inquiry rather than personal rebuke.
In light of these two distinct perspectives, the
following questions ought to be raised with regard to
Weber's theory of judgment: What are the philosophical
sources which underlie his concepts of political and
scholarly judgment, and how might they impact his
theoretical project of politics?
It must be stressed that Weber's political writings
offer far more than attacks against his foes, especially
those writings in which he theorizes a notion of political
judgment. In fact, Weber's 1919 "Vocation" lecture on
politics provides a unique insight into his theoretical
approach to the idea. Despite scolding revolutionary
socialists and pundits of Machtpolitik for their lack of
judgment, he conjectures a theory of judgment based on a
subtle degree of " distance from things and people." 20 He
does so, not for the sake of diminishing the political force
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Of his opponents, hut for the purpose of restraining the
"common vanity of all persons who assume the weight of
political leadership.
.'Only if one accustoms oneself to
distance,- Weber maintains,
-can one achieve that powerful
control over the soul which distinguishes the passionate
politician from the 'sterile excitement' of the political
amateur,. The
..'lack of distance'.' between a
politician's conviction and his vain desire to dominate
others, denotes a type of judgment by which the struggle of
politics "becomes a matter of purely personal self-
rntoxication instead of being placed entirely at the service
of the 'cause'."- Though Weber's theory of political
judgment parallels his disdain for flawed judgments, it
still tends to fixate on the element of "distance," ensuring
a politician's steady subservience to the advance of one
specific ultimate goal. 23
The goal which informs Weber's notion of political
judgment is, of course, the expansion of German national
power and greatness. This is not overly apparent in his
"Vocation" lecture, but it is evident 24 years earlier in
his Freiburg Inaugural address. In that work Weber's
approach to political judgment departs from his critique of
the German bourgeoisie, whom he perceives as a barrier to
the prospect of national glory. He points out how the
brilliant yet forceful rule of Count Otto von Bismarck
afforded Germany a sense of national unity, a degree of
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political prestige, and an opportunity to augment its role
in world affairs. However, Weber also notes how Bismarck's
Caesarist" authority "almost seems to have been too strong
for us, scorching the bourgeoisie's slowly developing
capacity for political judgement ." 24 The alternative to
this Bismarckian "tragedy" mandates a new class of
politicians whose sense of judgment is nurtured by an active
and continuous engagement with opponents in Germany's
struggle for national power. Moreover, Weber insists their
judgments reflect "political maturity, which is to say their
grasp of the nation's enduring economic and political power
interests and their ability... to place these interests above
all other considerations."- Hence his initial depiction
of political judgment fails to underscore the importance of
"distance" from things, people, and even oneself. However,
it does emphasize the supreme aim of German national power,
which, m turn, shapes Weber's notion of political judgment
into an instrument for the advance of a particular end.
This function is also apparent in some of Weber's later
writings, where he theorizes an idea of judgment capable of
enduring Germany's political tumult during and after the
First World War. In 1917, while surveying the possible
problems of "a New Political Order" in Germany, Weber again
faced the tragedy of "Bismarck's legacy." He repeats his
claim that Bismarck "left behind a nation accustomed to
submit passively and fatalistically to whatever was decided
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on its
leader
behalf
.
whose j
But rather than merely
udgments display distance and
yearn for
maturity,
a
he
theorizes
cultivate
citizenry
a set of parliamentary institutions which might
sound political judgments among the German
For Weber the nation's "habit of sharing
responsibility, through its elected representatives
... is the
only way [it] can... be trained in the exercise of political
judgement He bases judgment on the distance and
maturity of a politician, but he also locates each component
within the "progressive democratisation" of post-war
national politics. in this instance, judgment takes shape
m "the professional politician" who trains in the
"palaestra" of "parliamentary conflict," where "great
problems are not only discussed but are conclusively
decided." 28 But it does so only insofar as the politician
assumes the duty "to sacrifice his office to his
convictions" and secure the German nation its "decisive say"
in world politics
.
Even after the war, as the German nation haggled over
its future at Versailles and Weimar, Weber continued to
probe the functional design of political judgment. One
month after his January 1919 lecture on the "vocation" of
politics
,
he published an essay on "The President of the
Reich" in the Berliner Borsenzeitung
. In it he not only
argues the merits of a plebiscitary president, "a head of
state resting unquestionably on the will of the whole
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people
.
1,29 He is after something else, as well, a
politician with more than just the power to save Germany
from selfish parliamentary infighting, ill-advised partisan
legislation, and vain demagogues. As Berlin was witnessing
a Spartacist revolt, followed by Frelkorps repression on
behalf of a Socialist government, Weber argued for "a bearer
of the principle of the unity of the Reich, a politician who
"will create a dam to prevent such one-sided tendencies
getting out of hand."- As a result, his depiction of the
Reich's President underscores the criteria of distance and
maturity which were central to his idea of political
judgment. Yet it also reveals the extent to which Weber not
only relegates political judgment beneath the goal of German
national power, but links it to a single politician who
judges in the name of the national citizenry
.
31
Based. on these works, Weber's notion of political
judgment appears to be similar to Thucydides's own idea of
judgment in his survey of "The Policy of Pericles."
Thucydides recounts how Pericles sought to put "fresh
courage" into the Athenian citizenry, which had grown weary
from failed military excursions, plague, and enemy
invasions. Speaking before an assembly, Pericles was blunt;
he told Athens that "courage alone" would not suffice in
bearing the weight of empire, an empire that was "now like a
tyranny." .Athens requires an "'intelligence that confirms
courage..., which proceeds not by hoping for the best...,
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but by estimating what the facts are, and thus obtaining a
clearer vision of what to expect.'" 32 in Pericles,
Thucydides found a model of judgment based on: 1 ) a degree
of distance between facts and ideals and 2) a level of
maturity that recognizes the contrast between the two.
Moreover, like Weber, he stresses how Pericles the political
leader wields judgment, not for the sake of fostering
democratic politics, but for the sake of advancing "the
imperial dignity of Athens." 33 For Thucydides and Weber,
judgment denotes a means to a politician's ultimate end, a
means embodied but by a few persons willing to subsume
themselves, and others, to the singular goal of collective
power and glory.
By positing judgment on the normative groundwork of
German greatness, Weber uncovers some of the theoretical
affinities he shares with Thucydides. Yet Weber also turns
away from "the Athenian" who "wrote the history of the war
fought between Athens and Sparta," exposing, ironically
enough, certain limits in his own approach to political
judgment. In other words, though Thucydides conjectures a
notion of political judgment similar to the sort theorized
by Weber, he nevertheless arrives at that point while
traveling towards a far loftier goal: crafting a history
that will last forever. Hence the reason for Weber's
aversion has little to do with Thucydides's dismissal of
other thinkers, people who "will not take trouble in finding
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out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the
first story they hear.- instead, it has to dQ with the
ultimate aim underlying Thucydides's method of scholarship,
that is, an impermeable monument to Hellenic history. For
such an aim potentially counters both the Athenian march
towards "imperial dignity" and the chief purpose animating
Weber's view of scholarship--"scientific
'progress.'" As
Weber notes in his Freiburg lecture, "it is precisely the
vocation of our science to say things people do not like to
hear--to those above us, to those below us, and also to our
own class." 35 Given this view of science, Weber's
detachment from Thucydides's historical statuary is not
surprising
. What is even more interesting, however, is the
extent to which such a view counteracts his own notion of
political judgment.
The philosophical underpinnings of Weber's view of
science are evident in his "Science as a Vocation" lecture,
which he delivered in Munich in November 1917. in this
lecture, which he also addressed to the Freistudentische
Bund, Weber argues that the possibility of science in the
early 20th century relies on some fairly daunting
presuppositions. Countering the "German youth" who rebuffed
science for the metaphysics of "experience, " he stresses how
"the 'way to true being,' the 'way to true art,' the 'way to
true nature,
' the 'way to true God, ' the 'way to true
happiness , ' have been dispelled" by man's scientific mastery
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Of the material world. 3 ' For this reason, the
presupposition of "disenchantment" circumscribes science
within a narrow field of events, any understanding of which
strictly depends on loqic method ^a ' rn , and empirical evidence.
Yet, despite its inability to substantiate universal truths,
science still "further presupposes that what is yielded... is
important in the sense that it is 'worth being known.'"”
Thus science cannot confirm the essence of, say, truth,
knowledge, beauty, or even national power--all of which can
justify the aim of science in the modern world. As far as
Weber is concerned, science "can only be interpreted with
reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or
accept according to our ultimate position towards life."”
His view of science, then, postulates not one but a
multiplicity of possible truths, indicating an unsettled
philosophical ground of moral difference and human
conflict
.
39 '
This philosophical context of Weber's idea of science
reflects the same sort of thinking that bolsters his idea of
scholarly judgment. He is clear with regard to science
being a "'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the
service of self
-clarification and knowledge of interrelated
facts ." 40 Insofar as a scientist acknowledges "the demon
who holds the fibers of his very life," and discerns it from
statements of fact,
"
scholarly judgments are not unlike
those rendered by a responsible politician. What separates
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the two is not so much the ultimate conviction which guides
a person' s' judgment, be it the quest for knowledge or the
quest for German glory. Rather, it has to do with Weber's
claim concerning the scientist's recognition of the fate of
"progress,' with this shift comes the added presupposition
that "the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be
brought to a final conclusion."” Scientists, especially
ones who investigate the "cultural sciences," thus construct
ludgments on something more than the struggle issuing from
scientific-progress. Unlike the politician, who judges in
relation to the advance of one value such as German national
greatness, scientists judge in relation to a multiplicity of
values which remind them "that others will advance further
than we have. 1,42
By positing scholarly judgment on the added foundation
of progress, Weber not only accentuates the difference
between it and his idea of political judgment. He also
signals the extent to which scholarly judgment promotes
conflict between various scholars, compelling them to
"'question'" and '"surpass'" their own deeds as well as
those of others. "The teacher," Weber declares before his
student audience, "can confront you with the necessity of
choice... He can... also tell you that if you want such and
such an end, then you must take into the bargain the
subsidiary consequences which according to all experience
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Will occur I„ other words, the aim behind the
judgments of scholars is not to recruit, consolidate, and
mobilize a party of followers committed to the advance of
one particular ultimate goal. On the contrary, Weber
identifies' the "useful teacher" as he who teaches "his
students to recognize
'inconvenient' facts-
-I mean facts
that are inconvenient for their party opinions
... for my own
opinion no less than for others. »« He even goes so far as
to apply the expression 'moral achievement'" to this duty,
which ensures an increase in human conflict but also
cultivates independent thinking, self
-clarification and
frank, public discussions .« In this context, the aim of
scholarly judgment indicates more than a person's ability
"to make a' decisive choice" in a morally unsettled world.
It signifies a desire to examine that choice in a way that
perpetuates rather than stifles human conflict.
In another context, Weber's notion of scholarly
judgment is diametrically opposed to his own notion of
political judgment. Again in "Science as a Vocation," he
claims "the qualities that make a man an excellent scholar
and academic teacher are not the qualities that make him a
leader to give directions in practical life or... in
politics ." 46 The qualities of the scientist are such that
his value is not contingent upon him being a "leader" of
people in the vital problems of life" or "in matters of
conduct." But it is contingent upon him acknowledging the
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historical and philosophical force of scientific progress,
which ultimately leads a scientist
"to the aim of clarity,"
In light of this admission, Weber continues, the scientist
"can force the individual
... to give himself an account of
the ultimate meaning of his own conduct.”" Thus the
scientist judges the world in way that provokes people to
clarify the "internal structure" of their values, prompting
them to recognize the gap between
"'inconvenient' facts" and
one's "ultimate position towards life." Conversely, the
politician judges the world in a way that supplies people
with a "principled conviction,
" one which privileges the
German nation over the judgments of other citizens.
Though Weber premises his notions of scholarly and
political judgment on quite divergent grounds, he still
intimates the existence of a shared oppositional bond
between the two. On the one hand, he posits political
judgment in relation to the ultimate goal of German national
power, locating its faculties in a politician who subsumes
himself and others beneath such a goal. On the other hand,
he establishes scholarly judgment on the shifting ground of
progress, which reveals a scientist who welcomes a struggle
over the interpretation of an array of ultimate ideals. At
the heart of Weber's theory of judgment, therefore, resides
a tension between the politician and the scientist, a
tension concerning the moral prominence of the German
nation. For the scientist, such a goal is more than just
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one o £ many equally valid goals tQ which a person
oneself. It is also worthy of opposition insofar as "the
ultimate and most sublime values" have suffered the untimely
fate of "disenchantment." The politician admits to this
"ethical irrationality of the world," but only to the extent
that his sense of judgment maneuvers across its
paradoxical" terrain to advance one goal over all others.
Given the chasm between science and politics, it is not
enough to say that a tension is evident in Weber's theory of
judgment. If the scientist judges the politician and his
"ultimate meaning towards life," then Weber's theory of
judgment also divulges a tension at the heart of his
theoretical project of politics.
Scholarly Judgment ( Urteil
)
Max Weber's notion of scholarly judgment (Urteil) stems
m part from his theoretical battles with other influential
schools of scientific thought during the late-19th and
early-20th centuries. If Weber was not challenging
"scientific positivists," who claimed that judgment helped
form moral convictions on the basis of empirical details,
then he was contesting "cultural subjectivists," who
believed judgment infused history with principled
convictions. In each case, the problem was not one
concerned with the theoretical meaning of judgment per se.
It was concerned with the degree of "distance" between
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judgment, a moral conviction, and the empirical constraints
tory. For Weber, the notion of judgment expressed by
positivists revealed too much distance, whereas the notion
expressed by subjectivists revealed too little. From 19 03
until 1917; during which he wrote essavs ony , among other
things,
"'Objectivity' in Social Science" and "The Meaning
of 'Ethical Neutrality,'"
„eber engaged both schools with
regard to the role of judgment in modern science. The
result was not a theory of judgment which superseded other
gns of the idea, but a scholarly discussion from which a
theory Of judgment spurred conflict rather than uniformity
around one ultimate goal of "truth" or "experience."
Such discussions once again stress Weber's link to the
political thinking of Thucydides, who, in his account of
"The Mytilenian Debate," denotes an idea of judgment based
on the public dialogue among Athenian citizens. With Athens
in a quandary over how to punish the Mytilenians for
rebelling against Athenian rule, Thucydides highlights a
debate which matches the realities of empire against the
promise of democracy. He first traces the reasoning of
Cleon, who, as a proponent of "imperial power" and
punishment "by death, " argues that Athens has become overly
enamored with "competitive displays" of speech-making.
Cleon perceives such "displays" as evidence of a growing
Athenian desire to act "more like an audience sitting at the
feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing
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matters of state ." 48 Converse! v .v,c ly, as the advocate of "wise
decisions" and "moderation in our punishments," Diodotus
claims Athens is in need of debate if the empire is to
flourish beyond its predicament with the Mytilenes. For
with "'words,'" he declarer .. , i A „u i s, it is possible to deal with
the uncertainties of the future'"”, reminding Athens
further "that the question is not so much whether they [the
Mytilenians] are guilty as whether we are making the right
decision for ourselves."- Thus, by altering a debate on
"punishment" into one on the value of debate, Thucydides
privileges conflict as the cornerstone of judgment, whether
it involves Cleon's drive for imperial power or Diodotus'
s
push for democracy
.
51
The same can be said about Weber's inquiries into the
meaning of science. However, where Thucydides witnesses a
debate between two dissimilar proponents of Athenian glory,
Weber observes a debate between two differing views of
science. As a result of his observations, Weber's own
interpretation indicates a notion of judgment informed, not
by the ultimate end of glory, but by the perpetuation of
human conflict involving a multiplicity of ends. If
conflict and struggle mark the substance of Weber's approach
to scholarly judgment, then what is its purpose in relation
to his theoretical project of politics?
The purpose of scholarly judgment manifests itself in
various forms over the course of Weber's writings on science
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and scientific methodology. in n SHpnrQy cience as a Vocation,
" he
claims science "is not the gift of grace of seers and
prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does
it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers
about the meaning of the universe.- science, and the
judgments which accompany it, involves itself in a far more
difficult task. As Weber understands it, science is an
enterprise by which scholars unearth conditional truths
are subject to the tumults of progress. They also
take part m a task to compel people-
-including the
scientists- themselves--to
"clarify" the distance between
"this or that ultimate weltanschauliche position" and the
inconvenient' facts" which counteract them. "Again,"
Weber remarks, "I am tempted to say of a teacher who
succeeds in this: he stands in the service of 'moral'
forces. This "'moral'" thrust of science, this "duty"
to raze rather than elevate values and truths, this
"unceasing struggle" between differing persons-
-each informs
the goal of scholarly judgment in its own way. The force of
each emerges when Weber battles the "positivist" legacy of
the German Historical School, as well as the "subjectivist"
bent of younger scholars who question the rational artifice
of science.
Max Weber's battles with the German Historical School
began when he arrived at the Verein fur Sozialpolitik in
1887. At the Verein
,
a group of scholars, business men, and
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officials who worked to sway the economic policies of the
German state, Weber encountered such
..strictly scientific-
individuals as Gustav Schmoller and Carl Wenger." it was
not until 1904, however, as the editor of the Heroin's
journal, Archiv, that he challenged his older colleagues on
the naive claim of ''-objectivity... buttressing their notion
of scientific inquiry. As a Herein member, Weber
acknowledged his intellectual tie to what he called "our
science," the "sole purpose" of which "was the attainment of
value-judgments concerning measures of state economic
policy. it was a 'technique'."” This "'technique'" was
such that scholars understood the garnering and ordering of
"empirical" details to be the source, not the consequence,
of "value-judgments" in modern science. 56 He labeled their
approach a "confused opinion," for they perceived value-
judgments to be "'deduced'" from empirical evidence yet
assumed such a method to be "'objective'" and void of "'one-
sided' viewpoints." As a backer of a "new 'science'," Weber
wanted to "reject this view in principle." He did so
because it can never be the task of an empirical science to
provide binding norms or ideals from which directives for
immediate practical activity can be derived." 57
By contesting the scientific purpose of the Historical
School, among others, Weber proposes a notion of scientific
objectivity'" based on a different set of principles.
First, he predicates it on the claim that there is "no
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absolutely
'objective' scientific analysis of culture"
distinct from the value- judgments undergirding a scholar's
perception of the world. Hence he in no way professes "that
value-judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific
discussion in general simply because
... they rest on certain
ideals and are therefore
'subjective' in origin." 5 * on the
contrary, his "new 'science'" aims at clarifying the
distance between a scholar's empirical analysis of culture
one s uniquely individual viewpoint, ensuring at least
an analytical link between facts and values. But more than
lust clarifying the scientific location of value- judgments,
Weber believes the scholar "can also 'judge' them
critically. This criticism can... have only a dialectical
character, i.e., it can be no more than a formal logical
judgment of historically given value- judgments and ideas, a
testing of the ideals according to the postulate of the
internal consistency of the desired end ." 59 Based on
"one's own Weltanschauung » and the prospect of "judgments"
being levelled against it, Weber's notion of "'objectivity'"
thus departs from the methodological creed of the German
Historical School. In doing so he points to an alternative
method which, instead of generating "binding norms and
ideals," measures the distance between them and a scholar's
"ordering of empirical social reality."
The basis of this method rests, furthermore, on what
Weber refers to as "heuristic means," which allow a scholar
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to judge "the confrontation* of facts with ideals. Again
departing from the Historical School, which deduced law-like
ends from empirical details, he theorizes "a conceptual
construct (Gedankenbil d) which is neither historical reality
nor even the 'true' reality. »» Instead, what he proposes
is an ideal
-type.* with ideal-types, Weber conjectures
"not the end but rather the means of knowledge," using them
to illuminate how a scholar's individually-configured
viewpoint impacts the ordering of "a finite segment" of
empirical reality. « Consequently, he claims it was "a
purely ideal limiting concept" which aids the scholar in
appraising only the analytical link between "the real
situation or action" and "certain of its significant
components.- This "limiting" trait marks the pivotal
function of his methodology of the social sciences, for it
does more than isolate the discord between historical facts
and human values in a given inquiry. it provides, too, the
preconditions for a struggle among scholars, all of whom use
distinctly "one-sided" forms of the ideal-type to interpret
the world around them. "By means of this category," notes
Weber, "the adequacy of our imagination, oriented and
disciplined by reality, is judged ." 63 With it he rebukes
the "'objectivity'" of his opponents, as well as embraces a
method of inquiry concerned more with the contingencies than
the necessities of human knowledge.
243
In his essay on '"Objectivity in Social Science,"
therefore, Weber contests the German Historical School's use
of "concepts" as "the reproduction of 'objective' social
reality" in science. The consequence of this critique,
however, manifests itself in his own "reformulation anew of
concepts on the foundations thus transformed." 8 * This is
Weber's idea of "progress" in the social sciences, and it
allows him to shift the focus of science away from "the
'actual' interconnections of 'things'" and on to "the
conceptual interconnections of problems ." 6S with the
latter approach, his notion of science becomes an enterprise
in which the purpose of a scholar's judgment is not to
produce a series of "'completed'" and "binding" norms from
specific historical facts. Insofar as it makes "a sharp,
precise distinction" between values and facts, while engaged
m " the Perpetual reconstruction" of ideas, the aim of a
scholar's judgment reveals the "individual character" of the
"objective validity of all empirical knowledge" in
science. Weber labels this aim "the elementary duty of
scientific self-control ," underscoring the scholar's moral
expedition to remind oneself and others of the "hairline"
proximity of knowledge to faith. It is an expedition which,
not only unsettles the "'objectivity'" of the Historical
School, but contests any endeavor to elevate an ideal on the
basis of it being complete, binding, and true.
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If Weber's criticism of the German Historical School
focuses on the excess of distance between values and facts,
his rebuke of "subjectivism" in science fixes on the lack of
it. This latter appraisal is evident in his essay on "The
Meaning of 'Ethical Neutralitv' iny m Sociology and Economics."
There Weber challenges "a large number of officially
accredited prophets" who, rather than face public scrutiny,
"enunciate, their evaluations on ultimate questions 'in the
name of science' in governmentally privileged lecture halls
in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion,
nor subject to contradiction."" it is a challenge not so
much aimed at the ideological viewpoints of certain
scholars, for Weber is known to chide both the nationalist
zealotry of Treitzschke and the socialist fervor of George
Sorel or George Simmel.« As editor of the Archiv, Weber
rejected such "one-sided" manuscripts as that sent to him by
Otto Gross, a student of Freud whose "'new ethics'" of
"sexual communism" revolved around one's personal quest for
pleasure. Weber's distrust is also evident in his
friendship with Stefan George, whom he lauds for "real
greatness" but scolds as "striving for self
-deification, for
the immediate enjoyment of the divine in his own soul ." 70
Thus his charge appears to have little to do with the
content of what a person values about the world. On the
contrary, it has a lot to do with a scholar's inability to
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separate clearly one's "own evaluations" from "personally
uncomfortable" facts.
Unlike the positivist traits of the Historical School,
the attributes of subjectivism reveal themselves to Weber in
a blatant disregard for empirical analysis, without naming
specific names, he witnessed this scholarly neglect
occurring among "the proponents of the assertion of
professorial evaluations," scholars who mingled value-
judgments with factual assertions. In the past, Weber
admits, a scholar's mix of facts and values typically
derived from a single Kantian imperative of justice which
was thought to be both "unambiguous" and "impersonal." 71
But in early 20th century Germany, he continues, "it is now
done in the name of a patchwork of cultural values, i.e.,
actually subjective demands on culture, or... in the name of
the alleged 'rights of the teacher's personality.'" 72 For
this reason, Weber's critique of subjectivism stems neither
from a desire to return to the "great epoch" of "objective"
imperatives nor from an aversion to the "ethical
irrationality" of the modern world. What sparks the
critique is his "fear that a lecturer who makes his lectures
stimulating by the insertion of personal evaluations will,
in the long run, weaken the students' taste for sober
empirical analysis." 7 ' It is a fear which leads him to
propose, not the erasure of values from science, but the
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formation of a method which affirms the impact of facts on a
scholar's value- judgments
.
The method Weber has in mind is not unlike the one he
theorizes in response to the Historical School's efforts to
render "completed" values from empirical details. However,
with regard to the advocates of "professorial evaluations,"
Weber s methodological aim is somewhat different. Indeed,
he seeks to "vigorously oppose (bestrei ten) » them on account
of their "view that one may be 'scientifically' contented
with the conventional self
-evidentness of very widely
accepted value- judgment ." 74 what Weber rejects is the
claim that such values as moral "progress," social
"justice," or personal "'experience'" ought to act as the
only guidepost for a scholar's analysis of empirical
reality. For, he notes, when a scholar's value- judgment
confronts a series of facts, it undergoes a "re
-adjustment"
m terms of its historical direction, baring a provisional
rather than immutable design. As a response, Weber premises
his own method on a scholar's capacity to perform three
specific duties:
"(1) to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike
fashion; (2)... to recognize facts, even those
which may be personally uncomfortable, and todistinguish them from his own evaluations; (3) to
subordinate himself to his task and to repress theimpulse to exhibit his personal
tastes
. . . unnecessarily
.
1,75
By opposing subjectivism, he is not doubting the moral or
historical weight of certain ends but the method by which
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scholars allow them to outweigh,
empirical analysis
.
even dismiss, the value of
Again Weber recommends the "ideal
-type” as the
methodological device for maintaining distance between
value
-judgments and factual assertions. In contrast to the
Historical School, whose accent on empirical analysis sought
to deduce fixed ideals from facts, Weber extols the ideal-
type as a "heuristic means" to the end of clarifying the
provisional design of ideals. Yet, in response to the
pundits of subjectivism, he utilizes it to show the extent
to which a scholar's value- judgments alone fail as a proxy
for the solid explication of facts. "Its function," he
repeats, "is the comparison with empirical reality in order
to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe
them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and
to understand and explain them causally ." 76 The technical
aim of Weber's ideal-type, therefore, is not directed at
negating the ethical, religious, legal or aesthetic ends of
the scholar. Nor is it fixed on deifying the scientific
function of empirical analysis. Its aim is to help the
scholar "make relentlessly clear to his audience, and
especially to himself, which of his statements are
statements of logically deduced or empirically observed
facts and which are statements of practical evaluations ." 77
This is Weber's way of stressing the "hairline" distance
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between "value- judc^ents and judgments of fact" in the work
of scholars who conflated, and thus confused, the two.
In addition to uncovering the
"uncomfortable" facts
which defy a scholar's value- judgment
, Weber's notion of the
ideal-type helps perpetuate a struggle among scholars.
Given that ideal-types promise at least an analytical
discernment of values from facts, Weber claims that scholars
face the demanding task of constantly rethinking the union
between each element. Hence, on the basis of this shifting
ground, he also designates the concern of such scholars to
be "a question not only of alternatives between values but
of an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between 'God'
and the Devil. Between these, neither relativization nor
compromise is possible.- This struggle occurs, Weber
believes, within the "souls" of individual persons and among
the scholars who adhere to the varied "procedures" of
science. With regard to his rebuke of the advocates of
"professorial evaluations," struggle is not dependent on the
scholar's utilization of ideal-types per se, for struggle
symbolizes the human quest for knowledge at least as far
back as Plato. However, ideal-types seek to promote the
prospect of human struggle within those souls and among
those scholars who have grown accustomed to the
"conventional self
-evidentness " of their own particular
value
-
j udgments
. It fosters a scholar's "understanding of
what one's opponent--or one's self--really means--i.e., in
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understanding the evaluations which really
... separate the
discussants and consequently in enabling one to take up a
position with reference to this value.'.” Ideal-types thus
mark Weber s attempt to nourish struggle within science, in
spite of trends among scholars who-
-absent a discussion--
revel in their "'personally tinted professorial type of
prophecy .
"
In light of his critique of subjectivism, Weber reveals
the extent to which the purpose of scholarly judgment was to
induce a struggle among persons with divergent ideals. The
means to this end of struggle is, of course, his notion of
the ideal-type, which allows the scholar to judge not only
the empirical confines of value- judgments but the requisite
analytical distance between each component. By contesting
the "'German ideas of 1914,'" the "'socialism of the
future,'" or the "spirit of German philosophy," Weber
perceives what he understands to be a lack of judgment on
the part of the scholarly champions of these ideals. 80 As
a response to this deficiency, he conjectures a notion of
judgment premised on something more significant than just
the configuration of ideal
-types and the rebirth of human
struggle in science. He premises the aim of scholarly
judgment on the idea that, though one's values may derive
from profoundly subjective sources, the objective element of
empirical details did not necessarily validate them for the
rest of the world. Quite the contrary, for he assumes the
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analysis of "empirical 'reality'" entailed countervailing
forces which required the scholar to "re-adjust" his or her
value- judgments. While pondering "The Meaning of 'Ethical
Neutrality,'" therefore, Weber declares the aim of scholarly
judgment to be the perpetuation of struggle, which
presupposes both the unruly vigor of facts and the
historical limits of human values.
By musing over the meaning of "'objectivity," moreover,
Weber understands the purpose of scholarly judgment to be
the source of human struggle in science. Yet he reaches
that conclusion by challenging the positivist legacy of the
German Historical School rather than the subjectivist claims
of scholars who pride themselves on their "professorial
evaluations." For Weber, life's "irrational reality" and
" inexhaustable store of possible meanings" discloses how the
positivist zeal for fact-based ideals collapses as others
remain "in flux, ever subject to change in the dimly seen
future of human culture." 81 in this case, his notion of
scholarly judgment shows more than a proclivity to spur a
human struggle in science. It also reveals the extent to
which such a purpose derives from the claim that empirical
knowledge "rests exclusively" on the subjective and entirely
intangible traits of what a person happens to value in the
world. Unlike his 1917 challenge to the backers of
subjectivism, which highlights the value of empirical
analysis, Weber's dispute with the Historical School
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stresses the epistemological force and elasticity of
values. At the intersection of both critiques, what
human
stands
out is a notion of scholarly judgment, the purpose of which
to acknowledge the distance between values and facts, a
distance which ensures the possibility of human struggle.
—
Limits
—of—Scholarly Judgment
If these two works on the methodology of the social
sciences reveal anything about Max Weber's notion of
ariy judgment, it is that progress and human struggle
buttress its theoretical design. By "scientific
progress Weber means something other than the
Enlightenment understanding of the term, one which posits
human reason as the source of economic, political,
aesthetic, even moral advancement. Insofar as reason
utilizes objective means to attain a subjectively desired
end, he instead perceives progress to be more than a
technical'" advance, but an open door to a tense nexus
between means and ends. Moreover, given his belief in an
irreconcilable death-struggle, " Weber discerns at least one
consequence of such progress: ultimate ends often rebut and
help shift the historical trajectory of technical
advancement, and vice-versa. Thus the struggle indicative
of science not only presupposes the likelihood of progress,
it also anticipates the "readjustment" of ends, means, and
the fragile union between the two. With regard to Weber's
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idea of scholarly judgment, progress and struggle denote its
theoretical design alright, but they do so while also
stressing the gravity of historical and moral contingencies.
The theoretical design of scholarly judgment, however,
points to more than just the contingencies bequeathed to it
by the specter of progress and struggle. in fact, while
arguing for an alternative view of "'Objectivity' in Social
Science" in 1904, Weber situates his views in part on an
Enlightenment and Liberal groundwork of human reason. 82
"The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science
lies," he professes, "in the fact that we are cultural
beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a
deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it
significance .
"
83 By marking
" cultural beings » with a
capacity to inscribe value on the world, a value based in
part on rational calculation, Weber claims "it will lead us
to judge certain phenomena" in relation to that specific
value. Yet, while rethinking "The Meaning of 'Ethical
Neutrality'" 13 years later, he strays from his initial
presupposition, asserting instead the prospect that those
persons endowed with scholarly judgment are but a few in
number. The basis of this later claim derives from what he
terms the "shallowness of our routinized daily existence,"
which allows persons to "avoid the choice between 'God' and
'Devil' and their own ultimate decision as to which of the
conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which
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by the other Though Weber posits his idea of scholarly
judgment on the provisional forces of progress and struggle,
he still circumscribes its use to technically trained
persons within a particular historical context.
Judging from these divergent qualities, it seems as
though Weber s idea of scholarly judgment entails a degree
of tension, one which issues from his thoughts on progress
and struggle. What are the theoretical formations of
scientific. progress and human struggle, and how do they
prompt the tension in Weber's notion of scholarly judgment?
In positing his idea of scholarly judgment on the
groundwork of "scientific 'progress,'" Weber does more than
simply denote the "fate" of modern science. He assumes,
too, that the orientation of science conforms to a
perception of history which, though fortuitous in its
outcome, establishes a priori the "increasing
intellequalization and rationalization" of human knowledge.
This is evident insofar as he traces an historical path from
Plato's "discovery" of "the concept " to Bacon's mastery of
'the rational experiment" to the modern scientist's sober
deployment of the "tools" of methodology
.
85 With the
addition of his own configuration of the "ideal-type," Weber
lengthens the path one step further, stressing the
instrumental aim of the ideal-type in differentiating facts
from values. Each "rational" device is thought to
constitute a larger historical project by which human beings
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seek "to bring order into the chaos" of the creaturely world
around them. Yet, for Weber, the uniqueness of this history
is not to be found in a teleological aim toward greater
knowledge or a more insightful understanding of the world.
"The intellectual apparatus," he counters, "which the past
has developed through
... the analytical rearrangement of the
immediately given reality... is in constant tension with the
new knowledge which we can and desire to wrest from
reality." Thus the history of rationality which colors
Weber's idea of progress secures itself, not to any one
absolute end, but to a faith in the technical supremacy of
analytical
- constructs
.
By grounding scientific progress on the history of
rationality, Weber tends to confine science to a domain in
which methodological "tools" mark the source of theoretical
engagement between scholars. This is the case in his
disputes with both the German Historical School, which
compiled concepts on the basis of strictly positive ends,
and the proponents of subjectivism, who did so without
weighing the empirical force of facts. Hence Weber's claim
in 1904 that science "cannot tell anyone what he should do--
but rather what he can do- -and under certain circumstances-
-
what he wishes to do." 87 Given that a construct such as
the ideal-type is one of many scientific tools, it fails to
ascertain the ultimate normative value of science itself, or
any other worldly enterprise, for that matter. The merit of
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these ideal-types, he believes, "consists in the insight
that every single important activity and ultimately life as
a whole... is a series of ultimate decisions through which
the soul... chooses its own fate, i.e., the meaning of its
activity and existence. "» From this perspective, Weber
views the historical path of science as strewn with those
constructs inept at ordering a given "'reality" rather than
the ultimate ends which govern their epistemological
direction. The "'progress'" of science, therefore, which
colors scholarly judgment, indicates not only a history of
rationality but a history in which rationality divulges its
instrumental limits.
This assumption about the rational design of history
thus features at least one significant limit within Weber's
theoretical configuration of scholarly judgment. with its
focus fixed on analytical tools, the history of "scientific
progress'" remains, as far Weber is concerned, "the
dissolution of the analytical constructs so constructed
through the expansion and shift of the scientific
horizon ." 89 However, the continuity of this process
follows from him granting epistemological supremacy to the
rational function of analytical constructs, particularly his
own rendering of the ideal
-type.
For this reason, Weber's approach to scientific
progress assumes a history symbolized by the rational
development of heuristic devices. But it does so in a way
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that limits the focus of science itself. insofar as
progress stresses the changing constellations of these
devices -
-devices which allow a scientist to order only the
empirical world--the enterprise of science focuses on the
means rather than the ends of human knowledge. By focusing
on the means of knowledge, science waives its ability to
"learn the meaning of the world from the results of its
analysis," entrusting that task to the forces of faith. As
a result, Weber limits the scope of scholarly judgment to
the divide between facts and values, but only insofar as
that divide reveals itself in the rational structure of
ideal
- types
.
If Weber's idea of progress signifies one restriction
on the prospect of scholarly judgment, his notion of human
struggle in science suggests another. in that he perceives
the enterprise of science to involve an "irreconcilable
death-struggle" between scholars, Weber assumes that it
privileges. a particular type of person who can endure the
ever- shifting landscape of human knowledge. He is adamant
about this point in his 1917 "Science as a Vocation"
lecture, when he designates science "a 'vocation' organized
in special disciplines in the service of self
-clarification
and knowledge of interrelated facts." 90 Science is neither
a gateway to "sacred values and revelations" nor an "evasion
of the plain duty of intellectual integrity, " both which
symbolize a type of person incapable of bearing the weight
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scientific conflict. Unlike the scientist-scholar, Weber
states in his 1917 essay on "'Ethical Neutrality,'" such
persons spend most of their lives not only refraining from
the choice between good and evil, but also evading the
deleterious consequences which correspond to such a choice.
The human struggle so central to Weber's view of science
thus signifies a person who not only endures the "common
fate" of specialization, progress, and personal frustration.
This person, unlike others, embraces the uncertainties
corresponding to the struggle of science with passion, with
a clear picture of empirical details, and with judgment
enough to distinguish one from the other.
Given these characteristics and abilities of those
persons who engage in the struggle of science, Weber does
not necessarily prevent others from participating in the
modern enterprise of science. "Yet," he remarks, again in
his "Vocation" lecture on science, "I have found that only a
few men could endure this situation without coming to
grief." 1 He refers to science, moreover, as "the affair
of an intellectual aristocracy, " the members of which are
persons who draw strength from an "inner devotion" to a
specific scientific venture. This "psychological" quality,
what Weber also calls "the inward calling for science,
"
emphasizes the degree to which a person adheres to a
scholarly passion despite the impersonal drudgery of
scientific specialization. It allows the scholar to
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withstand "a struggle against another's ideals from the
standpoint of one's own," ensuring not the supremacy of
one's ideal but the chance that it, and the empirical
studies it colors, extends the breadth of scientific
discussion. Thus, as he assumed editorial control of the
journal Archiv, Weber asserted: "Whoever cannot bear this or
who takes the viewpoint that he does not wish to work, in
the service of scientific knowledge, with persons whose
other ideals are different from his own, is free not to
participate. Accordingly, human struggle exhibits
Weber's desire to populate science not with just any
scholar, only those with mettle enough to subject their
analyses and corresponding values to the scrutiny of other
scholars
.
By postulating science on the notion of struggle, which
m turn allows "only a few men" to possess scientific
dispositions, Weber unveils the other constraint on the
prospect of scholarly judgment. It is a limitation insofar
as those scholars who follow their "calling" for science
constitute the primary agency of judgment within the
enterprise of modern science. This is the case, not because
they willingly embrace the "death-struggle" of science, but
because they distinguish with "clarity" the analytical
distance between the facts and values which are at least one
source of that struggle. Indeed, the scholar's desire "to
gain clarity " on the rifts between "antagonistic persons,"
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among "mutually loving persons," or within "the individual's
own mind" comprises the unique quality he brings to bear on
scientific struggles. Most people, Weber surmises, "do not
become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware" of
the antagonisms stemming from the mix of facts and values,
consigning such tensions instead to "the intellectual
aristocracy" of science.” His idea of scholarly judgment
contains far more than a faith in the function of analytical
constructs, which confines scholarly judgment to the limited
epistemological landscape of instrumental rationality.
Weber s idea of scholarly judgment also imparts a view that
such a faculty is the domain of unique persons, persons who
not only endure the struggle of science but perpetuate it by
underscoring the distance between facts and values.
The specters of rationality and an intellectual
aristocracy thus symbolize the extent to which Weber's
theoretical, approach to scholarly judgment entails certain
formidable limits
. With the former constraint, his idea of
scholarly judgment tends to privilege such heuristic devices
as the ideal
-type, circumscribing the chaos of human
knowledge with analytical means aimed towards a particular
end. However, Weber's trust in the rational ordering of
knowledge also tends to incite a scholar's judgment in a way
that marks analytical constructs for criticism and, thus,
lengthens the trajectory of "'progress'" in modern science.
"The greatest advances in the sphere of the social
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sciences," he remarks, near the end of his essay on
"'Objectivity' in Social Science, "are substantively tied up
the shift in practical cultural problems and take the
guise of a critique of concept-construction ."’ 4 Hence the
very constraint of rationality not only limits scholarly
judgment to a technical domain, in which the divergent
elements of facts and values conform to purely "mental"
constructs. Of greater weight, it enables the scholar to
judge the inadequacies and limits of empirical analyses,
ultimate ideals, and even the privileged foundation of
rationality itself. This ironic twist allows Weber to
perceive the great attempts at theory-construction" as
"always useful for revealing the limits of the significance
of those points of view which provided their
foundations
.
1,95 Thus his idea of scholarly judgment
acknowledges as well as challenges the supremacy of
rationality in modern science, underscoring a propensity for
epistemological disruptions and their matching struggles.
With regard to an intellectual aristocracy,
furthermore, Weber's notion of scholarly judgment refers to
persons with human qualities unlike those of most other
people. This exclusionist axiom encloses the prospect of
scholarly judgment not by virtue of mandatory psychological
criterion alone, that is, "prerequisites" which entail the
scholar's merger of "enthusiasm and work" into a scientific
venture. It hinders scholarly judgment insofar as the
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scholar measures one's own deeds by making "explicit juBt
where the arguments are addressed to the analytical
understanding and where to the sentiments . »» By requiring
scholars to typify these paradoxical traits, Weber's idea of
scholarly judgment suggests a burdensome struggle for the
few who heed "the call" for science. Yet, if these
aristocrats represent the agents of scholarly jud^ent, then
they also reflect, as did Weber, the ability to discern the
fact of hierarchy in science from the ideal of the
"specifically particular character" of science. Only with
this prospect of immanent critique can science, like other
cultural pursuits, "change" what Weber labels "its
standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the
streams of events from the heights of thought ." 97 The
elitist underpinnings of scholarly judgment, therefore,
mandate rare human qualities, but they are qualities that
simultaneously summon a "readjustment" in the thrust of
judgment and, quite possibly, the order of modern science.
By factoring in the ideas of "scientific 'progress'"
and "human struggle," Max Weber lays bare a few of the
theoretical shortcomings in his notion of scholarly
judgment. Though these limits mark a tension at the crux of
scholarly judgment, one between epistemological promise and
historical agency, they nevertheless confirm the gravity of
judgment in Weber's methodological works. In one instance,
he situates scholarly judgment on the ground of progress,
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tethering its critical faculties to the historical
development of rational "methods of thinking, the tools and
the training for thought." in anchoring scholarly judgment
to the idea of progress, however, Weber not only restricts
its faculties to the realm of rationality. He also unveils
conditions by which the scholar, using judgment, denotes
the distance between the liberal goal of lending the world
"significance" and the narrow means of rationality which
fosters the disenchantment of the world.'" in another
instance, he posits scholarly judgment on the ground of
human conflict, such that it privileges the judgments of
those "few" persons who are "able to countenance the stern
seriousness of our fateful times." Yet, Weber not only
anchors the prospect of scholarly judgment to an
"intellectual aristocracy;" he highlights, as well, the
struggle of progress which reminds the aristocracy of its
own "provisional and not definitive" fate. Thus Weber's
idea of scholarly judgment exemplifies certain theoretical
limits alright, but they are limits which nevertheless
foreshadow openings within science itself and towards the
narrow confines of professional politics.
Judgment and Political Theory
In his introduction to the history of The Peloponnesian
War, Thucydides bestows on future generations of scholars a
vexing perspective on the gravity of judgment. This
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perspective conveys the extent to which he thought of
judgment as both a means to induce the judgments of
successive scholars and an end to all subsequent judgments
concerning politics, war, and history. On the one hand, he
hopes "these words of mine are judged useful by those who
want to understand clearly the events which happened in the
past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some
time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the
future. This is typified by his idea of the Athenian
way of life" in the chapter on "Pericles' Funeral Oration,"
the "future" of Athenian democracy in "The "Mytilenian
Debate" between Cleon and Diodotus, and Alcibiades's role in
"the downfall" of Athens in the chapter on "Launching of the
Sicilian Expedition." Thucydides, however, understands that
his "work" is "not a piece of writing designed to meet the
taste of an immediate public, but was done to last
forever."” His rich chronicle of the war between Sparta
and Athens represents, as well as imposes, a formidable
standard of judgment, one which confines its critical and
factual orientations to the Hellenic world. Consequently,
Thucydides's approach to historical judgment exposes a
tension between his desire to spur on future judgments and
his wish to obviate them
.
100
Max Weber's approach to scholarly judgment embodies a
theoretical tension not unlike that displayed in the work of
Thucydides. Weber proposes "ideal -types" as a way of
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promoting the
-formal logical judgment of historically given
value-judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according
to the postulate of the internal consistency of the desired
end." 1 This approach concurs with his typologies of,
among other things,
"rationalization" in the "Protestant
Ethic" essays, "national leadership" in certain political
writings, and "social science" in the methodological works.
Weber s desire to sustain scientific discussions fails
to acknowledge the restrictive assumptions underlying his
views on progress and struggle, assumptions which limit
discussion to the function of ideal-types among a few
qualified scholars. Thus there is his vexing depiction of
scholarly judgment as both the source of and obstruction to
the possibility of human struggle in modern science. Unlike
Thucydides, though, who hoped his judgment of Hellenic
history might "last forever," Weber hopes "the professional
thinker" can "keep a cool head in the face of the ideals
prevailing at the time... and if necessary
...' to swim against
the stream. ' " 10 *- This aspiration allows Weber to situate
scholarly judgment in contrast to Thucydides's monumental
project of history as well as his theoretical foes in modern
science. It allows him, too, to challenge the dominant
judgments and ultimate ends which comprise the wholly
unscientific enterprise of modern professional politics.
Having held out the prospect of resisting the self-
evident ideals of early-20th century German society, how
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might Webet's notion of scholarly judgment constitute a
plausible challenge to the modern profession of politics?
One consistent point throughout Weber's methodological
writings is that he perceives the scholar and the politician
as two persons who perform entirely separate tasks in the
world. Weber is adamant about this distinction insofar as
he witnesses the scholar working in "governmentally
privileged lecture halls" and the politician laboring in
public places or in sectarian conventicles." it is
likewise the case when he claims the instrument of science
to be "a utopia
"
which "cannot be found empirically anywhere
m real ity" and that of politics to be "the ethically
dangerous" force of "violence." Finally, Weber signals this
distinction when, in "Science as a Vocation, " he notes that
" [t]o take a practical political stand is one thing, and to
analyze political structures and party positions is
another ." 103 Yet, despite these claims concerning the
distance between science and politics, Weber deems science
and the scholar to be a valuable "service" to politics. The
"scientific worker," he argues, "can tell you that if you
want such and such an end, then you must take into the
bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all
experience will occur ." 104 in other words, the scholar
"can confront you with the necessity of this choice ." 105
By judging the distance between facts and values, which in
turn discloses the limited scope of a person's worldly
266
options, the scientist-scholar thus exhibits, not
necessarily an aptitude for politics, but merely a capacity
to oppose it.
This oppositional element of scholarly judgment fails
to put Weber at ease, however, since it is at odds with the
"self-confinement" he requires of those scholars who
recognize life's "inexhaustible" meanings. Although
scholarly judgment aids in clarifying the logical
incongruities and ethical inadequacies allied with persons,
parties, and other institutions, Weber still seeks to keep
its focus trained on "the methods of scientific research."
Despite this tension, he intensifies it when he proclaims,
at the outset of his "'Objectivity'" essay, "the express
purpose of the Archiv" to be "the education of judgment
about practical social problems" as much as "the criticism
of practical social policy, extending even as far as
legislation ." 106 Contrary to the professional politician,
the modern scholar does not rely on violence, demagoguery,
and compromise as means to the specific ultimate end of,
say, German national glory and power. Weber's depiction of
the scholar does not reveal a commitment to any one
particular goal other than the perpetuation of struggle
among persons who mirror an endless flow of possible ends.
It is a goal which differentiates the scholar from the
seemingly myopic foresight of the professional politician.
What the scholar also has is judgment, which, in clarifying
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the "hairline" distance between the "infinite variety" of
facts and the "individual character" of "cultural values,"
uncovers the limits of a multitude of Weltanschauungen. The
scope of scholarly judgment, therefore, stretches beyond the
battles with scientific positivism and cultural subjectivism
to include encounters with, among others, Socialism,
Machtpolitik, Pacficism, and even German nationalism.
Based on this potentially broad reach, Weber's idea of
scholarly judgment intimates an orientation towards a world
which contests the ends of politics, even though it concedes
the ethically distinct traits of such a profession. To
illustrate this orientation, Weber addresses the possible
nexus between "an ethically neutral science" and the
political enterprise of "syndicalism," which he finds to be
both ruthless" and steeped in " romanticism. " 107 He does
so in his 1917 essay on "The Meaning of 'Ethical
Neutrality,'" one year prior to Socialist rebellions in
Munich and Berlin. in that essay, Weber states "the
analysis of syndicalism" is "completed when it has reduced
the syndicalistic standpoint to its most rational and
internally consistent form and has empirically investigated
the pre-conditions for its existence and its practical
consequences." 108 The "task" is to judge, not simply the
logic of an ideal that mirrors a "new society" of class-
conscious trade unionists, or the historical force of "the
general strike and terror" which seeks to paralyze
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even Socialist
capitalist production and subvert
parliamentarians. More important, as Weber notes in his
'"Objectivity" essay, it is to judge the degree to which
action and ... inaction imply in their consequences the
espousal iParteinahme] of certain values-
-and herewith
... the
rejection of certain others." 109 Hence his notion of
scholarly judgment moves beyond science towards politics,
bringing with it a distrust of absolute political ends and,
thus, a faith in the prospect of struggle over the
significance of such ends.
The way scholarly judgment rouses the prospect of
struggle in politics is similar to the way it does so in the
profession of science: rendering "ultimate" ends as
"provisional and not definite." While lecturing on the
subject of "Science as a Vocation" to an audience of
aspiring scholars in November of 1917, Weber speaks in blunt
terms about the historical condition on which he posits the
scholarly quest for distance and clarity. He believes
science takes "its point of departure from the one
fundamental fact, that so long as life remains immanent and
is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an
unceasing struggle of... gods with one another." 110 This
view of the historical trajectory of science confirms the
degree to which Weber perceives more than just the empirical
limits of cultural subjectivism or the subjective
constraints on scientific positivism. Indeed, it also
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permits him and other scholars to approach the ultimate ends
of modern politics with an eye towards judging their
empirical as well as subjective underpinnings. From this
'ewpoint, Weber s idea of scholarly judgment signifies a
capacity to subject all "gods," even science, to an
evaluation of the bond between normative ambition and
historical impediments. It demonstrates his conviction,
furthermore, that "the ultimately possible attitudes toward
life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never
be brought to a final conclusion ." 111 The potential impact
of scholarly judgment on politics points, therefore, to the
prospect of a struggle based, not on the advance of one
particular end, but on the provisional character of all
ultimate ends.
As a scholar and scientist, Weber understands the
provisional character of the gods, and other assorted human
values, as an historical moment imbued with promise. His
belief in the "common fate" of "'progress'" specifies a time
when "one can.
. .master all things by calculation, " while at
the same time it validates the "strange intoxication" of
persons who devote themselves to science with great
enthusiasm. 11 - This paradoxical mix of worldly
"'disenchantment'" and individual "passion" promise the
scholar anything but a simple choice between the sterile
rigors of empirical analysis and the unfettered reach of
human values. If scholars use clear judgment in their
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scientific ventures, they will recognize the distinction
between facts and values, but only insofar as such
distinctions reflect one of only a multitude of worldly
viewpoints. in fact, Weber insists the "belief which we all
have in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity
ultimate and final values... is not incompatible with the
incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints, from
which empirical reality gets its significance. Both these
views are, on the contrary, in harmony with each other ." 113
Such predicaments promise the scholar, if not knowledge of
the ultimate value a person ought to follow, then an
understanding of the limits which define the value one
chooses to follow. Scholarly judgment thus aims to
accentuate the "hairline" distance between any ultimate end
and the shifting stream of empirical details which underlies
it, suggesting at least a possible contestation of those
values mirrored in modern politics.
The sort of struggle which Weber associates with
scholarly judgment involves neither the violence nor the
demagoguery he ascribes to the human struggle of politics.
His idea of scholarly judgment affords modern politics an
alternative form of struggle which, instead of merely
advancing a more forceful ultimate end at the expense of
others, tends to advance the value of human struggle itself.
By "'Understanding all'" values, however, Weber "does not
mean 'pardoning all' nor does mere understanding of
271
another's viewpoint as such lead, in principle, to its
approval. On the contrary, he believes scholarly judgment
and its related struggles lead "at least as easily, and
often with greater probability to the awareness of the
issues and reasons which prevent agreement." 114 it forces
politicians into a struggle, not for the purpose of
maintaining "the binding force of an ethical 'imperative,'"
but for the sake of ensuring the possibility of future
"'discussions of evaluations.'" m this way, Weber's notion
of scholarly judgment confirms "that the attainment of such
an ethic is externally, at least, impeded by the
relativizing effects of such discussions." 115 Though it
promises little aid in the maintenance of the supremacy of a
particular ideal, scholarly judgment still offers "insight"
into the "unbridgeably divergent ultimate evaluations" in
science, economics, religion, aesthetics, and even politics.
In addition to its impact on politics, which counters a
person's desire to limit politics to the advance of a
specific end, Weber's idea of scholarly judgment hints at a
political theorist who questions the confines of politics.
This is quite a departure from an earlier stance Weber
assumes in his 1895 Freiburg Inaugural Address, when he
claims " [t]he science of political economy" to be "a
political science." 116 At this early moment in his
academic career, he designates science, and the judgments
which accompany it, as a vehicle for the advance of an
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explicitly
"one-sided" value. In particular, science acts
as "a servant of politics, not the day-to-day politics of
the persons and classes who happen to be ruling at any given
time, but the enduring power-political interests of the
nation. 1,117 ' Yet, with the wilhelmine German nation growing
increasingly more divided over issues of class, suffrage,
party politics, and war, his view of science tends to grow
more inclusive with regard to the type of ends a scholar
might hope to advance. By 1904, Weber no longer views the
German nation as the sole end of science; instead, he
espouses a science based on the "assumption that only a
finite portion" of an "infinite multiplicity of... events"
constituted valuable knowledge. 118 with this shift from
the universality of the nation to the individuality of ends,
it is no wonder that by 1917 he perceives science as being
composed "not only of alternatives between values" but of
cases in which "the value- spheres cross and
interpenetrate. " 119
In many of Weber's intellectual endeavors, the
intersection between science and politics is laid out in
such a way as to demonstrate the forceful reach of the
scient is t
- scholar
. As one who questions "the significance
of theory and theoretical conceptualization ... for our
knowledge of cultural reality, » Weber finds himself on a
path which leads to "the confrontation of empirical reality
with the ideal-type." He rejects the idea that a scholar
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as the result of
rely solely on "'the facts themselves'
some "naive" attempt to quash one's own convictions, without
Which "there would be no principle of selection of subject-
matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete
reality. Nor is he content to traverse a "'middle
course'" which, for instance, maintains "that through the
synthesis of several party points of view, or by following a
line between them, practical norms of scientific validity
can be arrived at.— The path he chooses as a scientist
and scholar leads up to and abuts the outer edge of modern
politics, leaving him--and those others who succeed him-
-to
face options other than those of moral silence or violent
action. By engaging in "the perpetual reconstruction
of .. .concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality,"
Weber denotes the option to judge not merely the "ideals and
value
-judgments" of other persons, including politicians.
He judges, too, these ends in relation to the "uncomfortable
facts" that, in light of "their starkness," inspire at most
"'discussions of evaluations'" between scientists and the
persons they face in politics.
At the very least, Weber's notion of scholarly judgment
grants to successive theorists an insight into the limits of
his own theory of politics. On the one hand, he postulates
his idea of politics on the ground of human struggle, one
that entails a multiplicity of ideals yet, ultimately,
privileges ' the end of a dynamic and powerful German nation.
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A problem emerges insofar as the aim of German national
glory supersedes and, potentially, obviates the struggles of
modern politics, thus illuminating a tension between Weber's
ultimate end and the means he theorizes so as to advance it.
On the other hand, he conjectures an idea of science on the
basis of "'progress,'" which mirrors a human struggle only
to the degree that it leads, not to the establishment of one
viewpoint, but to the displacement of all viewpoints. The
impetus behind these struggles manifests itself in scholarly
judgment, a critical accounting of the distinctions between
the facts and values which form, and reform, the
perspectives constituting science as much as politics. it
appears "as not so trifling a thing to do," remarks Weber,
referring to the scholar who "succeeds" in helping others as
well as oneself assess "the ultimate meaning " of their
conduct in the world. As far as he is concerned, such a
person "stands in the service of 'moral' forces; he fulfils
the duty of bringing about self
-clarification and a sense of
responsibility ." 122 His idea of scholarly judgment,
therefore, and the science of which it is part, is not a
proxy for a type of politics tethered to a specific ultimate
end. If anything, it is simply an option which allows a
scholar to contest the moral limits of modern politics and
the epistemological confines of political theory.
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CHAPTER V
theorizing against politics
Introduce. i nn
By now I think it obvious that Max Weber epitomizes the
degree to which political theorizing differs from the
practice of politics. The dividing line Weber draws between
vocations of politics and science underscores "the use
of violence" on the one side and "the aim of clarity" on the
other, respectively. m fact, he lived much of his own
professional life struggling to abide by this divide,
castigating professors for being demagogues in the lecture
hall and politicians for being blind to the diabolical force
of power However, though each vocation (Beruf) deviates
from the other in terms of its ethical bearing, Weber still
contends that politicians and scholars confront one another
under certain circumstances. These often involve a
politician who, for reasons of ethical doubt, entreats
scholars who aid others in deciphering the possible
consequences that issue from a political mix of violent
means and moral ends. Max Weber thus perceives science and
politics as two distinct "value spheres," each with a unique
ethical disposition. But he does so without obviating an
encounter between the spheres, suggesting that scholars and
P^-'-^icianS-
-though ethically distinct
-- signal a possible
intersection of political theory and political practice
.
2
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Jurgen Habermas's theoretical enterprise posits a view
of contemporary philosophy not unlike the
from the "modern times" of the Occident.
Theory of Communicative Action
f Habermas
one Weber derives
In his work The
accepts Weber's
vaew of the conditions which divide philosophy from other
ways of being in the world, including politics. This is the
case inasmuch as Habermas dxscerns that the " [t ] heoretical
surrogates for worldviews have been devalued, not only by
the factual advance of empirical science but even more by
the reflective consciousness accompanying it ." 3
Accordingly, like Weber, he observes the modern world to be
a place of moral fragmentation and ethical strife. Unlike
Weber, however, Habermas charges that from this metaphysical
turmoil might loom the prospect of a new bond between
philosophy and other worldly pursuits. He believes that
"the way is opening to a new constellation in the
relationship of philosophy and the sciences ." 4 This "new
constellation" rejects Weber's allusions to the rational
"disenchantment" of the modern world
.
5 it instead points
to an intersub j ective understanding or communication"
between dissimilar persons, even theorists and politicians.
A more provocative response to the divide between
theory and politics surfaces, I think, in the work of Michel
Foucault. It is provocative in that Foucault, unlike Weber
and Habermas, declares contemporary political theory a
failed enterprise. In his lecture on "The Political
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Technology of Individuals," Foucault contends "the failure
of political theories is probably due neither to politics
nor to theories but to the type of rationality in which they
are rooted.- What vexes him is not so much modernity's
push toward rationalization, a push that also disturbs the
likes of Weber, Habermas, and especially Theodor Adorno.
Foucault warns against an "increasing individualization"
that, in the name of an emancipated self, validates
rationalization and, paradoxically, the technical reach of
the total state. He contends that political theory
"nowadays must lead not to a nonpolitical way of thinking
but to an investigation of what has been our political way
of thinking during this century."’ Hence Foucault does not
seek to challenge politics per se with political theory;
instead, he seeks to confront the rationality of theory
through a particular type of political practice
.
8
Theodor Adorno also submits an interesting rejoinder to
the breach between theory and practice. The interesting
aspect of Adorno's project is not that he concurs with
Weber's view of the rationalization of the world's value
spheres. His "Dedication" in Minima Moral i
a
notes "the true
field of philosophy ... the teaching of the good life," has,
since its "conversion into method, " suffered through
"intellectual neglect, sententious whimsy and finally
oblivion. 1 Despite this "melancholy" view of philosophy's
empirical trappings, Adorno rejects Weber's claim that
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rationalization tends to fragment the value spheres of
modern life. On the contrary, Adorno charges that technical
rationality leads, not to the splintering of values, but to
their consolidation under the totalizing cultural scope of
commodity capitalism.- "What the philosophers once knew
of life," he argues, "has become the sphere of private
existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an
appendage of the process of material production, without
autonomy or substance of its own ." 11 Hence a tension
between theory and practice appears absent in Adorno's
thinking insofar as the practical reason of capitalism
privileges the empirical remains of human life. Yet, what
is present is a desire to transgress the totalizing reach of
instrumental practice. This desire manifests itself in
Adorno's idea of "critical theory, which can
"scrutinize.
. .the objective powers that determine individual
existence even in its most hidden recesses ." 12 in short,
it critiques the factual foundations of scientific
positivism, commodity capitalism, and reifed thought which
combine to constrict the prospects of human subjectivity.
Clearly the theoretical projects of Habermas, Foucault,
and Adorno do not exhaust Max Weber's impact on the
enterprise of contemporary political theorizing. After all,
his theoretical reach touches the work of other thinkers,
such as Lukacs, Mannheim, Merleau-Ponty
,
Strauss, Arendt,
and even Bataille. Neither do I suggest, therefore, that
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Habermas, Foucault and Adorno adequately reflect the
manifold scope of contemporary political theory. „hat j
will suggest is that each of the three theorists reveal a
unique relationship with Max Weber's theoretical corpus, one
that departs from the concept of rationalization. Though
they all depart from this comparatively unique concept, each
theorist ultimately turns against both Weber's theoretical
project and the contemporary enterprise of political theory.
It is. thus important to underscore, 1 believe, the
degree to which each thinker perceives contemporary
political theory to be a barrier to any fruitful union of
P itics and theory. Yet, their varied perceptions ought
not to goad other theorists into thinking they can mend the
divide between politics and theory, recede from politics
altogether, or forfeit theory to the empirical reality of
political practice. I contend that contemporary political
theory permits the theorist, not a gateway into politics,
but a critical posture against the enterprise of politics.
It compels one to think in the breach between politics and
theory for the sake of theorizing against rather than for a
political practice that often ignores the democratic merits
of critical thought
.
13 The support for my claim stems from
Weber's political thinking, inasmuch as the "ethical
paradoxes" undercutting his thought also point to the
possible source of a critical dialogue between scholars,
iticians
,
and citizens. In addition to this instructive
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flaw in Weber's thinking, the works of Habermas, Foucault
and Adorno further confirm, in differing ways, how theorists
both confront and transform the practical confines of
contemporary politics. As a conclusion I win discuss
, not
so much the political aspects of theorizing, but the
educational prospects that provoke differing theoretical
erpretations of politics, such that they countervail
political practice
.
14 Unlike Weber's idea of •political
education,” which targets "the ruling and rising classes" of
the German nation, I defend an education in theory that
provokes politicians, citizens, and theorists to think about
politics in a different light.
Max Weber and th e Limits of Theory
Despite his many contributions to contemporary
political thinking, Max Weber's legacy lingers in the
shadows of more recent thinkers. it is apparent that
Weber's thinking bears on Habermas's probe into the
problematic meaning of "purposive rationality." Yet,
Habermas's approach entails a specific reading of Weber's
sociological works, omitting those works that address
politics and the shifting interpretations of rationality
.
15
For that matter, Foucault confronts Weber on the basis of
the structural limits underpinning Weber's view of
rationality
.
16 Foucault overlooks, however, the extent to
which Weber's methodology of the social sciences might
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anticipate his own critique of the powers that nourish what
he calls the "human sciences." Furthermore, Adorno
critiques Weber on the basis of his "unrealistic" theories
of rationality and scientific methodology. But even he
to address the controversial dimensions of Weber's
political thinking, except to relegate it to the vast
category of bourgeois subjectivism.” it is my contention,
therefore, that Weber's contributions tend to issue, not so
much from his thoughts on politics, but from his views on
science and methodology. it does so in that Weber's idea of
science unknowingly exposes the "ethical paradoxes" in his
own political thinking, reminding subsequent theorists that
such flaws open up rather than preclude a dialogue between
scholarship and politics.
Though Weber's idea of science broadens the view of his
theory of politics, it still consists of several
incongruities that diminish its value to contemporary
theorizing. Indeed his approach to science confronts such
controversial issues as "progress," "methodology,"
"'objectivity'," and the "ethical neutrality" of university
teachers. However, by confronting and affirming these very
issues, Weber also imposes weighty standards on both his own
theoretical approach to politics and opposing theorists. By
analyzing Weber's theory of politics through the critical
prism of his idea of science, at least three discrepancies
become apparent in his theoretical corpus. They include the
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principle of the small number' " the nror^t- *' cn p ecept of a world of
"various spheres of values » an d m, the axiom that "the use of
violence" is essential to politics.
With regard to the first of these discrepancies. Max
Weber' s idea of politics never ceases to postulate select
criteria for those persons who engage in politics. Notable
among them is the politician's capacity to weather the
ethical tumult that corresponds to any coupling of good ends
with violent means. This condition is central to Weber's
argument in The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in
which he articulates his theoretical design of the
politician. Of course, he dismisses the idea of a
politician who holds to an "ethics of conviction"
(Gesinnungsethik)
, since such persons fail to acknowledge
"the ethical irrationality of the world." To contend with
this "irrationality," Weber insists a politician must be
conscious "that the achievement of 'good' ends is in many
cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or
at least mprally dangerous means ." 18 Furthermore, he
continues, the politician "must reckon with the possibility
or even likelihood of evil side-effects ." 19 in this way,
Weber qualifies the politician on the basis of something
other than an impassioned duty to a cause or principled
conviction. There is also the element of " judgement "
(Augenmass
)
,
which Weber refers to as "the decisive
psychological quality of the politician ." 20 Without it, he
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concludes, the politician contributes little to the
enterprise of politics beyond either the "pure conviction"
of a syndicalist or the "empty pose" of Machtpolitik
.
Aside from the "personal" trait of "judgment," Weber
stipulates that the politician must also anticipate a
decidedly turbulent ethical fate. in other words, it is not
enough for a politician "to be conscious of these ethical
paradoxes and of his responsibility for what may become of
himself under pressure from them ." 21 The politician must
be conscious of the possible alterations in the meaning of
his cause or principled conviction, given that he couples it
with the morally dubious means of physical force. He must
concede, says Weber, "that the eventual outcome of political
action frequently, indeed regularly, stands in a quite
inadequate, even paradoxical relation to its original,
intended meaning and purpose {Sinn )." 22 Therefore, the
person who pursues a path into politics is unique not only
m the sense that his powers of judgment discern the
distance" between morally good ends and violent means. The
politician is unique, moreover, in the sense that judgment
allows him to anticipate the disruption of and challenge to
the ultimate ideal that marks his ethical path through
politics. This proviso of judgment clearly divulges an
element of elitism in Weber's theory of politics. Yet, I
believe it is an element that nevertheless relies on the
unique qualities of other persons, thus indicating the
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degree to which his idea of politics might very well
threaten the elevated status of modern politicians.
indeed I think Max Weber's idea of the politician
reveals something more intriguing than a person's
psychological and historical insights into the meaning of
ethical paradoxes. it seems as though the politician
sometimes relies on the insights of others, notably persons
wrth specifically scholarly qualifications. In fact, from
his 1895 "Freiburg Address" to his 1917 lecture on "Science
as a Vocation, « Weber denotes in various ways how scholars
might inform the ethical bearings of politicians. in the
"Freiburg Address," he characterizes the scholar as "a
servant of politics" who promotes "the enduring power-
political interests of the nation." 23 in his essay on
"'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," he
contends that a scholar can "aid the acting willing person
m attaining self
-clarification concerning the final axioms
from which his desired ends are derived." 24 Finally, when
he speaks before fellow scholars in Munich of 1917, Weber
declares that "if we are competent in our pursuit... we can
force the individual, or at least we can help him, to give
himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own
conduct.
"
2S Given the politician's sense of judgment,
which admits to the prospect of modified and differing
ideals, the scholar, therefore, can help him clarify his
ethical options or challenge him to explain the consequences
297
of
II /
is
his political deeds. in any case
principle' of the small number" is
problematic, not just because it
i I think Weber'
s
u problematic one
.
narrows the scope of
It
politics, but because it allows some scholars to alter
possibly the ethical and practical design of politics.
In addition to positing politics on the basis of a
unique trait of judgment, Weber postulates politics as one
of several. "spheres of values," revealing what I believe to
be another discrepancy in his political thinking. The
source of fragmentation among these spheres, Weber argues,
appears in the historical and cultural process of
"rationalization." In his 1906 essay on "The Protestant
Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,
" he ascribes this modern
process to a religious proclivity, one that pushes "inner-
and other-worldly values towards rationality, towards the
conscious endeavor, and towards sublimation by
knowledge.'; 26 However, inasmuch as a religious value of,
say, "salvation" plays itself out in the rational mediums of
commerce, aesthetics, science, or politics, Weber also
observes a significant "tension." This tension surfaces in
a paradox, which reflects the transgression of divine
salvation by the "impersonality" of the market, the "appeal
to violence" in politics, or the "empirical refutations" of
science. He also believes it surfaces in "man's relations
to the various spheres of values," such that over time these
relations "have.
. .pressed towards making conscious the
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internal and lawful aufonomy of thg lndividual spheres
By positing this view of the world as a series of value
spheres, Weber reveals his neo-Kantian commitment to
rationality while confirming his belief in the practical
differences between science and politics. 2 *
As result of rationalization, the value spheres of
politics and science thus distinguish their separate
vocational boundaries. According to Weber, they also "drift
into those tensions" which result from each sphere's own
sense of " internal and lawful autonomy
,
" suggesting
struggles that extend beyond those with religion. This
distinction and tension between politics and science is
evident in Weber's lecture on "Science as a Vocation." "To
take a practical stand is one thing," he remarks, referring
to the conduct of the politician, "and to analyze structures
and party positions is another." 2 ’ This latter conduct,
which Weber ascribes to the scholar, is unlike the conduct
of the politician, whose "words" are hardly "plowshares to
loosen the soil of contemplative thought; they are swords
against the enemies: such words are weapons ." 30 The
scholar, though, struggles to "abstain" from such political
maneuvers and flagrant expressions of one's ultimate ideals.
The task of the scholar, says Weber, "is to serve the
students with his knowledge and scientific experience and
not to imprint upon them his personal political views ." 31
Yet, though the conduct of the scholar is separate from that
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Of the politician, they still share a common domain in terms
of the "cultural values" which politicians propound and
critique. Such a domain indicates, I think, a
countervailing claim against Weber- s premise of distinct
"spheres of value ." 32
The most formidable demarcation between the "spheres"
of politics and science, however, involves the politician's
necessary use of physical violence. While depicting the
scope of politics, Weber notes that " [i] t is only this very
appeal to violence that constitutes a political
association," and that "the state" is what claims "the
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.^ By positing
the sphere of politics on the basis of violence, therefore,
he not only constricts the ethical conduct of the
politician. He implies, as well, that politics prohibits
other worldly conducts by virtue of the distance between
them and violence, eliminating, among others, artists,
clerics, and scholars. Yet, interestingly enough, the
violence which Weber ascribes to the sphere of politics
evokes at least one particular aim. That aim has to do with
something other than just the "constitution" of the unique
traits of the political sphere. It has to do, I think, with
the "absolutely essential" claim that "every political
association" appeals "to the naked violence of coercive
means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of
internal enemies ." 34 In other words, violence constitutes
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the unique design of politics hnt- ih nP nes, but it also represents that
Which bridges policies to differing value spheres,
suggesting a fusion rather than a separation of spheres.
Another apparent dividing line between politics and
science is somewhat more subtle than the politician's use of
violence. That element pertains to the scholar's disclosure
of "'inconvenient' facts" in the face of ultimate ends.
Central to Weber's characterization of "The Intellectual
Sphere" is, of course, the rational push toward factual
explanations of events, ideas, and other phenomena. This
trajectory also indicates a provocative consequence, not the
least of which is that each "increase of rationalism in
empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the
rational into the irrational realm ." 35 Indeed it impacts
value spheres other than those of religion. Yet, the
rational thrust of science has little interest in value
spheres per se; its chief concern involves the values
themselves, regardless of the sphere in which they dwell.
Weber submits, therefore, that "the empirical as well as the
mathematically oriented view of the world develops
refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way
asks for a 'meaning' of inner-worldly occurrences ." 36
Though the sphere of science derives its singular design by
clarifying and refuting ultimate ideals, it still reaches
beyond its designated scope to infiltrate other spheres
which propound such questionable ideals. Given this
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nexus, I thus believe the "various spheres of
values" which comprise Weber , s v . ew Qf fche moaern
reflect not a strict separation but an occasional
confrontation between differing spheres.
One other inconsistency undercuts Weber's standing in
contemporary theory. It again concerns the degree to which
postulates violence as the fundamental element of
politics. Given the criterion of political
"judgment" and
the "rational" fragmentation of the value spheres, it is no
wonder that violence is the chief feature of Weber's theory
of politics. For these reasons, and others, he charges in
the "Science as a Vocation" lecture "that as long as life
remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it
knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one
another. 1,37 Under these circumstances, the politician has
no choice but to fight for his ultimate ends, to struggle
for a cause he deems both invaluable to the world and
incomparable to other convictions. Violence thus represents
the chief means of the politician who seeks to advance such
ends in the modern world. However, insofar as Weber claims
that "the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be
brought to a final conclusion, " 38 violence is also
available to persons outside the sphere of politics. It is
available, I believe, not because Weber inscribes the other
spheres with violent means. On the contrary, he does no
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thing. Rather, it is available to other spheres on the
of life s "irreconcilable" elements, which suggest
that the political sphere's "monopoly on the legitimate use
of violence" is at best a contestable claim.
Therefore, though violence is the defining feature of
s theory of politics, the ethical repercussions of
violence still reach beyond the sphere of politics. They
reach toward "The Intellectual Sphere" when a politician
either relies on scholars for their ethical "clarity" or
attacks them on the basis of their status as "inconvenient"
outsiders. I thus believe Weber's political thinking points
to an interesting confrontation between politicians and
political theorists. In this breach between the "spheres,"
between "the means of violence" and "the aim of clarity,"
between the practice and theory of politics-
-this is where
the scholar meets the politician. This is one place where,
according to Weber, the scholar "stands in the service of
moral forces; he fulfills the duty of bringing about self-
clarification and a sense of responsibility ." 39 This
possible confrontation, however, does not stem from Weber's
theory of politics, which postulates an elite number of
persons, separate spheres of value, and a monopoly on the
use of physical violence. It derives from the scholar's
duty to articulate the ethical clarity between "'good' ends"
and "morally suspect" means, as well as from the scholar's
desire to undercut all convictions with "inconvenient'
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facts
.
" Hence, the limits of Weber's theory of politics
emerge in contrast to his idea of scholarship, which
suggests a likely encounter between politicians and
political theorists
.
Because his theory of science points to the theoretical
confines of politics, I think it provides the enterprise of
contemporary political theory a different interpretation of
Max Weber's political thinking.- it is different in the
sense that- the flaws and paradoxes in his political thought
do more than validate the critical components he ascribes to
the scholar. They also demonstrate the degree to which
scholars undercut claims about the "'principle of the small
number'" and the monopoly on "the use of violence " in
politics, thus obscuring the lines that separate "the
various spheres of value." For this reason, I further
contend that Weber's theoretical approach to politics offers
contemporary political theory a critical alternative. It is
an alternative in that political theory can now provide
something other than a vehicle by which to advance such a
narrow cause as German national power or a neo-Kantian
divorce from the practice of politics. In light of Weber's
flawed project, I believe contemporary political theory
promises a confrontation between the practice of theorizing
and that of politics. This is not to say that I think
theory represents a practice more political than politics,
but only that it exhibits practices and ideas which undercut
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the practical sanctity of politics. it is to say, simply,
that the purpose of contemporary political theory is to
provoke new ways of thinking about both the practice of
politics and the critical distance between it and political
theory. m order to illustrate this purpose in more detail,
I now turn to the contemporary theoretical projects of
Habermas, Foucault, and Adorno.
Habermas and the Rationality of Thpnry
Jurgen Habermas has taken on an intellectual role in
contemporary German society similar to the one Max Weber
assumed during the Wilhelmine period. Like Weber, Habermas
defends publicly a specific view of the role of science and
scholarship in the modern university. However, contrary to
Weber's view of the "bureaucratized" university life,
Habermas believes the university still symbolizes "a
discursive debate that carries with it the promissary note
of the surprising argument ." 41 in the well-respected
weekly Die Zei t, moreover, Habermas rebuked the
"revisionist" tendencies of several prominent German
historians who
,
after decades of "distance" from the
Holocaust, equilibrated it with the American bombings of
Dresden and the Stalinist purges. This scholarly "balancing
of accounts" led him to champion something other than "an
ideologically closed milieu to which reality no longer has
access."'- Rather, he defended the "mediators and the mass
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media- who criticize such "scholarly results" in "the public
flow o£ the appropriation of tradition
... it is here, in the
public sphere, that comparisons can be used to settle
damages." The public role Habermas assumes is thus
reminiscent of Weber's encounters with a mass German
audience. Yet, when it comes to Habermas's specific
theoretical ambition, Weber plays an altogether dissimilar
role as Habermas's adversary.
For the last two decades, Habermas has formulated,
advocated, and clarified what he refers to as a "theory of
communicative action." it is part of a theoretical
enterprise that expressly departs from certain facets of
Weber's sociological work, notably his idea of
"rationalization." In particular, Habermas critiques
Weber's theory of "purposive-rational action" insofar as
Weber defines its instrumental push through the world as
"universalist" in design. Habermas rejects this design
because it regards the "multiplicity of forms of life as
limited to cultural contents, and ... asserts that every
culture must share certain formal properties of the modern
understanding of the world ."'1 '4 in contrast, he theorizes
an idea of "communicative" reason that points "to a
symbolically structured lifeworld that is constituted in the
interpretative accomplishments of its members and only
reproduced through communication ." 45 Given this
pluralization of reason, I thus submit that though Habermas
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concedes
rejects Weber's theory of rationalization, he still
to a notion of philosophy that presupposes the absolute
necessity of rationality. indeed, in light of his loyalty
to rationality-
-albeit "communicative"--! contend that
Habermas reveals a fusion of theory and practice such that
it foils the critical element of each particular craft."
difficulty which Habermas accentuates in Weber's
thinking consists of the "universal" reach Weber ascribes to
"purposive rationality." it is evident, though, that
Habermas comes to Weber with a significant degree of respect
for his impact on contemporary social and political
thinking. In Theory of fommunicat i
»
he esteems
Weber as a theorist "who broke with both the premises of the
philosophy of history and the basic assumptions of
evolutionism" that comprised late modern European social
thinking." Despite these breaks, Habermas approaches
Weber with caution, portraying him as one "who ... wanted to
conceive of the modernization of old European society as the
result of a universal
-historical process of
rationalization ." 48 This element of "rationalization"
constitutes a problem for Habermas. It does so for several
reasons, not the least of which has to do with what Habermas
labels as Weber's "largely unclarified" and "restricted idea
of purposive rationality [Zweckrationali tat]
.
1,49 The more
significant flaw has to do with the degree to which Weber's
idea of rationality is "not complex enough to capture all
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those aspects of social actions to which societal
rationalization can attach.- Accordingly, Habermas does
not dispute rationalization per se, only the breach between
Weber's theory of rationality and the manifold social
actions of the lifeworld of modernity.
The point of Habermas's critique focuses, therefore, on
what he perceives to be the "universalist" ambitions
underlying Weber's theory of rationality. Although he
admits that "Weber himself did not draw universalistic
consequences without reservations," Habermas seeks "to
defend the thesis that a universalist position follows from
Weber's conceptual approach ." 51 By "universalist
position," he means the extent to which Weber imputes to
rationality more than just a worldly action that advances an
ultimate end with objective means and a sense of proportion
between that end and means. it involves, too, Weber's
contention that such an action represents the " formal
properties " of all manifestations of purposive rationality
m the modern world. This is so, proceeds Habermas, despite
Weber's "culturalist position." Such a position "requires
that for every form of rationality it is possible to specify
on the same level at least one abstract point of view from
which this form could at the same time be described as
'irrational .'" 52 He thus charges that Weber admits to a
ist
"
as much as "culturalist" view of rationality,
hinting at a possible tension that might at least undermine
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rationality' s technical push toward universalis.. Hahermas
rebuffs this prospect, however, since he claims Weber
ultimately gauges the "progress" of these cultural spheres
by the culture- invariant of successful disposition over
natural and social processes encountered as something in the
objective world Habermas critiques the flawed
"universalist" design of Weber's theory of purposive-
rationality. He does so, not for the sake of expelling it
from contemporary theorizing, but for the sake of reclaiming
the "culturalise traits that linger within the worldly
scope of theory.
The discrepancy between the universal scope of
rationality and its particular cultural manifestations marks
Habermas's chief point of contention with Weber. He
attributes this flaw to Weber's narrow methodological view
of the "universal-historical process of rationalization."
It is a view that "takes into consideration the horizon of
possibilities opened by the modern understanding of the
world only to the extent that it serves to explain the core
phenomenon he [Weber] identified in advance ." 54 in short,
the weakness in Weber's theory of rationality is such that
he elevates the idea of universal rationalization over the
empirical evidence that might refute it. "Thus," says
Habermas, "Weber starts immediately from the actually
existing forms of Occidental rationalism, without viewing
them against the counterfactually projected possibilities of
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^ ional i zed lifeworld 1,55 d,, ii-ewona. By failing to assess
universal rationalization against the empirical signs that
defy it, Weber ignores the culturally nuanced variants of
rationality. They are the variants of science, politics,
religion, aesthetics, and the economy that take shape in
distinct and separate value spheres despite a shared
normative duty to means-end rational thinking. Thus, Weber
appears to ignore a profound rift between his theory of
rationalization and its practical and empirical forms in the
cultural spheres of modern society. These oversights, or
what Habermas calls the "repressed problems" in Weber's
theoretical project, make themselves known when they "turn
up again" in Weber's "reflections on the state of our
times
.
,,5S
What troubles Habermas most about Weber's project is
not the foreshadowing of a "disenchanted" society indicative
of the increasing depletion of individual autonomy. Rather,
it has to do with Weber's problematic postulate of universal
rationalization which undergirds this bleak depiction of
modern society. On the one hand, Habermas notes how Weber
sees the sign of the age in the return of a new polytheism,
in which the struggle among the gods takes on the
depersonified, objectified form of an antagonism among
irreducible orders of value and life ." 57 Hence, Weber
points to his " culturalist " notion of purposive rationality,
even though its "universalist " design precludes, in theory,
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such a struggle by mandating the same "formal properties »
for all value spheres. On the other hand, Habermas notes
how Weber sees rationalization as a "threat" to a person's
"inner autonomy," sinCe "within modern society there is no
longer any legitimate order that could guarantee the
cultural reproduction of the corresponding value
orientations and action dispositions . »=» Thus, Weber
denotes the "universalist" reach of purposive rationality,
even though its "culturalist" traits demonstrate, in
P ice, a capacity to inscribe a disenchanted world with
myriad of values. Given this theoretical tension in Weber's
thinking, Habermas doubts Weber's view of "disenchantment"
and its role in the depletion of an individual's autonomy.
I believe that the main problem with Habermas's
critique of Weber exists, therefore, in a form other than
his dismay at the "rational" depletion of an individual's
autonomy. it appears in Habermas's alarm over the divide in
Weber's thinking, between his "universalist" design of
rationalization and his empirical confirmation of its
"culturalist" displays in modern society. He rebukes Weber
for failing to "engage in counterfactual reflections," such
that they aid him in clarifying the discrepancies in his
theoretical approach to rationality and rationalization.
However, Habermas's critique makes its own push toward
universalism in that he claims "Weber considers societal
rationalization explicitly from the perspective of purposive
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rationality. At the level o£ institutions, he does not
apply the comprehensive concept of rationality upon which he
bases his investigations of cultural tradition."”
Habermas rarely delves into Weber's less sociological works
to spur the " counterf actuai reflections" that might reveal a
contentious view of rationalization. in fact, Weber's
view of the institutions of science and politics would
confirm that rationalization, though "purposive" in its
design, still encounters persons who infuse rationality with
"substantive" values. In this way, the divide between his
theory of rationalization and its cultural manifestations in
the modern lifeworld appears less spacious than Habermas
perceives it to be. it appears cramped, suggesting that
Weber's notion of rationalization underscores the clash
between its theory and practice in the modern world
.
60
As a rejoinder to the limits of Weber's theory of
rationalization, Habermas conjectures of course a theory of
communicative action. The purpose of this rejoinder is to
"mobilize the rationality potent ial ... expressly for the
cooperatively pursued goal of reaching understanding ." 61
Yet, I think Habermas's response is a problematic one, in
that he seeks to resurrect "rationality" from the ruins of
Weber's theoretical enterprise. By positing action on a
theory of communicative "rationality" Habermas seeks to
marry what
-Weber divorces: theory and practice. He replaces
purposive rationality, which presumes a means-end dichotomy,
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With a communicative rationality that reflects "the
intersubjective relation" between objects, subjects, and
their shared social world. m other words, communicative
rationality denotes "a concept expressing the
interconnection of those moments of reason that become
separated in the modern world."- Given this theoretical
ambition, Habermas clearly diverges from Weber's enterprise.
doing so, he postulates an overarching ideal that
indicates a universal language, such that it orchestrates
relations between differing subjects, differing value
spheres, and the differing practical actions of daily life.
A problem surfaces, therefore, not solely in the universal
overture of communicative rationality. it surfaces in
Habermas's desire to obviate the divide between contentious
interpretations of the lifeworld.
Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action thus
possesses another problematic dimension. This problem
surfaces, I believe, insofar as "process of reaching
understanding" presupposes an idea of rationality that spurs
dialogue across seemingly incommensurable value spheres.
Habermas claims "the interpretive accomplishments on which
cooperative processes of interpretation are based represent
the mechanism for coordinating action ." 63 He is also quick
to claim that "communicative action is not exhausted by the
act of reaching understanding in an interpretative
manner ." 64 Hence, Habermas declares his "communicative"
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prospects of
project an open-ended one, anticipating the
modification, clarification, and reinterpretation that
correspond to the "process" of human communication. Despite
these conditions, Habermas maintains a theoretical
commitment to "understanding," which "refers to
communication aimed at achieving a valid agreement. »«
This end point of agreement, at which a theory of
communicative action aims, may include change and
reinterpretation, but only insofar as they advance the goal
of rational agreement. The prospect of disagreement, of an
incongruity between interpretations of the lifeworld, seems
perfunctory within-if not entirely absent from-
-Habermas
' s
theory of communicative action.
In light of these theoretical tensions, I think it is
apparent that Habermas's critical view of Weber leaves a lot
to be desired. His view of Weber's idea of rationality,
though accurate in its detection of a rift between theory
and practice, responds with a theory of "communicative"
rationality that, like Weber's, reveals a universalist
ambition. Thus, where Weber's theory of rationality affords
a critical gap in which to judge the degrees of disagreement
between theory and practice, Habermas's theory of
communicative rationality engenders a march toward
linguistic understanding and agreement. This aversion to
theoretical discrepancies, human conflicts, and differing
perceptions of the world reveals, I contend, not only the
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universal reach of Habermas's project. I believe it also
reveals how his theory of communrcative action disarms the
oppositional and quarrelsome traits of human interaction,
relinquishing the prospect of difference for the sake of a
coordinated understanding. These traits are especially
indicative of scholars and politicians, who, in very
different ways, strive for clarity and understanding but who
still value the creative contingencies lingering in human
disagreements and misunderstandings. Indeed, they often
stem from an unquestioning commitment to purposive
rationality. But they also derive from the substantive
values that correspond to and influence rationality, in
either its purposive or communicative form. Given
Habermas's staunch commitment to "rational" understanding, I
thus perceive the prospects of a dialogue between
contentious interpretations, between theory and practice, to
be limited by the overarching quest for a singular notion of
understanding. His idea of "communicative action" does not
merge theory and practice as much as nullify their
distinctions, which provoke multiple dialogues about the
meaning of the contemporary lifeworld.
Foucault and the Power of Theory
Unlike Jurgen Habermas, who directly contests Max
Weber s theory of rationality, Michel Foucault approaches
Weber's theoretical corpus in a more oblique manner. "I
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don't think I am a Weberian
,
" Foucault once rented at a
roundtable talk with other Furopean intellectuals,
"since mybasic preoccupation isn't ratinn^iit-ionality considered as an
anthropological invariant " 6S LdkPibe Habermas, he spurns
Weber's theory of rationality in that -i t-Y l lt:
'
not only posits
"an absolute value inherent in reason," but uses "the term
empirically in a completely arbitrary way."- Poucault
departs from Habermas, though, when he relegates rationality
"to an instrumental and relative meaning," choosing instead
"to resituate the production of true and false at the heart
of historical analysis and political critique."- By
turning away from Weber's theory of rationality, Poucault
moves closer to a critique of the "production of truth," a
locution for power he ascribes to the likes of philosophers,
psychiatrists, and political statesmen. Foucault reveals
his connection to Weber inqnfarso as he rejects the structural
rigidity undergirding Weber's idea of rationality.
I therefore contend that the focus of Foucault's
critique of Weber is not the idea of rationality per se, but
the rational "truths" that support it and Weber's legacy in
contemporary political theory. indeed, Foucault is not
interested in the "difference.
. .between the purity of the
ideal and the disorderly impurity of the real."” As it
relates to Weber's idea of rationality, he is more
interested in the "different strategies
.. .which can
perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality,
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even though they don't conform to the initial
programming." Rationality thus represents a departure
point for Foucault, spurring a critique from the standpoint
of such traits as madness, sexuality, and discipline which
defy the theoretical structure of the ideal in question
Given this critique of the structural limits of theory,
Foucault obscures the fine lines that divide the rational
from the irrational, science from politics, theory from
practice. Accordingly, I believe that Foucault's critical
project entails a rethinking of the rationality that braces
the discourse of contemporary political theory. However,
this "strategy" is somewhat problematic. For I further
contend that, insofar as he rethinks the rationality of
theory, Foucault politicizes theory more than he theorizes a
distinct notion of politics. 71
Many of Foucault's early writings-
-notably his
structural inquiries into insanity, the human sciences, and
the prison-
-tend to stress the philosophical impact of
Enlightenment thinking. In "What is Enlightenment
,
"
Foucault outlines a philosophical tradition stretching from
Kant in the 18th century to his own theoretical aims at the
end of the 20th century. Drawing on Kant's own essay of the
same title, Foucault locates Kant's Enlightenment legacy "at
the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on
history. it is a reflection by Kant on the contemporary
status of his own enterprise." 72 Foucault thus also claims
317
Art
that Kant's interpretation of Aufklarung confronts
contemporary thinkers with a difficult choice. He
underscores this choice in a 1983 lecture entitled "The
of Telling the Truth." since Kant, Foucault charges, modern
thinkers "may opt for a critical philosophy that will
present itself as an analytic philosophy of truth in
general" or "a critical thought that will take the form of
an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present." 73
Kant's Enlightenment thinking obliges modernity to work
toward either "true knowledge" or a critique of "truth" as
the basis of the alleged reality of the present. it is the
latter project that, says Foucault, "has founded a form of
reflection in which I have tried to work." 74
The chief aim of Foucault's theoretical enterprise
manifests itself in a critique, not of a metaphysical past
or future, but of the historical present. Again, with
regard to Kant's essay on "What is Enlightenment," Foucault
claims that its uniqueness appears in "a reflection by Kant
on the contemporary status of his own enterprise.
"
7S
Rather than sustain a philosophical search for truth, Kant
affords the philosopher an alternative type of inquiry which
scrutinizes the enterprise of philosophy itself. This
inquiry unfolds relative to something other than the
metaphysical ambitions of philosophy, ambitions that reach
from the ancient Greeks to the modern Europeans and decree a
philosophical uniformity between past and present. "It is,"
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Foucault states, "in the reflection on 'today as difference
in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task
that the novelty of this text appears to me to lie."™
Thus, Foucault's theoretical project takes shape in a
critical disposition outside, but in relation to, the
transhistorical confines of modern philosophy. its target
is not the metaphysical design of truth, justice, or beauty
per se, but the contemporary practices of a philosophical
tradition that perpetuate them.
Michel Foucault's project demonstrates the extent to
which Kant's idea of Enlightenment informs his own desire to
think against modern philosophy and its contemporary legacy.
But to think against philosophy does not necessarily mean
one must discard or ignore its historical impact on the
present. After all the production of "truths" and "true
knowledge," which extend beyond mere statements to include
an intricate web of established practices, represents the
departure point of Foucault's project. Indeed, Foucault
problematizes " more than "man's historical mode of being,
and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject,"
a task that affirms his commitment to a modern notion of
philosophical interrogation." 7 ' He also seeks to prompt
the permanent reactivation of an attitude.
. .a philosophical
ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our
historical era, " confirming his desire to think against the
project of modern philosophy
.
78 Consequently, Foucault's
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critical task signifies at least two unsettling components,
both of which contest the established practice of
philosophy. The first has to do with its critical
orientation "toward what is not or no longer indispensable
for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous
subjects. The other, which issues from the first,
entails a recasting of "the critique conducted in the form
of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes
the form of a possible transgression . "»» m other words,
each element targets the ontological foundations of
contemporary philosophy: subjectivity and necessity.
Countering the Enlightenment's sway over philosophy,
Foucault contests the legacy that perpetuates necessary
"truths" about past and future notions of human
subjectivity. "The critical ontology of ourselves,"
concludes Foucault, "has to be conceived as.
. .a
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of going beyond them ." 81 This critique of
present-day philosophy, however, indicates a narrowing of
the theoretical scope of the philosophical enterprise. It
is one thing to heed Foucault's claim that an "escape from
the system of contemporary reality" for the sake of "another
way of thinking ... has led only to the return of the most
dangerous traditions." 8 - It is another thing altogether to
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heed his claim that "the crit-in^n « ^ ,al ontology of ourselves"
constitutes a "work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves
as free beings.- The problem with this last point is
not, I believe, one that concerns Foucault's critical desire
to broaden the philosophical issue of human freedom.
Rather, I think the problem lies in his desire to localize
the critical force of philosophy against itself. His
critical ontology thus points to a fruitful turbulence
within the enterprise of contemporary philosophy, but I am
not sure if it engenders a compelling theory of politics.**
This problem becomes more apparent in Foucault's examination
The History of Sexualify
.
Michel Foucault's chief task in The History nf
Sexuality involves discerning what is typically understood
to be sex from that which he perceives to be the discourse
of sexuality. Put differently, his theoretical concern is
not the degree to which persons indulge in or abstain from
sex. Nor is he interested in the manifold interpretations
of sex as they reveal themselves in history and across
cultures. According to Foucault, the "central issue" is "to
account for the fact that it is spoken about... What is at
issue, briefly, is the over-all 'discursive fact,' the way
m which sex is 'put into discourse .'" 85 His exploration
thus entails something more than sex; it entails, too, the
relationships of power that correspond to sex. He explores
the language of the persons who talk about sex. He
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persons as
investigates the institutions that sustain these
well as archive and disseminate their discourses. More
important, he contends that the seemingly indefinite
qualities of sex give way, over time, to the peculiar
discourse of sexuality.
"Under the authority of a language
that had been carefully expurgated so that it was no longer
directly named," Foucault charges, "sex was taken charge of,
tracked down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow
it no obscurity, no respite. »« Hence, the critical force
of his exploration takes aim at the discourse of sexuality,
which is another way of saying it targets the marriage of
sex and power.
he discursive structures underlying the expansion of
sexuality confirm, therefore, not the repression of sexual
pleasure, but its stimulation within technically advanced
societies. Foucault contests a Freudian tradition which
posits the productive capacities of society on the
repression of sexual desire, pleasure, and excess-
-traits
that, it was thought, distracted persons from more socially
virtuous pursuits. "We must ... abandon, " he charges, "the
hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an
age of increased sexual repression ." 87 He justifies this
claim insofar as history and, more important, discourse
reveal something other than a modern technological denial of
pleasure, or vice-versa. Indeed, as far as Foucault is
concerned, " [p] leasure and power do not cancel or turn back
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against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce
one another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms
and devices of excitation and incitement
. Accordingly,
he perceives the expansion of sexuality inasmuch as the
institutions of science, law, the state, and the economy
forge discourses from, ironically, their attempt to moderate
and control it. "We have not only witnessed a visible
explosion of unorthodox sexualities," remarks Foucault.
But, he continues, we have seen also "a deployment quite
different from the law" of repression, one that "has
ensured.
. .the proliferation of specific pleasures and the
multiplication of disparate sexualities ." 89 Sexual
pleasure has not been diminished in the least; it has been
transformed and amplified in conjunction with power.
As a result of this discursive ordering of sexuality,
Foucault contends that an affirmation of the human body and
subjectivity constitutes the primary duty of modern
institutions. Again, he challenges an essential precept of
modern political thinking, one that postulates fear and
violence as the chief means that link rulers and ruled.
Corresponding to the expansion of sexuality, what took shape
"was a political ordering of life, not through an
enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of
self ." 90 Modern power thus converts from a source of pain,
consternation, and suffering into one of possible pleasure.
It reveals a multi-faceted character, furthermore, that has
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learned how to control subjects by knowing and caring for
their many pleasures rather than by modifying them into
objects of technical force. According to Foucault, modern
power "provided itself with a body to be cared for,
protected, cultivated, and preserved from the many dangers
and contacts, to be isolated from others so that it would
retain its differential value. Sexuality appears to
augment political power, extending its reach below the
exterior of subjects and into their precarious biological
and emotional environs. It demonstrates, too, the degree to
which Foucault's critique disrupts the modern theoretical
approach to political power
.
92
Michel Foucault's critique of sexuality theorizes,
therefore, not so much an agency of power that negates life,
but one that controls it by administering human desires and
bodily pleasures. "Power," he charges, is no longer
concerned with "legal subjects over whom the ultimate
dominion [is] death, but with living beings, and the mastery
it would ... exercise over them would have to be applied at
the level of life itself ." 93 A theory of politics,
however, or a set of human practices (discursive or
otherwise) which strive to acquire, maintain, or contest
this power over life, appears absent from Foucault's
exploration of sexuality. It is clear that "life" plays a
central role in his view of politics, especially when he
claims that "modern man is an animal whose politics places
324
xistence as a living being in question."” What is
not so clear is the theoretical design Foucault ascribes to
the politics and "political struggles" that correspond to
this questioning of life, pleasures, needs, rights, or sense
of happiness. He establishes the discursive controls of
sexuality such that they manifest themselves in, say, laws
against sodomy, scholarship on deviance, or the shifting
demographics of pregnancy. He also confirms the conversion
of power over death into a power over life. Yet, I believe
Foucault fails to explicate a political nexus between
discourse and power, such that the critique of "truths"
moves beyond the pinched realm of archivists, psychologists,
administrators, and scholars.
In his work on "governmentality, •• though, Foucault
tries to flesh out a theory of politics that highlights the
provocative bond between discourse and power. Moreover, it
represents his most direct confrontation with the
theoretical legacy of Max Weber. Departing from a tradition
of thinking that stretches from Machiavelli to Weber,
Foucault rejects the claim that violence constitutes the
essential ground of political power. Unlike his view of
P°Wer in The History of Sexuality
,
where he ascribes it to a
web of discursive institutions, Foucault's view of
governmentality" locates power in one specific discursive
practice. In his essay on "The Subject and Power," Foucault
stresses how "power is less a confrontation between two
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adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a
question of government."” power entails, he continues,
"guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the
possible outcome Foucault thus moves beyond, say,
Machiavelli' s notion of princely "virtu," Hobbes's idea of
forceful "covenants," or Weber's claim about the state's
"monopoly of legitimate physical violence .» Indeed, he
seeks to reveal something different about power. He points
to "the possible field of action of others" whereby "free
subjects" confront "government," the chief aim of which is
to direct the various conducts of individuals and groups.
He seeks a notion of power that cannot "be sought on the
side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary
linking.
. .but rather in the area of the singular mode of
action
. . .which is government." 97
The more interesting element of Foucault's idea of
governmental ity concerns the degree to which he grounds it
on antecedents other than those of a political design. He
contends, rather, that it emerges in conjunction with
specific economic practices. In his 1978 lecture on
"Governmental ity , " Foucault draws on the 16th century
literary quarrels surrounding Machiavelli
' s publication of
Tho—
P
rince to support his claim. "The art of government,"
he notes, referring to Machiavelli and, later, La Mothe Le
Vayer, "is essentially concerned with answering the question
of how to introduce economy.
. .how to introduce this
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meticulous attention of the father towards his family into
the management of the state."” More specifically,
Foucault is interested in the economy as it reveals a
paternal component indicative of administering the possible
actions of children, wives, mistresses, wealth, and other
ant resources." in light of these familial intrusions
into the field of power, he further contends that, by the
18th century, the discourse of government prioritizes the
value of economy. Relying on Rousseau and the Physiocrat
Quesnay, Foucault notes how the "word 'economy'" begins to
signify not only "a level of reality" but, more important,
"a field of intervention" which broadens the discursive
scope of government
.
99 The discourse of government reveals
a managerial quality distinct from that of physical violence
or legal contracts.
Given the economic discourse of governmental ity,
Foucault rejects the idea of the modern state as an agency
defined by, its functional unity and political totality. He
again contests both Weber and the foundations of modern
political theory, claiming that "the state is no more than a
composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose
importance is a lot more limited than many of us think.
Maybe what is really important ... for our present... is not so
much the etatisation of society, as the
governmental ization ' of the state. 1,11111 By " atzatisation of
society, " Foucault refers to the ever-increasing
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functionality of the state to dominate and manage the
multitude of desires that compose modern society. Yet he
also refers to the state inasmuch as its functional reach
becomes the "target" of opposition, thanks to those persons
who perceive themselves to be the opponents of the state's
impersonal force. Hence, he departs from a feature that is
central to Weber's notion of a bureaucratic state, Marx's
idea of bourgeois state, and even Hegel's theoretical
depiction of an Enlightened state
.
101 The
" governmental! tat ion of the state is... the only real space
for political struggle and contestation," since "it is the
tactics of government which make possible the continual
definition and redefinition of what is within the competence
of the state and what is not ." 102 The totality of the
state is thus a fiction as long as government inscribes it
with a discourse that reflects, not only free subjects, but
free subjects who challenge the discursive boundaries of the
government
.
With his theory of governmentality
,
Foucault
underscores neither a monolith of total power nor the
absence of human freedom. Rather, he points to the fissures
that characterize the modern concept of power, such that
they undermine any reach for totality and the negation of
human freedom. Again, in his lecture on "The Subject and
Power," Foucault reminds us that " [a]
t
the very heart of the
power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the
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calcitrance of the win and the intransigence of
edora. Though he alludes to governmental ity as the
chief souroe of modern political struggles, Foucault still
fails to explain its theoretical design. The most he
provides is a reference to "
' agonism' , » or what he calls "a
relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation
and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which
P lyzes both sides than a permanent provocation ." 104 His
idea of governmental ity, therefore, points to a theoretrcal
space in which the agon of politics occurs. However, I
think this agon tends to advance not the aim of politics,
which possibly imperils the structure of government, but the
aim of government itself, which entails the power to
constrain the prospects of politics. In other words,
Foucault's idea of agonistic politics appears anchored to
the structures and discourses of government rather than the
discourses of an agon which might reveal a differing notion
of politics. Hence he not only falls short of theorizing a
politics, but he appears to deviate from his desire to
augment the discourses of governmental ity
.
I thus believe Foucault's idea of agonism reveals, at
best, a "political task" whereby a person partakes in "the
analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question" the
governmental" desire to administer human conduct. Yet, his
theoretical insights into the agon still presuppose the
necessity of a governmental discourse, suggesting that he
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constrains
not only views government as "indispensable" but
the discursive field o£ " possible transgression." In this
way, Foucault offers us little in the way of thinking
against the very modern liberal democratic institutions that
constitute contemporary politics. Indeed, with the
exception of his recasting of "power" in terms of life over
death, he appears to validate their pluralistic structures
and ambitions. At its worst, moreover, I believe Foucault's
idea of agonism indicates a narrow field of "strategies"
that push toward the aim of power at the risk of diminishing
the prospect of resistance. The is the case, not only
because he posits government as the primary site of agonism,
but because he postulates power as the primary ambition of
agonistic politics. Though a reach for power may "provoke"
a desire to resist it, recalling James Madison's warning
that " [a] mbition must be made to counteract ambition,"
Foucault's theory of agonism nonetheless elevates the goal
of power over all others. Thus, Foucault's critical
enterprise- reveals a theory of politics. The question
remains, however, whether it stems from a "critical ontology
of ourselves" or echoes an affirmation of "man's historical
mode of being."
Michel Foucault confirms how Kant's Enlightenment
thinking turns against its own rational aspirations,
suggesting that thought itself might reveal the limits of
public power. He explained, too, how the discourses of
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sexuality constitute a novel approach to "bio-power": the
administrative expansion of human desires and bodily
pleasures. Even his approach to "governmentality" documents
egree to which power represents a clash between willful
subjects and the disciplinary aims of government. But
Foucault, whose theoretical aim is to advance a "critical
ontology of ourselves," tends to underscore the traits of
historical "others" rather than the theoretical limits of
contemporary politics. This is not to say his project lacks
a critique of the way theorists approach the subject of
politics. Nor does it mean his project lacks a differing
approach to thinking about politics. Instead, I think
Foucault demonstrates the extent to which his critique
engenders, not so much a theory of politics per se, but a
politics that impacts the enterprise of political theory.
This impact appears in his own thinking against the
allegedly "indispensable" discourses of rational "truth,"
"sexuality," and "government." But it is most evident in
that Foucault's project adheres to an scholarly discourse,
which disrupts the meaning of theory yet still affirms the
pluralist aim of a liberal political practice.
Adorno and the Dialectics of Theory
Max Weber's impact on the early members of the
Frankfurt School at the Institut fur Sozialfurschung spurred
neither a "critical ontology of ourselves" nor a theory of
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"inter-subjectivity." what Weber did contribute to the
"critical theories'' of Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and
Theodor Adorno, among others, was their interest in his idea
of rationalization.- m various ways, each thinker
appropriated Weber's idea insofar as it posited the dominant
role of " Zweckrationali tat" under industrial capitalism.
They also departed from his idea of rationalization, given
what they percieved to be Weber's intellectual surrender to
market capitalism, bourgeois political institutions, and
scientific positivism. The last of these limits is the one
Adorno tends to stress in Dialectic of Enlightenment Minima
Moralia
,
and Negative Dialectics 106
The chief issue that spurs Theodor Adorno's critique of
scientific positivism derives from a legacy he inherited,
not only from Weber, but principally from Hegel and Marx.
That legacy involves the troubled ties between theory and
practice. In Minima Moral:
a
,
for instance, Adorno perceives
the rational push of positivism as a force that has "set
aside" Utopia and "demanded" the transparency of theory and
practice. Consequently, he believes "we have become all too
practical. Fear of the impotence of theory supplies a
pretext for bowing to the almighty production process, and
so fully admitting the impotence of theory ." 107 The thrust
of Adorno's project surfaces, therefore, in an attempt to
rescue theory from the empirical and instrumental advance of
rational practice, which he thinks gradually annihilates the
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critical force of theory. In ^
even turns to the
"positivistic" scholarship of Weber,
seizing what he calls
"constellations" for "the conversion
into objectivity, by way language, of what has been
subjectively thought and assembled. ">« He seeks to
promote a tension between theory and practice, one that
validates the critical power of theory while it subverts the
totalizing grasp of practice. I contend, however, that
though Adorno's enterprise points to the fruitful mix of
theory and practice in "constellations," it still leaves the
"critical" theorist detached from any vital encounter with
the practice of politics. >“» This becomes apparent, I
further charge, inasmuch as Adorno's project of "negative
dialectics" postulates a "totality" that obviates, not only
theory, but any such theoretical task that seeks to subvert
the cultural dominance of rational practice
.
110
Like Michel Foucault who succeeded him, Adorno locates
the flaw of modern philosophy in the achievements of
Enlightenment thinking. Yet, where Foucault finds a
thriving "philosophical ethos" in the Enlightenment, Adorno
locates quite the opposite
.
111 One of his chief
contentions m Dialectic of Enlightenment turns on the claim
that Enlightenment thinking contradicts its own emancipatory
ambitions. "Men," Adorno explains, referring to the
Enlightenment's anthropological underpinnings, "have always
had to choose between their subjection to nature or the
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subjection of nature to the Self."- Given th±s rigia
choice, he further notes that "[t]he essence of
enlightenment is the alternative whose inevitability is
that of domination Of course, modern man opts for the
second choice, dominating nature rn a way that allows him to
transform the world from a place of subjective apprehension
and ignorance to one of objective order and empirical truth.
Despite this "rational" orchestration, man's "enlightened-
path is not necessarily paved with the glowing remnants of
his liberation from nature. "With the extension of the
bourgeois commodity economy," counters Adorno, "the dark
horizon of myth is illumined by the sun of calculating
reason, beneath whose cold rays the seed of the new
barbarism grows to fruition." 11 " For Adorno the
Enlightenment represents, therefore, not just the growth of
man's subjective sovereignty, but also its complicity in the
social and cultural displays of rational domination.
In light of this paradox, Adorno details the extent to
which man's rational liberation from nature reveals the
eradication of one's own treasured subjectivity. By using
reason to control the contingencies of nature and secure the
end of self-preservation, man gains an objective knowledge
of the natural world around him. Man does so, however, at
the cost of neglecting the nature of his own subjectivity.
"As soon as man discards his awareness that he himself is
nature," Adorno charges, "all the aims for which he keeps
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himself alive-social progress, the intensification of all
his material and spiritual powers, even consciousness
itself -
-are nullified.— They are nullified because the
means of instrumental reason supersede the ultimate goal of
self-preservation. Consequently, man renounces the very
elements of his nature that defy reason: passion,
indeterminacy, chance. "Man's domination over himself,"
claims Adorno, "is almost always the destruction of the
subject in whose service it is undertaken ." 116 This
eradication of subjectivity thus derives not solely from
man's technical control of the objective elements of nature
It occurs because "the substance which is dominated,
suppressed, and dissolved by virtue of self-preservation is
none other than that very life as functions of which the
achievements of self-preservation find their sole definition
and determination ." 117 Hence, man's struggle to free
himself from the "irrational" elements of the world
underscores more than just his technical control of nature.
Integral to Adorno's project, it also accentuates man's
gradual depletion of the human desires, ideals, stories, and
theoretical ambitions that stem from incalculable sources.
Theodor Adorno contends that the profound distinction
of Enlightenment thinking thus manifests itself, not in the
growth of human thought, but in the dissipation of its
critical faculties. If the Enlightenment cannot move beyond
the confines of instrumental reason, then modern thought
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entails far m0re than the renunciation of nature and human
subjectivity. According to Adorno, it assumes the "reified
form of mathematics, machine, and organisation," confirming
the degree to which thinking
"avenges itself" on the persons
who comprise modern society and culture.- indeed, in
that the Enlightenment took "everything unique and
individual under its tutelage, it left the uncomprehended
whole the freedom, as domination, to strike back at human
existence and consciousness by way of things.'— To
lsion a manner of thinking beyond instrumental reason,
beyond the. empirical objectification of nature-including
one's own subjective self-is thus unfathomable. Adorno
refers to such thinking as "the oppressor's fortress," a
narrow domain in "which even revolutionary imagination
despises itself as utopism and decays to the condition of
pliable trust in the objective tendency of history ." 120
Its architecture shields man and reason from irrationality.
Yet, by shielding both, Enlightenment thinking obstructs the
view of the world beyond the fortress, beyond the clutches
of instrumental reason.
Judging from Adorno's Dialectic of Enl i ahi-pnmpnf
modern society appears to leave little--if any-
-critical
space within which persons might theorize against
instrumental reason. This is evident in his notion of the
culture industry," which reflects the subordination of "all
areas of intellectual creation" to the "same end" of
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Zweckrationali tat
. If demonscraces how thinking aspires
a cultural uniformity that, not only affirms the consequent
commodity of reason, but soothes the persons who make
themselves numb within the bourgeois system of commodity
capitalism.
"What is decisive today," notes Adorno, "is the
necessity inherent in the system not to leave the customer
alone, not for a moment to allow him any suspicion that
resistance is possible."- The confines of society become
increasingly rigid and narrow given the absence of
theoretical prospects that provide a countervailing force
against the "totality" of the culture industry. However, I
think the extent to which Adorno posits this "totality" on a
human duty to the "same end" marks the limit of his own
thinking in Dialectic of Enlightenment. if Enlightenment
thinking obviates critical resistance, if it "dictates" that
man's "needs should be so predetermined that he feels
himself to be the eternal consumer,"— then Adorno's
project can only follow one of two paths. His project
manifests itself either as a critique of Enlightenment,
which m turn possibly foils the claim of "totality," or as
another entertaining product of the culture industry, which
nullifies its critical impact. In either case, the force of
Adorno's project appears constrained by its own theoretical
designs
.
If there is an effective force behind Adorno's
theoretical approach, it appears in his critique of modern
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science. He outlines this particular task in Minima
Moralia, a series o£ aphorisms through which he formulates a
notion of "dialectical thought." it constitutes his
critical charge against what he believes to be the most
perilous repercussion of the Enlightenment: the reified
thinking of scientific positivism. Like the Dialeptic^f
Enliqhtenment
, Adorno's task in Minimajoi^ involves a
critique of instrumental reason as it reflects, not only the
uniformity of human subjectivity, but the scientific
objectification of human experience. This latter trait, by
which a "hardened plaster-cast of events take the place of
events themselves," represents Adorno's understanding of
reification. Reification signifies the positivist tendency
of modern science, a tendency that exalts the empirical
design of objects as the genuine embodiment of human
subjectivity. Countering this naive and dehumanizing drift,
Adorno rejects not only "the last traces of a deductive
system, together with the last advocatory gestures of
thought. Dialectical thought opposes reification in the
further sense that it refuses to affirm individual things in
their isolation and separateness: it designates isolation as
precisely a product of the universal ." 123 Accordingly,
Adorno theorizes a "dialectical" perception of the world
that thinks against the modern reified mind, which, he says,
"pays for its absolute judgements by loss of the experience
of the matter judged ." 124
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in this way Adorno stresses the chief shortcoming of
positivism and reification: the lack of "distance" between
thinking subjects and empirical objects. He locates this
shortcoming in the false transparency between human
experience and methodological representations. As a
theorist, Adorno struggles to think against this
instrumental muddying of the philosophical waters, so to
speak, advocating an infusion of critical "gaps" between
subjects and objects. The "value of thought," he states,
highlighting the flaws of reification, "is objectively
devalued as this distance is reduced; the more it
approximates to the preexisting standard, the further its
antithetical function is diminished . »“» Thus, for Adorno,
locating the gaps that exhibit the differences between
diverse subjects and empirical objects, represents an
integral element of the "dialectical" enterprise. Contrary
to the "totality" toward which positivism and reification
lean, Adorno contends that "knowledge comes to us through a
network of prejudices, opinions, innervation, self-
corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations ." 126
Equally important, it comes to us "through the dense,
firmly- founded but by no means uniformly transparent medium
of experience .
"
12 If there is a way to resist the
totality" of Enlightenment thinking, to resist reified
thinking, it occurs through the act of theorizing the
oppositional distinctions between subjects and objects.
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Dialectical thought symbolizes Adorno's attempt to
counteract the expansion of reified thinking with increasing
degrees of theoretical distance.- indeed, his notion of
critical theory postulates a degree of dissonance between
thinking and the facts that correspond to it. According to
Adorno, thought "relates to facts and moves by criticizing
them, its movement depends no less on the maintenance of
distance. it expresses exactly what is, precisely because
what is never quite as thought expresses it.— The
enterprise of critical theory finds its most provocative
voice in revealing the philosophical limits of the culture
industry and the quests for reification that nurture its
totality. As a consequence of this enterprise, Adorno
reveals a distinct theoretical approach to thinking and
being in the modern world. "Distance is not a safety-zone,"
he cautions, "but a field of tension," a place "to prove, by
criticism of knowledge, the impossibility of a coincidence
between the idea and what fulfills it ." 130 in Minima
Moralia, Adorno's critical task seeks to reject outright the
totalizing aims of reified thought, countering it with a
theory that differentiates the absolute yet fragile bounds
of the culture industry. He seeks to theorize not only a
view different from that of modernity's reach for totality,
but a way of thinking that relates to totality from an
oppositional locality.
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appear in a
The consequences of this distance do not
simple Cartesian divide between thinking subjects and
P rical objects. They appear, according to Adorno, in the
critical space that rejects the totality of reified thought.
Within this space, critical thinkers do not theorize
alternative or utopian paths to Enlightenment thinking and
the culture industry. Rather, they theorize in ways "that
displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its
rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will
appear one day in the messianic light."'” However, Adorno
is well aware of the obstacles facing the theorist who
chooses to inhabit this space. In fact, he declares that a
"dialectic" approach to theorizing "is also the utterly
impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint
removed, even though by a hair's breadth, from the scope of
existence ." 132 Hence, Adorno's theory of dialectics
confronts something other than a totalizing culture
industry, the aim of which nullifies theoretical strategies
of resistance. It also encounters a distance that, despite
its pledge of a fruitful clash between theory and practice,
still situates dialectical thinking within reach of the
culture industry. Therefore all thought, even Adorno's
dialectics, appears "marked... by the same distortion and
which it seeks to escape. 1,133 Given this
postulate of "distance, " I think it is again evident that
Adorno's quest to circumvent the practical reach of
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Enlightenment thinking fails to evade its fundamentally
invasive drift. If Adorno hopes to promote a critical
theory at odds with the culture industry, he must rethink
the "gaps" between such differing environs.
His rejoinder to this theoretical inadequacy assumes
its most definite shape in Negative Dialectic »« m this
work Adorno delineates a problem that encompasses more than
the reification of philosophical thought--!
.e.
,
the troubled
bond between theory and practice. Adorno presumes that
philosophy has "broken its pledge to be as one with reality
or at the point of realization," rendering its new task as
one that would "inquire whether and how there can still be a
philosophy at all." 135 Based on this presumption, which he
derives m part from the "historical" ruins of 20th-century
fascism, capitalism, and Soviet Marxism, Adorno confirms the
subservient relation of theory to practice. 136 "The call
for unity of theory and practice," he repeats, "has
irresistibly degraded theory to a servant's role, removing
the very traits it should have brought to that unity." 137
The critical force of theory has been sacrificed for the
sake of solidifying, say, claims to racial, ideological, or
methodological superiority. It diminishes theory's capacity
to countervail the ambitions of practice. In turn, Adorno
renews his charge that practice is "nonconceptual ,
"
given
that it lacks the critical distance by which to perceive
distinctions between theory and practice, thus becoming what
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As a.
he calls "the prey of power " ao __consequence, he proposes
to explore the idea of a "constellation in science," such
it holds in an ever- changing oppositional bond both
critical theory and rational practice. "This is why,"
Adorno declares, "theory is legitimate and why it i 8
’
hated
.
" 138
Dialectic of Enlightenment and Minima Moral i
^
Adorno inscribes dialectics with the task of theorizing
against the reified concepts of the culture industry, even
though this totality tends to obviate such resistance. With
Negative Dialectic s, however, Adorno modifies the same task
With a specific notion of theoretical constellations. In
order to reinvigorate the critical force of theory, Adorno
does not detach it entirely from practice, nor does he seeks
to conflate each endeavor. Instead, he hopes to restore the
tension between theory and practice by exploring thought in
terms of constellations, "a knowledge mindful of the
historic positional value of the object in its relation to
other objects ." 339 They represent Adorno's attempt to
theorize beyond the rational concept reflected in the
couplet of a thinking subject and an empirical object, to
render both susceptible to more than one single
interpretation. In doing so, he turns "to a scholar of so
positivistic a bent as Max Weber, who did ... understand
ideal types' as aids in approaching the object, devoid of
any inherent substantiality and capable of being reliquified
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at will.- Drawing on weber , s not . on q£ „,. deai types(n
for the social and cultural sciences, Adorno claims he has
found a way of thinking "beyond the alternative of
positivism and idealism." indeed, he contends that "a close
look" at Weber' s ideal types "win show that these... are not
mere conceptual fixations. Rather, by gathering concepts
round the central one that is sought, they attempt to
sxpre s s what that conrpnt nt- ,cep aims at, not to circumscribe it to
operative ends.— m this way, constellations transform
thinking from a technical instrument into a valued end,
whereby the pursuit of totality encounters theoretical
scrutiny
.
The impact of thinking through constellations manifests
itself in something more than a trace of subjectivity in
otherwise wholly reified objects. it appears in the form of
a contradiction, such that it frustrates the Enlightenment's
rationally practical reach for a totalizing identity. By
theorizing constellations, Adorno points to the possibility
of thinking as something other than a conceptual validation
of instrumental reason, something other than an absolute
transparency between thinking subjects and empirical
objects. He wants to emphasize "that objects do not go into
their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come
to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy ... the fact
that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived ." 142
Adorno s approach to constellations thus reveals a type of
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theoretical practice that, contrary to the totalizing
Identity of the culture industry, fixates on the fruitful
contingencies of contradiction.
"Contradiction is," Adorno
states, "nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the
dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes
the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity." Put
simply, lt provides the theorist not so much a particular
perspective but a field of possibilities that defy any
overture toward totality. Such contradictions, which derive
from a constellation, promise that "the heterogeneous
collides with its limit," allowing for a type of thought
that "exceeds itself ." 143
The underlying ambition of Negative Dial ort- ire
surfaces, therefore, in Adorno's affirmation of theoretical
prospects in the increasingly narrow design of the culture
industry. Furthermore, the strength of this work is not so
much Adorno's vexing diagnosis of modern philosophical
thinking. Nor does it stem from his resuscitation of
Weber's theory of ideal types, a thinker whom Adorno links
to the Enlightenment's legacy of scientific positivism.
Instead, I think the strength of Negative Dialectics is
Adorno s belief that even though we may theorize in a
critical manner, "the words we use will remain concepts.
Their precision substitutes for the thing itself, without
quite bringing its selfhood to mind; there is a gap between
words and the thing they conjure ." 144 Yet, the very
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strength that corresponds to Adorno's theory of
"constellations" also mirrors a srgnifreant flaw. It
indicates a flaw, I be i leve, in that constellations
presuppose not only the totality of the culture industry,
but a strict divide between subjects and objects, theory and
practice
. Like Weber's theory of ideal types, Adorno's idea
of constellations maintain an insightful tension that
countervails any overture toward ideological and practical
absolutism. Unlike Weh^-r u
' hough, who at most sought to
contest the one-sided views of historical materialism and
scientific positivism, Adorno seeks to contest a monolithic
mind-set which encompasses all views. Thus, constellations
may reveal the possible margins of Enlightenment thinking,
but in turn they cannot avoid its certain assault against
the design of constellations.
I would also argue that the critical distance between
subjective expression and objective representation
represents another weakness in Adorno's project. it does so
by the fact that "negative dialectics" employs the promise
of possibility" to betray "a gap between words and the
thing they conjure ." 145 The very "possibility" of negative
dialectics confirms, therefore, not just a challenge to the
reifed grasp of the culture industry, but, more important,
the dispersion of Adorno's postulate of "totality." in this
way, Adorno finds himself in a theoretical bind. If Adorno
presupposes the totalizing reach of Enlightenment thinking,
346
then he risks nullifying the critical force of negative
dialectics
. if he invests critical theory with a forceful
element, an element indicative of constellations, then he
risks dispelling the very totality that spurs negative
dialectics m the first place. The other "possibility" lies
between the totality of Enlightenment thinking and the force
of negative dialectics, a prospect that compels theorists to
question the presupposition of totality and the hope of
negative dialectics. This prospect confirms, not so much
the limit of Adorno's theory of negative dialectics, but its
confinement to the practice of theory, thus revealing the
subversion of his own philosophical enterprise.
The Contemporary Purpose of Political Theory
If Max Weber's theoretical corpus underscores anything
about political thinking, it is that the rift between theory
and practice remains an onerous obstacle for contemporary
political theorists. It is evident in Adorno's idea of
"dialectics," such that his desire to think against
practical reason leaves him lacking either a "totality" to
critique or a "critical theory" by which to resist it. Even
Habermas, who seeks to mend the rift between theory and
practice with "communicative reason, " confronts a barrier by
anchoring theory to the practical cause of
intersubjectivity." Finally, Foucault confronts an
obstacle insofar as his theory of a "critical ontology"
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tends to unsettlp not- <-v,^S
' n0t Che Practlce of politics per se
, but
the practice of contemporary political theory. m each
case, the divide between political theory and political
practice remains intact
.
146
It is important to note, I think, that this divide
spurs significant tensions in the work of Weber, Adorno,
Habermas, and Foucault, tensions that reveal quite divergent
views of political practice and theory. I have argued,
furthermore, that such tensions do not diminish the
political force of contemporary theory, nor do they invite
the theorist into the practical routines of politics.
Instead, I believe they provide insight to theorists who
seek to rethink the critical purpose of contemporary
political theory
.
147 These insights appear in such
scholarly ethics as Weber's appeal to "'inconvenient'
facts," Foucault's request for "permanent provocation,"
Adorno's search for a "field of tension," and even
Habermas's request for "a valid agreement." Given these
insights, I would contend that the purpose of contemporary
political theory is not so much to theorize a new type of
political practice, nor to politicize the traditional
enterprise, of political theory. Rather, in light of the
vexing rift between theory and practice, I perceive the
critical purpose of contemporary political theory to be
primarily an instructive one . 148 By instructive I mean
that a theory of politics allows a theorists to challenge
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politicalthe very value of nr-ao*- •lce
, inciting a discussion
between theorists and others that drsrupts the meaning of
politics in theory as well as practice. Consequently, I
contend that this sort of instruction divulges a theorist's
particular approach to politics, scholarship, and ethics, an
approach that engenders varied political implications.
The enterprise of contemporary political theory appears
most provocative when an idea of politics confronts the
empirical weight of political practice. This challenge is,
I believe, the hallmark of Max Weber's theoretical
enterprise. it is evident in that he insists on
postulating a theory of politirc; a-; . ny P lti s that directly opposes the
given political landscape of Wilhelmine Germany. This
oppositional proclivity is apparent at the outset of his
theoretical endeavors, when, in his 1895 Freiburg address,
he situates himself between Germany's provincial past and
its idealized future. He rejects both the Prussian Junker's
view of a "patriarchal" politics and the German
proletariat's reach toward a "classless" politics. In fact,
Weber even rebukes those growing voices who advocate the
political project of liberal democracy, claiming that "the
vital interests of the nation take precedence even over
democracy or parliamentary rule." 150 Yet, he still
underscores the necessity of democratic institutions, though
he theorizes their design as an instrument of national power
rather than a goal that might rival the German nation. Thus
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Weber concedes that "if parliament were to fail and, as a
result, the old system were to return, the consequences
would be far-reaching indeed."-* Given this difficult
position between Germany's dying traditions and its
fledgling reach toward the future, Weber's theory of
politics provides more than an alternative to each political
camp. it offers itself up as a force that unsettles the
standard concepts of politics in Wilhelmine Germany.
In terms of Weber's theoretical successors, the more
sanguine approach to theorizing comes from the work of
Habermas. Indeed, he seeks to defy the instrumental drift
modern society and politics with a pluralistic notion of
communicative action. His theoretical opposition to
politics is more subtle than Weber's, a theorist who clearly
and publicly articulates a notion of politics at odds with
the historical drift toward liberal-democratic axioms. In
theorizing a notion of communicative action, Habermas
indirectly questions something other than the modern
institutional design of liberal
-democratic politics. He
contests the philosophical postulates of a technically
rational subjectivity, postulates that support such a
contemporary political design. 15 * He claims that
communicative reason does not simply encounter ready-made
subjects and systems" which are the central tenets of
liberal politics. Rather, he continues, "it takes part in
structuring what is to be preserved, " thus challenging
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liberal
-democratic politics to entaace a more fluid and
participatory design. His project, though, still tends
to reach beyond the past and present limits of contemporary
politics to embrace a utopian politics in which individual
subjects strive for shared understandings rather than
partisan differences. Ultimately, he seeks a notion of
"subjectivity" that "resists the denaturing of the self for
the sake of self-preservation.
. .a symbolically structured
lifeworld that is constituted in the interpretative
^.ccompl i shment s of its rnpmhprc: 3r,HLb membe s and only reproduced through
communication
.
1164 For this reason, Habermas's theoretical
project of politics defies contemporary approaches to
politics, not by critiquing them directly, but by reaching
beyond them toward some utopian future
.
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Michel Foucault's theoretical approach to politics is
more intricate than Weber's and clearly more provocative
than Habermas's. Indeed, Foucault's idea of power disputes
the notion of a centralized or even disengaged agency,
positing instead a provisional one in which various foes
contest one another's schemes of domination
.
156 Contrary
to many contemporary forms of politics, which either affirm
the state as the epitome of power or diagnose the citizen as
a victim of it, Foucault envisions a politics in which those
very forms constitute the source of conflict. He notes that
'every intensification, every extension of power relations
to make the insubordinate submit can only result in the
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limits of power. 1,157 Yet this notion of decentralized
power, I believe, is limited by something more than the
ambiguities and vagaries of Foucault's lexicon. it is also
limited by a subtle affinity with traditional notions of
liberal democratic politics.- This is evident insofar as
he declares that "between a relationship of power and a
strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a
perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal. At every moment
the relationship of power may become a confrontation between
two adversaries.— Clearly, Foucault's theory of
politics compels us to rethink the empirical designs of our
contemporary commitment to liberal
-democratic political
institutions. The more important question is, however,
whether a return to past notions of political "agonism" can
bear fruit for contemporary politics rather than just for
those persons who engage in the shifting discourses of
political theory.
The often obscure theoretical endeavors of Adorno
nevertheless clearly divulge, I believe, the principal
theoretical challenge to the contemporary practice of
politics. Like Weber in many ways, Adorno is honest enough
to see the naive ambitions of a utopian design of politics,
as well as the desperate turn toward the past for
romanticized ideals of an agonistic democracy. His chief
target is the politics of the present. His approach to
politics "considers actual or imagined differences as
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stigmas indicating that not enough has yet been done; that
something has still been left outside its machinery, not
quite determined by its totality."- This is not to say
that his theoretical task, his dialectical opposition to the
present state of politics, epitomizes the critical force of
political theory. indeed, an explicit theory of politics is
absent from his understanding of critical theory. He simply
states that politics "should point to the bad equality of
today... and conceive the better state as one in which people
could be different without fear." lsl insofar as
"dialectical thought" maintains critical "gaps" between a
theory of politics and political practice, Adorno precludes
a return to the past and discounts a reach to the future by
struggling to remain in the present.
These contemporary acts of theorizing against politics
thus signify, not a political practice per se, but a
scholarly venture that potentially engenders political
consequences. Though he advances an idea of politics
against the totality of the culture industry, Adorno still
concedes that theorizing confronts an obstacle in the form
of reification. The very act of theorizing against the
totality of the culture industry presupposes elements of
thinking that stem from the Enlightenment underpinnings of
that peculiar totality. "When oppositional intellectuals
endeavor," he asserts, "to imagine a new content for
society, they are paralyzed by the form of their own
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consciousness, which is modelled in advance to suit their
needs of this society."*- The theorist's critical
engagement with the world thus comes with a significant
cost, one that reminds him or her of the distance between
theory and practice. In other words, critical thinking "has
forgotten how to think for itself, it has... become its own
watchdog. Thinking no longer means anything more than
checking at each moment whether one can indeed think."*-
The consequence of theory, therefore, not only underscores
the paradoxical limits of the theorist's scholarly practice,
but reveals at least one perspective on the theoretical edge
of contemporary politics. it provokes others to consider
whether a paradox or philosophical tension informs their own
interpretation of politics
.
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Max Weber also points to the sort of cultural closure
to which Adorno alludes. Unlike Adorno, though, Weber's
approach to theorizing presupposes a type of conscious
struggle which he ascribes to politics: Where the politician
struggles for power, the scholar struggles over the meaning
of theoretical concepts. The critical force of theorizing
thus concerns, not so much the practical conduct of, say,
politics, but the conceptual elements which inform,
perpetuate, and renew it. The scholar's practical domain
entails "the analytical rearrangement of the immediately
given reality, " a domain that necessarily mirrors a
constant tension with the new knowledge which we can and
354
desire to wrest from reality.— According to Weber,
however, the practice of the theorist remaxns distinct from
that of the politician; still, the repercussions of a
theoretical struggle allude to the practical "reality" of
politics. The scholar is after all integral to "a
continuous process passing from the attempt to order reality
analytically through the construction of concepts
... and the
reformulation anew of concepts on the foundations thus
transformed.— The practical direction of theory is thus
contrary to an idea of politics, and for that reason
constitutes a challenge to any practical notion of politics.
In many ways Habermas shares Weber's commitment to
scholarly conflict, but he rejects any notion of struggle
that, like Weber's, presupposes the primacy of sovereign
individuals. Indeed, Habermas rejects the philosophy of
consciousness he believes underlies modern notions of
subjectivity, and thus the growing rational disenchantment
with the contemporary world. For this reason, he claims
that theorists no longer need to be concerned with
explicating "the knowledge and mastery of an objective
nature. The more important theoretical inquiry concerns
theoretical clarification of "the intersubjectivity of
possible understanding and agreement -
-at both the
interpersonal and intrapsychic levels ." 167 The distinction
between Habermas and Weber becomes apparent insofar as
Habermas's theoretical reach for communicative action
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reflects, not a critical struggle, but a common
understanding among different persons. According to
Habermas,
"communicative actors move in the medium of a
natural language, draw upon culturally transmitted
interpretations, and relate simultaneously to something in
the one objective world, something in their common social
rid, and something in each's own subjective world ." 168
Hence, Habermas's theoretical project signifies the
possibility of a worldly engagement between theorists and
politicians, yet this engagement reveals no direct challenge
to the contemporary practice of politics. It precludes the
prospect of dissension for the sake of valid agreement.
Michel Foucault's theoretical charge against politics
corresponds in many ways to Weber's own scholarly
disposition. it does so by targeting, I think, not so much
the act of politics itself, but the ideas and values that
sustain such acts. In this way, Foucault also distinguishes
his project from that of Habermas's theoretical quest for
understanding, " which presupposes a shared rational
language rather than a discernment of marked differences.
Foucault does so, more specifically, when his theoretical
project reflects a critique, not of politics per se, but of
the knowledge that helps maintain the self-evident qualities
of a contemporary notion of political practice. "It's a
matter of shaking this self -evidence, " he declares, "of
demonstrating its precariousness, of making visible not its
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arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a
multiplicity of historical processes .-- 169 Again, his
approach to theory is primarily a scholarly one, but a
scholarly endeavor with a significant political consequence.
For Foucault seeks to unsettle the very meaning of politics
by "making visible a singularity at places where there is a
temptation to invoke a historical constant
... an obviousness
which imposes itself uniformly on all .-' 170 i n short, he
seeks to exploit the "breach of self
-evidence" underlying
the contemporary political practices we take for granted.
Therefore Foucault's "critical ontology," which thwarts the
epistemological uniformity of theorizing, represents a
critical force. It is forceful in that it vexes, not the
practice of politics, but the theorist who contends that
practice and theory represent either two distinct domains or
one ambiguous quest for power
.
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One significant consequence of contemporary political
thinking thus emerges, I believe, in an ethical disposition
that acts against the dominant approach to present-day
politics
.
172 It is also important to note that the ethical
posture of contemporary theory derives in part from the
theoretical distinction Weber makes between politics and
science. For Weber, this posture is not reflected in or
founded upon the daily practice of politics, where the
struggle between persons necessarily entails the use of
violence. The words of a politician, repeats Weber, "are
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not means of scientific analysis but means of canvassing
votes and winning over others
... they are swords against the
enemies: such words are weapons.'— However, the ethical
posture of the theorist denves, not from the confines of
science per se, but from the more fluid enterprise of
teaching. As a teacher, the theorist differentiates "that
it is one thing to state fact s ... while it is another thing
to answer questions of the value of culture and its
individual content and the question of how one should act in
the cultural community and in political association.—
It is thus important to note that Weber's approach to theory
entails more than a broad catalogue of ideas stretching from
the varying degrees of Herrschaft to the opposing
"vocations" of science and politics. His approach to theory
reveals, I believe, an ethical stance that provokes a
possible rethinking of what we as citizens take for granted
about the boundaries of political practice.
If there is one obstacle that defies the theorist's
ethical orientation it undoubtedly stems from Adorno's view
of the culture industry. The obstacle for Weber was clearly
what he perceived to be the sense of "disenchantment"
indicative of the "iron cage" of modern culture, a condition
whereby the likes of scholarship and politics remain
insulated within their own distinct spheres. According to
Adorno, however, the "culture industry" represents a broader
and more formidable obstacle than the "iron cage,"
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especially insofar as it negates the line between political
practice and theory. m other words, "the irreconcilable
elements of culture, art and distraction, are subordinated
to one end and subsumed under one false formula: the
totality of the culture industry."'” The ethical stance
of the critical theorist, therefore, manifests itself in his
or her capacity to undermine rather than simply establish
dominant perceptions of the contemporary world-
- including
politics. The theorist cannot expect to contest the culture
industry's "influence over the consumers" with an "outright
decree," an influence bolstered by the pleasurable allure of
"entertainment." Instead, according to Adorno, the theorist
must reveal "the hostility inherent in the principle of
entertainment to what is greater than itself ." 176 Clearly,
Adorno's critical enterprise and public act as a theorist
advocates an ethical stance that defines itself as
oppositional. The more important facet of this stance,
though, is not the practical struggle against the culture
industry, but the critique of thinking that spurs at least
the possibility of a dialogue of differences.
There is an ethical alternative to Adorno's dour view
of political theory's promise. That option manifests itself
m Habermas's "communicative" resistance against bourgeois
society's "self-conscious" philosophical impulse. The
ethical dimension of Habermas's theoretical project takes
shape, moreover, in relation to his ultimate ideal, in which
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a society of relatively autonomous persons who, through
critical dialogues, come to share understandable ends. This
IS Habermas's way of saying that the modern quest for "self-
preservation
... becomes dependent on the integrative
accomplishments of subjects who coordinate their action via
criticizable validity claims," 1” it is an ethical
disposition that recognizes the limits of instrumental
reason and the promise embodied in the communicative
ambitions of all persons, despite their differing ideals and
ambitions. As far as Habermas is concerned, it "reproduces
itself both through the media-controlled purposive-rational
actions of its members and through the common will anchored
m the communicative practice of all individuals." 1™ His
theoretical task thus represents an ethical approach to the
world, not for the purpose of advancing the struggle of
differing ideas, but for the sake of advancing the struggle
as a means to the end of a common understanding.
I believe there is another option, however, one that
diverges from Habermas's idealistic theoretical ambitions.
Indeed Foucault's idea of an ethos of contemporary
theorizing indicates a struggle that moves, not toward a
community of subjects, but the dissipation of subjectivity
altogether. Perhaps Foucault best articulates the theorist's
ethical disposition in a way that Weber, Habermas and Adorno
could not, in a way that clearly articulates the critical
perspective of the ethical theorist. "Maybe the target
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nowadays is not to discover what we are," he suggests, "but
to refuse what we are.— However, this ethical
disposition does not impact the theorist alone. Besides
spurring conflict within the identity of the individual
theorist, it encourages a prospective tension between
theorists and politicians. Thus, Foucault concludes, "the
political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our day
is not to try to liberate the individual from the state."
Rather, the more urgent task of the political theorist is
"to liberate us both from the state and from the type of
individualization which is linked to the state ." 180
Foucault's ethical stance as theorist, therefore, reminds us
that contemporary political theory is not about provoking a
news idea of politics. It is about provoking new ideas
about the self that result in rethinking how such selves
approach both political theory and the practice of politics.
The implication of this ethos of contemporary
theorizing manifests itself, I contend, not in a political
practice per se, but in an educational one that unsettles
the practical ambitions of citizens and politicians alike.
This instructive element is indicative of Adorno's critical
project insofar as it challenges political theorists not to
succumb to the simplistic oppositions that constitute the
sparse political practices of the culture industry. A
similar component can be found in Habermas's work, even
though he departs from Adorno's claims concerning the
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direction of "negative dialectics." indeed, if there is a
political consequence underlying Habermas's theoretics!
project, it is not one concerned with perpetuating a
dialogue of differences or a "field of tension." Its
instructional promise reveals, at best, the theorist's
complicity in the perpetuation of a political practice
premised on epistemological order as opposed to possibility.
For that matter, Foucault's project instructs theorists and
others about the "antagonistic reactions" that are integral
to a contemporary idea of politics, even a political
practice that denies the prospect of differing reactions.
I also believe each theorist reveals, therefore, an
instructive element that is integral to Weber's theoretical
enterprise, one that involves his push for a political
education of the German nation. He made this point quite
clear at the outset of his academic and, in many ways,
political career in the Freiburg address, in which he
advocates a particular type of political education. At the
end of his Freiburg address, Weber remarks that "there is no
more serious duty for each of us in our narrow spheres of
activity than to be aware of this task of contributing to
the political education of our nation ." 181 But more
importantly, what is central to his instructive tasks-
-both
early m his career and later-
-is a notion of education that
transforms people into something other than what they were
m the past or are in the present. "We shall not succeed in
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exorcising the curse that hangs over us," he declares
referring to the
"unpolitrcal spirit" of Wilhelmine Germany,
unless we drscover how to become something different: the
precursors of an even greater epoch. "*« Though Weber's
theoretical enterprise seehs to rnstruct the German nation,
rt nevertheless provides insight into a type of education,
t-hs focus of which i q -av-, js an idea and practice of politics that
is fundamentally contingent, contestable, and open to
multiple interpretations.
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5This point is made evident in Seyla Benhabib CritioueNgrm and Utopia
. Her basic claim, like many othe^ ^oristswho approach the history of the Frankfurt School, is Jha?lie accepting Weber' s diagnosis of the dynamics of societal
^
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'
they criticize this process fromthe standpoint of a non- instrumental paradigm of reason."ore important, however, Benhabib proceeds to demonstrate howthe eariy members of the Frankfurt School inevitably encounter3 amit in
_
that "this non- instrumental reason can no longer beanchored immanently in actuality and assumes an increasingly
utopian character," 163.
On Adorno's critique of scientific positivism seeMartin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1984)
,
.
who notes that, for Adorno, "positivism failed to
recognize the active, constitutive power of subjectivity in
creating the world.
. .and thus was complicitous with a passive,
contemplative politics which accepted the world as finished
reality, a 'second nature'," 58. Given this critique of
positivism, Adorno and his Frankfurt School colleagues sought
to theorize in various ways a countervailing force that might
emancipate modernity from such philosophical strictures. On
this point see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory:
Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1980) . "In order to sustain their critique of
positivism and positivist philosophy, " notes Held, "the
Frankfurt theorists had to elaborate their own notions of
'reason', ''objectivity' and 'truth'," 174.
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-' Susan Buck-Morss
,
The Origin of Ne^HvoDialectics
. "The fact of the matter is," she says "thatAdorno's talk of the mediation between intellectual praxis andpolitical praxis remained abstract and vague, with noexplication of. the social medium which might serve as aconduit for this mediation, once the role of the Party was
rejected," 42. For a differing view of this claim concerningAdorno's detachment from political practice, see Gillian Rose,The Melancholy Science
. Rose's contention is that cries for
social and political action on the part of critical theorists,
especially Adorno, only perpetuates the "social reality of
advanced capitalist society." The trick for Adorno, notes
Rose, is not to fall prey to a theory which supports such a
society with prescriptions and remedies. Rather, Adorno's
melancholy science is not resigned, quiescent or
pessimistic .. .His 'morality' is a praxis of thought not a
recipe for social and political action," 148.
““Concerning the problematic dimensions of Adorno's
critical approach to "totality, " see Fredric Jameson, Late
Marxism (New York: Verso, 1996) . It is Jameson's claim that
Adorno "retains the concept of the system and even makes it,
as target and object of critique, the very center of his own
ant i
- systematic thinking. However, the critical purpose of
postulating this totalizing system of capitalism is to remind
us "of our imprisonment within system, the forgetfulness or
repression of which binds us all the more strongly to it, in
ways reminiscent of the illusions of identity, with which it
is of course in one sense virtually synonymous," 27.
According to Jameson, therefore, Adorno destines modernity and
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1180n Adorno's j.^au±un, bee
Martin Jay, Adorno (Carnbridge
,
MA: Harvard University Press,
1984) . Jay clarifies the philosophical tradition from which
Adorno derives his particular critique, a tradition thatincludes departures from the critical theories of Marx and
Lukacs
. "Although at times in his own work an apparently
Lukacsian usage did appear, " says Jay, "reification for Adorno
was not equivalent to the alienated objectification of
subjectivity, the reduction of a fluid process into a thing.
Instead, and here Adorno's debt to Nietzsche on the origin of
exchange was particularly evident, reification, when he used
it in a pejorative sense, meant the suppression of
heterogeneity in the name of identity," 68.
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One source, of these critical "gaps" and degrees ofistance seems linked to Adorno's rejection of Hegel's reachtoward phrlosophica! totality. On this subject 9 see SavidHeid,, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas
( erkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
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134F°r a rich discussion concerning Adorno's desire "tokeep criticism alive" by way of "negative anthropology, " see
Susan Buck-Morss
,
The Origin of Negative Dialectics (New York:
The Free Press, 1977) . Buck-Morss clarifies the degree to
which Adorno understood how the consequence of theorizing
often ran "the risk of reproducing the commodity structure
within consciousness.
. .The purpose of what in Adorno's case
could be called 'antitheories' was to avoid such conformism at
all costs
,
" 186 .
135Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics
, trans. E. B.
Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 3-4. Hereafter referred
to as ND
.
136Concerning this point in the work of Adorno and other
early members of the Frankfurt School, see Martin Jay, The
Dialectical Imagination
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" 43
. My only reservation about Ball ' s projectof conceptual theory" is that maybe the purpose of theory isnot necessarily comprehension, which presupposes a reachtoward epistemological order, but also the cultivation ofcontingency which makes all claims prone to difference
contestability, and ultimately a shifting dialogue on themeaning of theory and politics.
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What comes to mind is the work of William E. Connolly
Identity\Dif ference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press'1991) . in particular, I think of Connolly's tenacious desireto acknowledge [the paradox of difference] and to convert itinto a politics of the paradoxical, into a conception of thepolitical as the medium through which the interdependent
antinomies of identity and difference can be expressed and
contested." One ought to pause, however, when Connolly
underscores the direction of this "politics of the
paradoxical," since he associates it with "liberalism, an
alternative, militant liberalism both indebted to and
competitive with other liberalisms and nonliberalisms
contending for presence in late-modern life," 92-94. For this
reason, we can see his attempt to rethink the monolithic
discourse of liberalism from a different, more decentralized
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“With regard to how Habermas in particular and
"communicative ethics" in general spur a challenge to
contemporary politics and philosophy, see Seyla Benhabib,
"Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical
Philosophy" in The Communicative Ethics Controversy
, eds
.
Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1990), 330-369. The task of such thinkers, says
Benhabib, "is concerned with the unmasking of such mechanisms
of continuing political ideology and cultural hegemony.
. .The
emphasis now is less on rational agreement
,
but more on
sustaining. those normative relationships within which reasoned
agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue, " 340-
346
.
Hence the Habermasian communicative approach confronts
the limits of political rationality by infusing society and
politics with "normative" conditions that mandate reason
without succumbing to the amoralism of technical rationality,
which is increasingly the hallmark of advanced liberal
democratic societies. However, my main point of contention
with this perspective is not the distinction drawn between
380
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Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: EmpiricalInsights and Normative Confusions" in Praxis Internationa l 3(1981): 272-287. Contrary to Fraser^ Lois McNay finds
oucault s theory of power not only easy to categorize but
'essentially positive " in that it rejects modern "uni-directional and repressive" notions of power. "Repression is
not the paradigmatic form of power," she states; "it is only
one in a multiplicity of positive and negative effects
generated through the interplay of power relations . " See Lois
McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (New York: Continuum,
1994), 90-91. In addition to this affirmative notion of
power, McNay nevertheless rightfully contends that "Foucault's
work finishes in an unresolved contradiction between a view of
social relations as fragmented and contestable and a vision of
a totally administered society," 111.
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1580n the "liberal" element in Foucault's political
thinking, I direct the reader to Jon Simon, Foucault and the
Political tLondon: Routledge, 1995), who questions whether "a
liberal democratic polity is implicit in Foucault's political
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ntroduction" in Foucault and Political Reason ed. AndrewBarry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (Chicaqo- TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1996). They characterizeFoucault's approach to liberalsm "not so much as a substantivedoctrine or practice of government in itself, but as a
restless and dissatisfied ethos of recurrent critique of State
reason and politics.
. .Hence liberalism is not about governingless but about the continual injunction that politicians and
rulers should govern cautiously, delicately, economically
modestly," 8. 7
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164Such provocations are integral to the recent work of
William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1995) . According to Connolly,
the central theoretical project of this text concerns his idea
of a "politics of enactment," which "involves the struggle to
cross both of these boundaries together- -the barrier posed by
the resistance of disrupted identities and that posed by
difficulty- the movement faces in clearing sufficient
institutional space to articulate a positive identity, " 183
.
In other words, such a politics requires a simultaneous
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CONCLUSION
The chief purpose of this dissertation has been to
rethink the intricate bond between morality and politics in
Max Weber s political thinking. I demonstrate how Weber's
moral ambition of German national glory constrains his
theory of politics m a way that depletes the prospect of
the very human struggle which begets such glory. i also
confirm the degree to which his notions of vocational and
parliamentary politics transgress the moral design of the
German nation. Accordingly, this study underscores an
ethical paradox in Weber's political thinking, one that
entraps the politician and the political theorist within the
ambiguous interchange of political means and moral end. In
addition to this ethical tumult, I analyze how a contending
moral ambition manifests itself in Max Weber's theory of
science, one which compels the scholar toward "clarity."
This becomes evident since "clarity," which necessitates
critical distinctions between human values, technical means
and corresponding consequences, exposes the ethical limits
not only of the politician in Weber's theory of politics,
but of Max Weber himself, the political theorist. Finally,
I conclude with an inquiry into Max Weber's place within the
project of contemporary political theory, claiming that his
political thinking inspires us, not to theorize a type of
politics, but to theorize against all conceptions of
politics
-- theoretical or practical.
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Another aim of this project has been to provide the
vast field of Weber studies with a differing interpretation
of his political thinking. This is evident, in that my
project did not simply establish a moral unity,
indifference, or ambiguity in Max Weber's political
thinking, positions which comprise both traditional and more
contemporary views of his work. Unlike Mommsen's fix on the
nation, Hennis's reach for the "'central question'" of
"Menschentum, " Owen's detection of a "genealogical"
enterprise or Breiner's perception of the "impartiality"
problematic, I have done more than mark a moral quest in
Weber's theoretical project of politics. Indeed I have
turned Weber's varied moral ambitions against each other.
As a consequence, I have portrayed Weber not so much as a
nationalist, moralist or even a potential democrat, but as a
political theorist whose moral quest for national glory
worked at cross-purposes with his moral aim of scientific
clarity. Thus, by turning Weber against himself, I have
confirmed how his quest for clarity undercuts his quest for
German glory, revealing the extent to which his scholarly
enterprise' unknowingly perpetuates that which his theory of
politics constrains: the prospect of human struggle. In
short, I have underscored the political promise, not of
Weber's theory of politics, but of his approach to modern
scholarship- -an interpretation that clearly broadens our
approach to Weber's political thinking.
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purpose of thisThis brings me to the third
dissertation, which has been to augment the enterprise of
contemporary political theory with a differing approach to
Weber's political thinking. I am not interested in
contesting the Straussian view of Weber as an instigator of
nihilism, for I charge that Weber's political thinking
posits the "ethical irrationality" of the modern world for
the sake of nurturing difference, not indifference. Nor has
it been my task to situate Weber within the Parsonian
concern for the "methodological" value of "' ideal
-types'
,
"
value- freedom" or " Verstehen, " since I stress primarily the
political importance of Weber's theory of science. Finally,
it has not been the purpose of this study to place Weber in
the pantheon of modern "liberal" thinkers, given that I
underscore, both his relatively anti-liberal idea of politics
and his contestable notion of individual subjectivity that
informs his theory of science. Rather, my project seeks to
locate Max Weber's political thinking within the legacy of
critical theory, such that it informs as well as reforms
Habermas's "communicative ethic," Foucault's "critical
ontology" and Adorno's "negative dialectics." As a result,
I have maintained that contemporary theory can glean from
Weber's flaws an instructive impulse to turn theory, not
against itself, but against politics. The limits of Weber's
political thinking aid us in perpetuating a dialogue that
unsettles our differing perceptions of politics.
387
Finally, in a more circuitous way, my purpose has been
to challenge the field of political science to rethink both
Max Weber's theoretical contributions and our contemporary
perceptions of politics. If we have understood Weber to be
a scholar trapped by an ethical paradox, and if we have
perceived him to be one whose immanent tensions impart a
cautionary approach to the future, then thinkers of all
stripes have reason to turn toward Weber. Political
scientists have often turned toward Max Weber, relying on
his theories of "legitimacy" in comparative politics, his
idea of " Machtpolitik" in international relations, and his
studies of "bureaucracy" in American politics and public
administration. Yet, I further suggest in this dissertation
that Weber's political thinking can provide us with far more
than structural, methodological, or theoretical avenues by
which to extend our scholarly enterprises. I note the
degree to which his political thinking provides us with a
way of looking at politics relative to our scholarly
ambitions, a perception that accents the critical divide
between scholarship and political. I have not prescribed
this tension in Weber's scholarship as a remedy for the
contemporary ills that plague the academic study of
politics. At most, I have merely hinted that it affords
future scholars insight into the possibility of seeing
politics in a way that is unlike the view we often take for
granted as the theoretical and practical standard.
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